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ABSTRACT 
 
ASHLEY CARSE: Transportation Environments:  
The Politics, Ecology, and Infrastructure of the Panama Canal 
(Under the direction of Peter Redfield and Carole Crumley) 
Many of us think of the Panama Canal as an excavated channel between the 
Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean that was finished nearly a century ago.  Open nearly 
any historical work on the canal and you will read about a monumental engineering 
project completed in 1914 by virtue of political will, technological innovation, and 
migrant labor.  The protagonists of these accounts – typically politicians, engineers, and 
thousands of laborers – overcame significant obstacles and united the oceans, fulfilling a 
colonial dream of interoceanic transit and cementing a modern vision of global 
connection.  I argue that this narrative, which might be called the “big ditch” story, is not 
inaccurate, but is too restrictive.  This is to say that a focus on historical excavation elides 
the ongoing political, ecological, and infrastructural work across the region around the 
waterway that makes interoceanic transportation possible.  My dissertation, which draws 
on ethnographic fieldwork and archival research conducted in Panama and the United 
States, reveals a constantly changing canal in which concrete and steel forms are bound 
up with water, soil, forests, and social life.  This built environment is highly politicized, 
given shape through the diverse, sometimes oppositional projects that have been pursued 
by United States and Panamanian state institutions, capitalists, scientists, and people 
whose livelihoods depend directly on the land.  The four main body chapters of the 
dissertation each examine a different aspect of changing political, ecological, and 
infrastructural relationships around the Panama Canal.  Each chapter focuses on an object 
iv 
(water, bananas, concrete, and forests) and a related theme (control/excess, 
governance/margins, politics/mobility, nature/infrastructure).  Through these case studies, 
I develop an analytical framework that I call the political ecology of infrastructure.   
 
v 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Panama Canal is a critical international trade route and pathway for global 
commerce.  Yet, despite the critical transportation services that the waterway provides, 
most accounts focus on the heroic tale of its construction.
1
  Consequently, many of us 
imagine the Panama Canal as an excavated channel between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans that was finished nearly a century ago.  Open nearly any historical work on the 
canal and you will read of a monumental engineering project completed in 1914 by virtue 
of American political will, technological innovation, and migrant labor.  The protagonists 
of these accounts – politicians, engineers, and thousands of laborers – overcame obstacles 
and united the oceans, fulfilling an old colonial dream of interoceanic transit and a 
modern vision of global connection.  This narrative – let’s call it the “big ditch” story – is 
not inaccurate, but it is too restrictive in spatial, temporal, and ecological terms.   
 
 My dissertation reveals a different Panama Canal: a work in progress where 
concrete and steel forms are bound up with water, soil, and forests.  This carefully 
managed environment is also politicized, given shape through the diverse, sometimes 
oppositional projects pursued by US and Panamanian state institutions, capitalists, 
                                                        
1The public’s continued fascination with the construction of the Panama Canal is illustrated by the 
significant attention received by Julie Greene’s The Canal Builders (2009) and Matthew Parker’s Panama 
Fever: The Battle to Build the Canal (2007, both reviewed widely in the English-language media. 
 2 
scientists, and smallholder agriculturalists.  The dissertation, a historical ethnography of 
canal landscapes, is a work of environmental anthropology in dialogue with human 
geography, environmental history, and science and technology studies.  I draw on data 
collected through ethnographic research in Panama and archival research in the US and 
Panama to examine how diverse groups have lived, worked, and made sense of this built 
environment.  Therefore, the dissertation is largely narrated by people who have known 
these landscapes most intimately – campesino farmers, state functionaries, and natural 
scientists, to name a few – and also by people who have acted upon them at a distance.  
 
 As my emphasis on infrastructure and ecology suggests, the protagonists here are 
not exclusively human.  This move reflects the environmental tradition in anthropology, 
engages a recent ontological turn in social theory,
2
 and reflects my research findings.  In 
interviews and archival documents, people consistently describe canal landscapes in 
active terms: that is, as ecologies with the potential to exceed human control.  Through a 
political-ecological and infrastructural analysis of the relationships between the Panama 
Canal and its hinterlands, my research explores the organization of transportation 
environments in general and examines what everyday life is like for people living at the 
margins of large technical systems.  Three main questions have guided my research and 
writing: 1) What projects of technical, political, and ecological reorganization have been 
implemented at a regional scale to facilitate transportation across Panama?  2) What new 
connections between humans and environments in Panama have been enabled through 
transportation infrastructure?  3) What existing connections have been disrupted? 
                                                        
2
Escobar 2007. 
 3 
WHY IS THE PANAMA CANAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL? 
The Panama Canal seems, at first, like strange ground for anthropology: too large, 
too technical, and insufficiently human.  But the themes that run through the dissertation 
– environment, technology, and development – have been persistent, if unstable, 
anthropological concerns.  As an object, then, the canal allows us to reflect on the 
changing theoretical relationships among these themes in the discipline.  Consider, for 
example, the research programs of mid-to-late-twentieth century cultural ecology and 
ecological anthropology.  Inspired by and writing against the legacy of Julian Steward, 
these scientific anthropologies focused on subsistence systems in small, rural, and often 
indigenous communities in the pursuit of generalizable rules about how societies adapt to 
their environments.  Steward’s cultural ecology posited a relationship between the 
environment, exploitative technology, and the forms of social organization necessary to 
bring technologies to bear on the environment.  More specifically, the social organization 
of labor (the “cultural core”), shaped by available technologies, was understood to be the 
axis on which the nature-culture relationship turned.
3
  For example, Steward argued that 
the Western Shoshone were distributed across the landscape in clusters of nuclear 
families because they occupied a resource-poor environment, their exploitative 
technology “was of the simplest sort known” (bows, digging sticks, stone-flake knives, 
etc.), and their labor was organized around hunting and gathering.  The group’s cultural 
features and social organization were considered adaptations to exploitable resources.
4
   
 
The heuristic utility of cultural-ecological models held so long as the scale of 
                                                        
3The first step in Stewardian cultural ecology was to analyze “the interrelationship of exploitative or 
productive technology and environment.” (1955, 41). 
4
Murphy 1977, 23-24; Steward 1970. 
 4 
research and analysis could be reconciled with the economic geography of an actually 
existing community.  Cultural ecologists perceived the nature-culture relationship to 
become diffuse and less amenable to scientific inquiry as subsistence economies became 
more connected with extra-local markets in terms of anthropological understanding, 
actual commercial activity, or both.  Steward hypothesized that the adaptive effect of 
environment on culture would decrease in proportion to social complexity and control of 
the environment through technology.  He wrote, “It makes a great deal of difference 
whether a community consists of hunters and gatherers who subsist independently by 
their own efforts or whether it is an outpost of a wealthy nation, which exploits local 
mineral wealth and is sustained by railroads, ships, or airplanes.  In advanced societies, 
the nature of the culture core will be determined by a complex technology and by 
productive arrangements which themselves have a long cultural history.”5 
 
Steward wrote those lines a half-century after the US government began work on 
the Panama Canal in 1904, marking the beginning of a decade-long construction project 
described at the time as modern man’s ultimate triumph over nature.6  The US Canal 
Zone, a transportation enclave forcefully established by a wealthy nation across a newly 
sovereign Central American republic,
7
 was emblematic of an expanding network of 
modern transportation technologies that created anthropogenic, or second, nature.
8
  In 
                                                        
5
Steward 1955, 39. 
6
There are many popular triumphalist accounts of Panama Canal construction.  Some exemplary titles 
include: Our Canal in Panama: The Greatest Achievement in the World's History (Allen 1913) and 
America's Triumph at Panama (Avery 1913). 
7
Panama became independent from Colombia in 1903 with the tacit support of the US government.  One 
good historical work on the subject is LaFeber 1978. 
8
The distinction of first nature (pre-human) and second nature (anthropogenic) comes from Hegel and Marx 
(Schmidt 1971, 42-43 and Smith 1984, 19).  However, as Cronon points out, the distinction becomes 
ambiguous once when we realize that nature is a mingling of non-human and human agency (1991, xix). 
 5 
Panama, the pursuit of transportation was a technical, environmental, and territorial 
project.  The Panamanian state granted the US “use, occupation, and control” of the ten-
mile-wide strip of territory later known as the Canal Zone in the Panama Canal Treaty of 
1903.  In Panama and elsewhere, new socio-ecological forms accreted along expanding 
networks of railroads, roads, and canals,
9
 giving rise to the cultural hybridization that 
North American anthropology at that time defined itself against as it sought to salvage or 
document “real” native cultures.10  The Panama Canal, then, was an anti-anthropological 
project insomuch as it was understood to link economies and erase cultural difference. 
 
From the perspective of twenty-first century anthropology, it is easy to criticize 
the bounded subsistence systems of cultural ecology as the byproduct of a selective 
vision or willful reduction, rather than accurate representations of historical communities.  
We know that the “pristine” cultures studied by early anthropologists were shaped 
through interactions with global political economies.
11
  If culture is less stable and 
recognizable than it once appeared, so, it would seem, is nature.  Anthropological 
approaches to “the environment” have fragmented as the perceived stability of a unitary 
nature has been questioned.  On the one hand, post-structural critics in the social sciences 
and humanities have argued that nature, wilderness, and environment are historical-
cultural constructs.
12
  On the other hand, natural scientists have called for a “new 
ecology” emphasizing non- or multi-equilibrium conditions, non-linearity, interactions 
                                                        
9See, e.g., Cronon’s (1991) environmental-historical analysis of Chicago via the transportation networks 
that linked it to hinterlands in the upper Midwest of the US and to east coast markets. 
10See, e.g., Kent Lightfoot’s (2005) discussion of cultural encounters in the missions of California and the 
perception of “legitimate” Indians among anthropologists.   
11
Wolf 1982. 
12
The 1995 exchange between Cronon and Soule highlights the tensions and stakes in what might be 
described as the construction of nature debates. 
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among discontinuous spatio-temporal scales, and increased consideration of human 
political, social, and economic systems.
13
 
 
Even as theorists interrogate nature from different philosophical, theoretical, and 
political positions, few dispute that significant material changes have taken place around 
us.  Beginning with the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, scholars, 
activists, politicians, and others argued that development and modernization had gone 
awry.  Rather than emancipating humans from environmental constraints, as Steward had 
hypothesized, environmentalists argued that modern technologies bound a global 
population more tightly and precariously to what seemed to be a shrinking planet.
14
  By 
1973, Clifford Geertz had abandoned cultural ecology for the open frontiers of 
interpretive anthropology.  His inversion of Steward’s development narrative that year 
anticipated important shifts in anthropological and environmental thought: 
It used to be thought that, although environment might shape human life at 
primitive levels, where men were, it was said, more dependent on nature, 
culture-evolutionary advance, especially technical advances, consisted of a 
progressive freeing of man from such conditioning.  But the ecological 
crisis has divested us all of that illusion; indeed, it may be that advanced 
technology ties us in even more closely with the habitat we both make and 
inhabit, that having more impact upon it we in turn cause it to have more 
impact upon us.
15
  
 
Geertz’s claim that technology binds us more closely to an environment of our 
own making resonates with contemporary problems and anthropologies.  Today, some 
observers define breakdown as the “new normal,” forecasting an endless future of enviro-
techno-political disasters like floods, famines, and oil spills.  Geertz speaks of humans 
                                                        
13
Fiedler et al. 2001, Holling 1973, Gunderson and Holling 2002, Scoones 1999, Zimmerer 1994, 
14
Perhaps the key work in modern Malthusian environmental discourse is Ehrlich 1968.  
15
Geertz 1973, quoted in Dove and Carpenter 2010, 19. 
 7 
collectively, but some of “us” are tied more closely to the environment than others.  The 
effects of disasters are not borne evenly.  As people in the most vulnerable and rapidly 
changing areas struggle to live with new environments, anthropologists and others are 
working to devise appropriate ways of theorizing, studying, and acting.  I have 
juxtaposed Steward’s cultural ecology and the infrastructural ecology exemplified by the 
canal in order to locate the major themes of my research – environment, technology, and 
development – within the genealogy of “environmental anthropology”16 and introduce 
three analytic problems – scale, boundaries, and politics – that have troubled this subfield 
and pushed it forward.   I will return to these three problems throughout the introduction. 
 
Anthropologists need more sophisticated analytical tools for thinking about 
technology, nature, and culture for a new set of circumstances.  Steward’s emphasis on 
technology and labor as mediators of nature-culture relationships is a good starting point 
if they are reconceptualized as relational, political, and historical materials – that is, as I 
explain below, in terms of infrastructure.  My theoretical objective in the dissertation is to 
develop a political ecology of infrastructure through the case of the Panama Canal.  
Bringing technology back into environmental anthropology via infrastructure turns our 
attention to technology as an integrated part of complex human-environmental systems. 
 
The remainder of the introduction is organized as follows: First, I explain how I 
came to conduct research in Panama and frame the dissertation project as I have.   
Second, I discuss the past and present of the transport economy in Panama and describe 
                                                        
16
I put environmental anthropology between quotation marks to flag that there was no subfield identified 
with that name before the 1990s.  I want to clarify that I am constructing a particular genealogy of 
environmental anthropology here, but will not use quotation marks hereafter. 
 8 
the two communities where I conducted field research.  I describe my field site selection 
process, methodology, and community engagement.  Third, I introduce the bodies of 
literature that underpin this work – infrastructure studies and political ecology – and lay 
out an analytic framework through a discussion of points of intersection between the two.  
Fourth, I map the organization of the dissertation and summarize the four body chapters. 
 
FROM FORESTS TO INFRASTRUCTURE (THE MACHETE AND THE FREIGHTER) 
My dissertation project emerged from preliminary research on forest politics in 
Panama.  I arrived in Panama City in June 2006 with an invitation to collaborate with an 
interdisciplinary team of natural and social scientists working at the Smithsonian Tropical 
Research Institute on the PRORENA project (project for reforestation with native tree 
species).  My research focus at the time was the relationships among environmental 
management, policy, and rural land use.  I knew little about the canal and considered 
dams, locks, and ships too “big” for anthropological research.  My work with 
PRORENA, which was limited to that summer, was to focus on the political, economic, 
and social context of deforestation around the Panama Canal.  It was thematically related 
with my previous research on perceptions of and conflicts around forests plantations in 
the Ecuadorian Andes, but the “context” was quite different.  The environmental issues 
that interested me were, it turned out, also infrastructural issues.   
 
Fresh water is vital to the operation of the canal.  Fifty-two million gallons of 
managed water from the surrounding drainage basin, or Panama Canal watershed, flow 
through a lock system and into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with each passing ship 
(Chapter 1).  The watershed is arguably the focal region for environmental management 
 9 
in Panama today.  But this is a relatively recent development.  Over the past thirty-five 
years, canal administrators, politicians, scientists, and media outlets have discursively 
constructed the problem of deforestation within the watershed in such a manner that rural 
ranchers and farmers – largely swidden agriculturalists – are scripted as the key actors 
behind a problem actually produced through the actions of multiple actors in Panama and 
beyond
17
 (Chapter 4).  Explanations have taken two forms since the 1970s.  At first, 
policymakers characterized farmers as irrational, environmentally-destructive actors.  In 
response to this framing and a changing intellectual climate, more sophisticated social 
science analyses have situated land use decisions within a multi-scale political, economic, 
and social context.
18
  What is obscured in both formulations, I later realized, is the critical 
role of water management and transportation technologies in formatting relationships 
between farmers and forests in Panama and networks of global producers and consumers.  
 
Put simply, forest politics around the canal cannot be understood without attention 
to the ecology of large technical systems.  International development organizations, 
conservation organizations, and the US and Panamanian states have channeled millions 
of dollars into watershed research, management, and development because forests are 
understood to regulate the flow of water into the network of streams, rivers, artificial 
reservoirs, and locks that makes transportation across Panama possible.  Attention to 
infrastructural relationships reveals that the canal’s water scarcity issues are not absolute, 
but defined through the relationship between traffic and the specific demands of the lock 
                                                        
17
Myths about the inherent environmental destructiveness of swidden agriculture, as Michael Dove (1983), 
points out, have often been used to facilitate the extension of state administration into new territories. 
18
See the work of Stanley Heckadon-Moreno (1984, 1985).  He argues that if the farmer is the principal 
actor in forest destruction, he should not be considered the major guilty party.  Agricultural modernization 
through low-interest loans, technical assistance, good roads, and institutional support pushed deforestation. 
 10 
system.  More ships require more water, which means that administrators and engineers 
must search for new ways of regulating and storing the flow of watershed rivers.  
 
Technology and environmental politics are inextricably connected around the 
Panama Canal.  Reflecting on the rise of the watershed as a new administrative region 
during the 1980s, Panamanian anthropologist Stanley Heckadon-Moreno wrote: “In 
essence, the government decided that, in order to save the Canal, the forests had to be 
protected from the machetes of the farmers.”19  Protect the canal from machetes?   How 
could such a simple, “local” technology threaten a modern, “global” commercial trade 
route?  How do we reconcile this surprising conjuncture with the hierarchical 
assumptions that have long been embedded in anthropological thinking about technology 
and the environment?  After all, for nineteenth century anthropologists like Henry Louis 
Morgan, technologies like the farmer’s machete and the canal’s freighter signaled distinct 
stages along what was understood to be a ladder or hierarchy of cultural development.  
Later, Julian Steward and Leslie White translated and applied Marx’s historical 
materialism to subsistence societies at the margins of capitalism.  These groups’ 
extractive technologies were understood to mediate between the spheres of nature and 
culture.  White, in particular, was reportedly fond of citing Marx’s statement that a hand 
axe creates one kind of society and the steam mill another.
20
  Today, this distinction is 
untenable.  Technologies cross-cut and redraw cultural and environmental boundaries.    
 
A key challenge facing contemporary environmental anthropology, then, is to 
                                                        
19
Heckadon-Moreno 1993, 138. 
20
Sahlins 2010, 374-375. 
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locate the hand axe and the steam mill – or, in the case of the Panama Canal, the machete 
and the freighter – within the same analytical frame.  Anthropologists have increasingly 
embraced multi-sited research.
21
  Ethnographies of global connection, to use Anna 
Tsing’s phrase,22 are the order of the day.  These efforts have led to important insights, 
but also raised difficult questions.  How do we take cultural and ecological difference 
seriously while also recognizing the importance of connection?  How do we theorize 
relationships that are irreducibly ecological, cultural, economic, political, technical, ad 
finitum, without writing about everything at once?  How do we move beyond the vague 
space of assemblage to the particularities and potentialities of form, organization, and 
design?  I propose the political ecology of infrastructure as a framework for navigating 
the ecology that binds and differentiates the ecologies of the machete and the freighter. 
 
PANAMA, THE TRANSPORT ECONOMY, AND ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD SITES 
Panama occupies an isthmus connecting North and South America and dividing 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  The nation has a land area of approximately 29,000 
square miles, just less than the US state of South Carolina.
23
  The canal is oriented 
northwest-to-southeast and bisects mountains that run east-west along the spine of the 
isthmus.  These mountains, the cordillera central, are flanked by upland plains that 
descend to rolling hills and coastal plains.  The coastal plains are the country’s best 
agricultural land, but 75% of an estimated 3.5 million inhabitants live in urban areas, 
particularly Panama City (population: ~1.4 million), which is located at the waterway’s 
                                                        
21
See Marcus 1995 on multi-sited ethnography and ethnography of the world system.  See Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997 for a seminal challenge to understanding culture in terms of a spatially localized group of 
people and call to situate the local within transnational spaces. 
22
Tsing 2005. 
23
CIA World Factbook 2011.  
 12 
Pacific terminus, and its sprawling metropolitan area, including large bedroom 
communities.
24
  Development also stretches along the canal to the Atlantic city of Colon 
(population: ~50,000). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Panama and the study area (Google Maps). 
 
Panama has achieved stellar rates of economic growth in recent years.  The 
national economy expanded at a rate of 8% annually between 2005 and 2010, the fastest 
rate in the Americas.
25
  Economic growth was driven by a robust service sector.  In 2010, 
the estimated gross domestic product by sector was: 77.6% service, 16.6% industry, and 
5.8% agriculture.
26
  The direct revenues generated by the canal, which is administered by 
an autonomous state agency called the Panama Canal Authority were 7.5% of gross 
domestic product ($2 billion) in 2010.
27
  However, the canal’s overall economic impact is 
                                                        
24
CIA World Factbook 2011. 
25
The Economist 2011. 39. 
26
The Economist 2011. 39. 
27
The Economist 2011, 39. 
Atlantic Ocean 
Pacific Ocean 
Panama Canal 
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certainly larger.  Pro-business governments have established a favorable tax and 
investment environment – including one of the lowest levels of import tariffs in Latin 
America – that has encouraged the expansion of the Colon free-trade zone and the 
expansion of insurance, finance, and legal industries.  The state’s focus on the 
development of service sector institutions and infrastructure over other sectors has 
benefited some groups of people more than others.    
 
The Economist magazine recently compared Panama with another rising tropical 
transportation hub, Singapore, and pointed out a key difference between the nations. 
While Singapore’s economic growth has been built upon high productivity – associated 
with investment in education – Panama’s growth has come from the accumulation of 
capital in the form of infrastructure.  Panama committed $5.3 billion to expand the canal 
(a project begun in 2007 and slated for completion in 2014) and another $13.6 billion for 
domestic infrastructural development.  The government also spends money on education, 
but with comparatively poor results.  Panama recently placed sixty-third out of sixty-five 
economies on the PISA study, a test of fifteen-year-olds.  Singapore placed fourth.  
Unsurprisingly, potential investors perceive Panama to have a shortage of skilled labor 
and oversupply of unskilled labor.
28
  Transportation generates economic growth at a 
national scale, but employs only six percent of the population vs. the twenty-five percent 
employed in agriculture.
29
  Moreover, Panama ranked third in income inequality in Latin 
America – just behind Colombia, Bolivia, and Honduras.30   
                                                        
28
CIA World Factbook 2011. 
29
Barry and Lindsay-Poland 1995, 72-73.  
30
This ranking is based on Gini coefficient calculations published in the 2010 UN Human Development 
Index.  The Gini coefficient – a measure of the “deviation of the distribution of income (or consumption) 
among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution” – is used because, 
 14 
 
The uneven distribution of the economic benefits of transportation is a historical 
problem in Panama.  Interoceanic transportation has dominated the economy around the 
Chagres River since the sixteenth century.  Between 1550 and 1750, the isthmus was a 
critical passage point for Spanish gold extracted from western South America and 
shipped back to Spain.
31
  Panamanian historian Alfredo Castillero Calvo characterizes the 
long-running relationship between Panama and the world system as transportismo.  He 
argues that Panama is distinct from other Latin American countries because its economy 
has been dedicated to transportation rather than natural resource extraction or 
monoculture agriculture.
32
  This orientation has meant that populations and political-
economic institutions have been spatially concentrated within the transit zone and that the 
regional economy has been marked by episodic cycles of boom and bust linked to outside 
events.  Another effect has been an entrenched oligarchy of a white, urban merchant class 
with ties to foreign investment and trade.  This situation was unusual in Latin America, 
where most countries were dominated by a landowning elite during this period.
33
 
 
Boosters of the transport economy have promised, but rarely delivered, 
widespread benefits.  Since the Spanish colonial system of ferias y galeones (trade fairs 
                                                                                                                                                                     
unlike calculations based on the gap between mean and median income, it accounts for income 
concentrated at different points in the distribution (United Nations Development Program 2010, 224). 
31
Castillero Calvo 1984. 
32
Castillero Calvo 1973. 
33
Panamanian historians have struggled with issues of sovereignty and nationalism, particularly defining a 
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and galleon ships), a few groups in Panama – the commercial class, storehouse owners, 
and transport service providers – have disproportionately benefited from the construction 
and institutionalization of transportation systems.  This process was repeated during other 
eras.
34
  Castillero Calvo writes about the persistence of transportismo in the wake of yet 
another unprecedented expansion of the Panamanian economy in the 1950s and 1960s, a 
period also marked by increased landlessness and rural-urban migration.  Drawing on 
dependency theory and world system theory,
35
 he argues that a key node of world trade 
was dangerously dependent on insecure global markets to meet internal needs for food 
and manufactured goods.  I sketch this history to situate my contemporary research. 
 
My ethnographic research in Panama focuses on historical experience and 
everyday life in two rural communities near the canal.  I selected the communities in 
order to understand different moments in regional history and relationships with canal 
administrators.  The first community, Limon, is situated on the east bank of Gatun Lake, 
the massive artificial reservoir that stores water for canal use.  The second, Boquerón, is 
located on a tributary of the Chagres River in the mountainous headwaters of the canal. 
 
Limon has approximately six hundred residents.
36
  Many of the older members of 
this largely Afro-Panamanian population describe themselves as descendants of laborers 
who worked on the Panama Railroad (1850-1855), the French canal project (1881-1889), 
or US canal project (1904-1914).  Like many artificial reservoirs, the creation of Gatun 
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Lake led to widespread human displacement.  In preparation for the flooding, US 
administrators relocated what they called “native communities,” typically inhabited by 
West Indians, Hispanic mestizos, Chinese, and Europeans, to lands above the level of the 
future lake.  The history of Limon is therefore closely tied to the lake, its islands, and the 
forgotten alluvial landscapes below its surface (Chapter 1).  According to oral history, the 
economy of the lake region was dominated by the export banana trade and subsistence 
agriculture before the Second World War (Chapter 2).  After the war, it became common 
for community members – especially men – to work as laborers in the US Canal Zone, 
but they continued to cultivate small farms.  The relationship between this community 
and canal administrators – at first North Americans and, today, elite Panamanians – is 
complicated.  From a hill above town, one can see cargo ships passing through the lake 
with goods, commodities, and people bound for other places.  Yet, in the community’s 
collective memory, the best times were not transportation booms, but agricultural booms. 
 
Boqueron had 130 residents in the 2000 census, making it even smaller than 
Limon.  The community was settled in the late-1950s by landless campesino farmers, 
largely from Panama’s rural interior – people with less direct historical connection to 
transportation projects.  The population increased through the 1960s and into the 1970s, 
when the community became the site of an asentamiento, a politically contentious state 
project that promoted rural colonization, cooperative economic development, and public 
service delivery.
37
  The physical nucleus of the community is a primary school, a public 
health clinic, a communal house, and two churches, one evangelical and one Catholic, but 
the houses stretch for miles along a gravel road that runs parallel to the Boqueron River 
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(Chapter 3).  What makes Boqueron particularly interesting in terms of expanding canal 
infrastructure is that it became an important site of contestation between rural people and 
canal administrators as the community was enclosed within the new Chagres National 
Park in the 1980s and the forests around it – which local people farmed – were legally 
incorporated into the canal’s water management network (Chapter 4).   Today, Boqueron 
and neighboring communities are popular sites for sustainable development projects.   
 
I lived in the two communities and Panama City for fourteen months while 
conducting ethnographic research.  Drawing on training in qualitative methods and 
previous fieldwork experience, I completed over seventy semi-structured oral history 
interviews focused on interviewees’ experiences with social, economic and 
environmental change.  The data that I collected through community-based fieldwork 
provides a fine-grained understanding of the changing contours of everyday life around 
the canal and highlights changing relationships among state agents, rural peoples, the 
land, and infrastructure.  I repatriated the narratives collected to the two communities by 
writing collaborative local history documents and then facilitating community history 
workshops, both in Spanish, during April and May 2009.  Second, I conducted eight 
months of archival research in Panama City and the US.  At the Panama National 
Library, I collected thousands of pages of state ministry reports related to environmental 
management and development (agriculture, public works, natural resource management, 
sanitation, etc.) and newspaper articles about pertinent historical events.   At smaller 
archives across the city, I collected relevant correspondence, which provided a more 
intimate understanding of the changing relationship between Panamanian state 
 18 
institutions and the environment.
38
  The data that I collected through Panamanian archival 
work demonstrates changing state plans for rural lands and citizens around the canal and 
the specificities of the projects through which those visions were enacted.  I also worked 
at the National Archives II in Maryland.  The official Panama Canal correspondence that 
I collected at this facility provides a detailed picture of changing US state plans for the 
rural areas of the Canal Zone, the human and environmental categories used within canal 
institutions, and connections with transnational expert networks.  Finally, I conducted 
two months of institutional ethnography in Panama.  The objective of this phase was to 
do semi-structured interviews with environmental professionals who worked in rural 
areas around the canal in order to link community-based research and archival materials.  
 
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
Through the analytical framework of the political ecology of infrastructure, I 
strive to build upon political ecology’s persistent focus on the human-environmental 
consequences of political-economic power relations and more recent concern with 
discourse by highlighting the role of infrastructures in organizing, but not determining, 
contemporary ecologies.  As scholars of science and technology have shown, the study of 
large technical systems – networks of pipes, cables, roads, and canals – illuminates the 
lines of connection (and spaces of disconnection) that often format the resource access 
and distribution problems at the core of political ecology research.
39
  Where does water 
(not) run?   Where are roads (not) built?  Where does electricity (not) work?  Thinking in 
terms of infrastructure reminds us that individual technologies, or artifacts, are 
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components of larger systems woven into the modern social and political fabric.  These 
systems materially inscribe human politics on the landscape in a manner that facilitates 
the movement and livelihoods of some communities and restricts those of others.   
 
Infrastructures channel flows of people, goods, and information, establishing new 
spatial forms that are different from the political geography of the nation-state, even if 
they continue to be shaped by the state.
40
  These connective tissues shape and transcend 
individual experience.  They format circulation across great distances, but are also vital 
sites for the organization of everyday life.  These are only a few of the ways in which 
infrastructure helps us to reconceptualize three key themes that I have identified in 
political ecology: scale, politics, and boundaries.  My objective below is to highlight 
absences and contributions useful for developing a political ecology of infrastructure.  I 
follow the genealogies with a brief summary of how I combine the literatures.  
 
Political Ecology: Scale, Boundaries, and Politics 
No unbroken line runs from early anthropological research of cultures and 
environments to contemporary political ecologies.  The anthropological traditions that 
influenced early political ecology (culture areas, cultural ecology, and ecological 
anthropology) were transformed through encounters with more radical scholarship (world 
systems theory, radical peasant studies, dependency theory, and post-structuralism, to 
name a few).  My goal is to point out the continuities and discontinuities between 
political ecology and older environmental anthropologies, particularly around the 
problems of scale, boundaries, and politics.  Again, these are the problems that we might 
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better navigate by conceptualizing technology in terms of infrastructure.  They also 
provide the theoretical background to situate why I have studied and written about the 
Panama Canal as I have.  
 
Political ecology was forged during the political and theoretical upheavals of the 
1970s and 1980s when scholars conducting research in the rural, Global South questioned 
the validity of the bounded human-environmental system.
41
   It was, at first, a 
conscientious effort by anthropologists and geographers to attend to problems of scale 
and politics in explanations of environmental degradation.  One of the field’s early 
analytical innovations was to situate local human-environment interactions within nested 
scales of political, economic, and social power.  However, both the system boundaries 
that early political ecologists critiqued and the multi-scale framework they proposed were 
both built upon the Western philosophical dualisms of subject-object, ideal-material, and 
– of particular importance for political ecologists – nature-culture.42  In this section, I 
highlight understandings of the nature-culture boundary in the environmental 
anthropologies prior to political ecology because ideas about the character of this 
relationship still shape pivotal theoretical debates.  Early political ecologists sought to 
explain environmental degradation, but, for early-twentieth century anthropologists, the 
“environmental problem” was different.  They wanted to understand culture, not nature.   
 
The study of culture areas, formalized in work by Alfred Kroeber (1939) and 
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Clark Wissler (1927), illustrates the tension between historical (diachronic) and 
environmental (synchronic) approaches to understanding culture.  I introduce political 
ecology via the idea of culture areas because the key problematic – the spatio-temporal 
distribution of culture – has persisted, even as research orientations and programs have 
changed.  Culture areas were spatial abstractions of the distribution of cultural features 
(technology, political systems, magic, religion, etc.) across human groups.  Kroeber, 
Wissler, and others identified a correlation between patterns of cultural and natural 
features, a finding that raised questions of human adaptation to the environment that were 
politically troubling given the socio-political context of environmental determinism.
43
  
Under the banner of Boasian historical particularism, most North American cultural 
anthropologists understood cultural development in terms of historical diffusion, not the 
environment.  Kroeber, Franz Boas’s student, concluded, “cultures are rooted in 
nature…[but] no more produced by that nature than a plant is produced or caused by the 
soil in which it is rooted.  The immediate causes of cultural phenomena are other cultural 
phenomena."
44
  By isolating culture from nature and demarcating history and evolution, 
Kroeber not only blocked environmental determinist interpretations of culture areas data, 
but also the opposite interpretation: that indigenous people had played an active, if not 
determinant, role in shaping their environments.
45
 Moreover, there was a politics to what 
could be said about people and the environment, even if politics were not part of the 
analysis, per se. 
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Julian Steward, one of Kroeber’s students, wanted to move beyond correlation to 
explain the origins of the cultural patterns in relation to the natural world.
46
  Steward and 
the generation of anthropologists he influenced studied the interrelationship of 
environment, technology, cultural features, and behavior patterns.
47
  For him, the nature-
culture relationship was dialectical and mediated by the social organization of labor and 
exploitative technology – or the cultural core.48  But, like culture areas, cultural ecology 
was dualistic.  Steward believed that the environment had a creative role in human 
affairs, but he was not an ecologist.  Like Kroeber and Wissler, he was interested in 
explaining cultural features.  So, the scale of analysis was coterminous with the perceived 
boundaries of a particular human group’s subsistence system.  A new generation of 
ecological anthropologists argued that cultural ecology lacked ecology.
49
   By privileging 
the scale of human subsistence, they argued, cultural ecologists cut off webs of 
relationships with non-human organisms and other human groups.
   
Ecological 
anthropologists borrowed concepts from the natural sciences – equilibrium, feedback, 
niche, etc. – to locate humans within the ecosystem. 
 
The shift from cultural ecology to ecological anthropology during the 1960s and 
1970s illustrates the manner in which the scale and politics of research were bound up 
with philosophical assumptions.  Ecological anthropology took steps toward dissolving 
the nature-culture boundary in favor of webs of mutual causality – ecosystems with 
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people in them.
50
   However, if borrowing from the natural sciences stimulated new 
insights, it also encouraged new forms of biological reductionism.  Concepts developed 
to describe the behavior of non-human populations were applied, often crudely, to 
complex human culture, history, and politics.
51
   At their most functionalist, ecological 
anthropologists reduced cultural factors to adaptive significance.  They also continued to 
focus on localized adaptations to specific ecosystems.  They included non-humans in 
their analyses, but did not account for extra-local political-economies and technologies. 
 
As I mentioned, political ecology – in its earliest, Marxian formation – emerged 
as an effort to deal with these problems of scale and politics.  Since then, major 
theoretical contributions have included the development of new analytical frameworks – 
nested scales, networks, and assemblages – for human-environmental research.  These 
frameworks have allowed scholars to critique hegemonic environmental narratives, 
particularly the widespread belief that environmental degradation in the Global South is 
driven by population growth and rural ignorance.
52
  In a seminal work, Piers Blaikie and 
Harold Brookfield write that local environmental degradation took place within the 
context of multi-scale, core-periphery relationships: “The complexity of these 
relationships demands an approach which can encompass interactive effects, the 
contribution of different geographical scales and hierarchies of socioeconomic 
organizations (e.g. person, household, village, region, state, world) and the contradictions 
between social and environmental changes through time.”53  For many scholars, however, 
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the theoretical and political problem with this approach was that it assigned capitalism a 
totalizing power and assumed a structured, hierarchical relationship among nested 
scales.
54
  The rural land manager was acted upon from above and denied agency.
55
   
 
Consider, again, the case of the farmer’s machete as a threat to the Panama Canal 
within this framework.  It sits awkwardly among the nested scales.  Which actor, scale, or 
level can be said to control the relationship?  In this case, ranked structure does not seem 
to reflect the multi-directional, indeterminate character of the relevant power 
relationships.  The relationships between the transnational socio-technical networks 
assembled to move a freighter and the trans-local networks that support rural agriculture 
are clearly asymmetrical.  Panama Canal administrators and state institutions can 
mobilize resources to forcefully relocate farmers or enact projects to control their 
behavior, but farmers are so distributed and the significance of each action so minor, that 
such projects are, at best, limited by logistical constrains.  Power, it seems, is neither here 
nor there, but distributed.  Where early political ecological chains of explanation render 
the “local” an outcome of regional-global processes, infrastructure suggests heterarchical 
political relations, meaning that power relations change with circumstances.
56
  I develop 
this alternative approach to political ecology below, arguing that linkages like this 
illustrate how power is distributed through relationships, including those built into the 
environment as infrastructure, rather than affixed to a given hierarchical organization.
57
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Even as Marxian political ecology held sway, concerns about reflexivity and 
discourse were ascendant in anthropology, influenced by broader trends in social theory, 
especially literary theory.
58
  The post-structuralist turn in political ecology, often linked 
with the 1990s work of Arturo Escobar, drew on Foucault and emphasized the discursive 
construction of nature.
59
  The proponents of this “second-generation” political ecology 
engaged epistemological debates around constructivism and anti-essentialism.
60
   The 
environment was understood to be constituted through language, particularly the 
discourses of modernist forms of knowledge like ecology and politically economy.  What 
is important to point out here is that, although (first-generation) Marxian and (second-
generation) post-structural political ecologies took distinct epistemological and political 
stances, they share a dualist philosophy in which one sphere (nature) was understood to 
be shaped by – or even collapsed into – the other (culture).  This dichotomy was further 
reified through polarizing conceptual and methodological debates concerning the 
accuracy and politics of privileging one sphere or the other.  Some scholars called for 
more attention to politics (culture) and others to ecology (nature).
61
   
 
Post-structuralist political ecologists emphasized other ways of knowing and 
acting vis-à-vis nature as a viable political alternative to dominant frameworks, 
particularly knowledge produced by social movements and indigenous peoples.
62
  The 
emphasis on discourse opened up new ways of understanding politics and important lines 
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of research,
63
 but, like neo-Marxists, post-structuralists often assigned little agency to the 
non-human world.  This is to say that it was known, constructed, contested, commodified, 
and constituted by humans, but rarely conceptualized as active or creative.  Timothy 
Mitchell addresses this problem in an essay entitled “Can the mosquito speak?,” arguing 
that an emphasis on discourse can be politically limiting: 
This kind of analysis leaves the world itself intact.  Intentionally or not, it 
depends upon maintaining the absolute differences between 
representations and the world they represent, social constructions, and the 
reality they construct.  It is an analysis that leaves the economists to carry 
on undisturbed, pointing out that they are not concerned with the history 
of representations, but with the underlying reality their models represent.
64
 
 
Post-structuralism struggled, in other words, with an incapacity to make strong 
truth claims about a reality that included, but was irreducible to, discourse.
 65
  Finding a 
way out of this philosophical and political challenge has been a key concern in more 
recent political ecology.  In a 2010 article, Escobar reviews the development of a cluster 
of overlapping “post-constructivist political ecologies” that are promising in this regard. 
What does a post-constructivist political ecology look like?  There are multiple answers 
to this question.  Many of these works embrace realism, but not in the same way.  Aletta 
Biersack, for example, argues that political ecology cannot afford to surrender realism.
66
  
She seems to embrace the kind of critical realism championed by Tim Forsyth: an 
approach that seeks to understand real environmental change through epistemological 
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skepticism – the position that the real can never be understood in any final way – while 
retaining a belief in biophysical reality beyond human experience.
67
  Scholars influenced 
by science and technology studies have emphasized nature-culture hybrids constituted 
through biological, discursive, scientific, and technical processes.
68
  This new literature, 
Escobar writes, “builds on the efforts at working through the impasses and predicaments 
created by constructivism, radicalizing them, while at the same time returning to 
questions about ‘the real’.”69  A key concept in recent neo-realist (or post-constructivist) 
political ecology inspired by Latourian actor-network-theory and Deleuze is the nature-
culture assemblage, a heterogeneous collection of elements including knowledges, 
practices, values, legal regimes, and material structures, and non-human life.
70
    
 
The explicit challenge to the nature-culture dichotomy and attendant embrace of 
hybridity has been theoretically stimulating and methodologically frustrating.  In a recent 
review article, geographer Bruce Braun called for political ecologists to attend not only to 
the existence of assemblages, but their organization.
71
  Anthropologists have long paid 
attention to social organization around circulation,
72
 but have only recently begun to 
address the infrastructures that make circulation possible.
73
  Assemblages, as Stephen 
Collier and Aihwa Ong point out in a recent work on the subject, are not unstructured but 
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given form through the specificities of infrastructures. 
'Infrastructure' designates specific institutional, material, and social conditions 
through which the functioning of a certain technology, ethical regime, form of 
regulation, or mode of communication is either enabled or impeded.   It inscribes 
the space and form of limited, finite, and localizable relationships and effects that 
occupy a certain space and concretely link -- or distinguish and divide -- various 
objects, spaces, techniques, individuals, and social groups.  An infrastructure 
allows these elements to come into communication but does not necessarily 
organize them in terms of a common structural or logical principle.
74
 
 
Collier and Ong do not discuss ecology, per se, but explain that the “complex 
infrastructural conditions that allow global forms to function” interact with other 
elements “in contingent, uneasy, unstable interrelationships.”75  In the discussion that 
follows, I built upon their claim and show how an emphasis on infrastructure is useful for 
thinking through problems of scale, boundaries, and politics in political ecology. 
 
Infrastructure Studies 
The term infrastructure came to English from French, where it referred to 
substrate material below railroad tracks.  The prefix infra- means below, beneath, or 
within.  Structure has various meanings and, of course, carries significant intellectual 
baggage, but might be defined as the relation of the constituent parts of a whole as 
determining its nature or character.
76
  The concept has been perhaps most widely used in 
economics and planning, where it refers to capital investments that facilitate directly 
productive economic activity or development.
77
  We typically imagine infrastructure as 
the large technical systems (transportation, energy, water management, waste 
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management, and communications) that facilitate the circulation and distribution of 
people, materials, energy, and information across space.  But, as scholars of science and 
technology have shown, infrastructures are never purely hardware.  They are sites where 
“hard” technologies are interwoven with “soft” cultural, political, and economic systems.  
 
The Panama Canal is an illuminating site to think about infrastructure, because 
the waterway supports international commerce and, at the same time, is supported by its 
own technological, human, and natural support systems.  Science and technology studies 
scholarship on the development of systems like the canal emerged in the mid-1980s 
following the publication of Thomas Hughes’s influential history of electrification.78  
Although it is beyond the scope of this introduction to review the large technical systems 
literature inspired by Hughes’s work, it is important to highlight some of the salient 
lessons that emerged.  First, technologies are understood as parts of the larger wholes – or 
systems – that support and sustain them.79  The entire system is the unit of analysis, not 
an individual artifact.   Second, technical systems emerge, stabilize, and develop.
80
  They 
have life cycles that can be studied in historical time.  Third, system builders – 
individuals, teams, and institutions that create systems and make them work – design and 
build projects with socio-technical content.
81
  
 
Infrastructure studies builds upon the insights of the large technical systems 
research and conceptualizes those systems in a manner more amenable to ethnographic 
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research.  The points listed above apply to infrastructure studies, but there are several 
distinctions.  First, the idea of a large technical system focuses attention on a hard 
technological core,
82
 but today the term infrastructure often refers to the socio-technical 
institutions that support education, governance, computing, and public health.
83
  Second, 
infrastructures can be understood as shaping a relational space, rather than situated 
within a single scale or nested scales.  Third, infrastructures are political.  The values and 
priorities of past designers are embedded in socio-technical systems and quietly influence 
the present.  System design and maintenance both reflect and reproduce patterns of 
inequality.  Fourth, infrastructures cross and act as boundaries.  Below, I develop these 
final three points specifically with regard to issues of scale, politics, and boundaries in 
political ecology.
84
 
 
Infrastructure and Scale-Making 
 
Infrastructure studies scholarship has addressed issues of scale.  Paul Edwards 
writes “infrastructure, as both concept and practice, not only bridges…scales but offers a 
way of comprehending their relations.”85  His method, mutual orientation, is a call to 
study infrastructures at a variety of intersecting scales, from the micro-scale research 
advocated by actor-network theorists and ethnographers to the macro-scale studies of 
large technical systems scholars.
86
  Scales reflect, on the one hand, the epistemological 
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decisions of the researcher.  However, as scholars of complex systems have observed, 
some patterns in the world are observable only at certain scales.
87
  How do we reconcile 
this apparent contradiction between epistemology and ontology?  I argue for attention to 
scale-making practices and technologies rather than defining scale a priori.
88
  For Bruno 
Latour and Anna Tsing, scales are not neutral, but purposefully brought into being – 
proposed, practiced, and transported.
89
  Tsing, in particular, argues that the linkages 
between scale-making projects – in her case, finance capital, franchise cronyism, and 
frontier culture – are sites for making sense of global connection.   
 
I argue, drawing on Doreen Massey’s theory of relational space, or space-time, 
that global connection should also be understood at the sites where the roads that support 
Tsing’s frontier culture intersect with the agencies of rivers, rhizomes, and mosquitoes.90   
For Massey, space is an ongoing production, a “constellation of on-going trajectories 
…[that are] not only of the human but of the nonhuman too – the buildings, the trees, the 
rocks themselves, all moving on, changing, becoming.  It is the multiplicity of trajectories 
that it is important to capture – not travelling across space conceived of as a continuous 
surface, but travelling across stories.”91  Her relational space resonates with philosopher 
of science Manuel DeLanda’s argument for a flat ontology in which each scale has “its 
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own history, occurring at its own tempo, even if these histories interact.”92  What 
emerges sounds like ecology, but a more heterogeneous and historical ecology than we 
generally find in political ecology.  In terms of empirical research, it recalls the multi-
scale historical ecology that Carole Crumley pioneered in Europe: reading landscapes 
through the intersection of longue durée geological and climatic patterns, the recovered 
histories of forgotten roads and anthropogenic forests, and the intimate rhythms of 
everyday life.
93
  I translate this eclectic sensibility to a different site and set of concerns.  
 
 
Infrastructure and Politics 
The infrastructural approach to politics, like scale, is relational.  It focuses our 
attention on the kind of politics that received little attention in political ecology before the 
recent post-constructivist, or ontological, turn.  Marxian political ecologists 
conceptualized politics in structural terms defined by capitalist political economy.  Power 
acted downward upon rural people and local environments, leading to a politics of 
domination and resistance.  Post-structuralists, focused on the constitutive power of 
discourse, emphasized the politics of possibility opened through other ways of knowing.  
The political ecology of infrastructure engages what Annemarie Mol calls ontological 
politics: 
Ontological politics is a composite term.  It talks of ontology – which in 
standard philosophical parlance defines what belongs to the real, the 
conditions of possibility we live with.  If the term ‘ontology’ is combined 
with that of ‘politics’ then this suggests that the conditions of possibility 
are not given.  That reality does not precede the mundane practices in 
which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within these practices.  So 
the term politics works to underline this active mode, this process of 
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shaping, and the fact that its character is both open and contested.
94
  
 
A neo-pragmatist politics has been central to infrastructure studies.  The 
conditions of political possibility are not given, as Mol writes, but shaped through our 
relations with the built environment.  Language and governance are important political 
sites, but so are sites of design and (literal) construction.  Thus, infrastructures play a 
critical role in organizing contemporary political ecologies, particularly the systematic 
dispersal of environmental vulnerability across space.  Environmental catastrophes, 
economic disparities, and the political spaces of hope and despair are bound up with the 
built environment.  For example, scholars have shown that famines are not confined to 
where natural events like droughts occur, but also the product of markets and distribution 
systems.
95
  Infrastructure created in historical contexts of discrimination both reflect and 
reinscribe human inequality.
96
  Langdon Winner’s theory of technological politics has 
been very influential in this regard.  Arguing that technologies are political phenomena in 
their own right, he writes, “The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not 
only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in 
tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and semiconductors, nuts and bolts.”97   
 
The initial technical decisions made by engineers and designers are important, 
because they give infrastructures a path dependency.
98
  Even as the new is continuously 
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layered over the old, the present is shaped by past decisions, contingencies, values, 
politics, and the standards of worlds that have passed.  Transportation systems are a great 
example of this type of layering.  Thus, the infrastructural politics of the present must be 
understood in terms of past biases and assumptions, decisions and actions.  Geoffrey 
Bowker and Susan Leigh Star have called scholars to conduct infrastructural inversions, 
or archaeologies of the organizational work and arrangements embedded in systems.
99
  
My research follows their call by inverting the standard history of the Panama Canal as a 
large technical system and attempting to recover the politics of the past. 
 
If infrastructures format relationships among humans and non-humans, as I argue 
above, they do so with normative force.  As I show in Chapter 3, for example, transport 
routes in Panama are not designed to move everything and everywhere, but to channel 
flows along specific paths reflecting particular political-economic priorities.  Roads, 
dams, and electrification projects are the symbols, organs, and connective tissues of state-
making efforts.  There is also a politics of aspiration associated with infrastructures.  
Infrastructures do not simply benefit or hurt people in a crude political-economic sense.  
They also enchant people and inspire unexpected forms of use and engagement.
100
  This 
reminds us that, technically and politically, infrastructures do more than they are 
supposed to.  People modify and use them for purposes other than those for which they 
were intended.  Thus, possibilities are not fixed, as Mol says, but shaped within practices.  
 
Infrastructure and Boundaries 
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Infrastructures cross and act as boundaries, creating edges and centers.
101
  On the 
one hand, infrastructures establish limits, points past which the movement of people, 
information, and objects is restricted or slowed.  On the other hand, they are meeting 
points: sites of convergence, attraction, translation, and negotiation.  Susan Leigh Star 
and James Greisemer developed the analytic concept of boundary objects to highlight 
how different groups successfully work together across social and economic 
difference.
102
  They argue that mobile objects like diagrams, maps, and metaphors “are 
plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of several parties employing 
them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites.” 103  By inhabiting 
multiple social worlds simultaneously, they form a common boundary.  Star and Bowker 
make a similar move with infrastructure, arguing that scholars should conceptualize it as 
relational rather than singular.  Boundary infrastructures, they argue, come into being, 
persist, and fail in relation to the socio-material practices of the communities that accrete 
around them.
104
  Therefore, they are particularly amenable to multi-sited ethnography.  
 
Star calls for an ethnography of infrastructure: qualitative research on the 
relationships between infrastructures and the human communities that build, use, and are 
affected by them.
105
  Over time and through practice, the boundaries between the formal 
and informal aspects of infrastructure are blurred.
106
  They change as people learn tricks 
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and adapt strategies for taking advantage of or dealing with the problems associated with 
the systems they encounter.  “This evolution,” Star and Ruhleder wrote, “is facilitated by 
those elements of the formal structure which support the redefinition of local roles and 
the emergence of communities of practice around the intersection of specific technologies 
and types of problems.”107  Another important point is that people and communities 
interact with multiple infrastructures, which are often networked with one another over 
great distances.
108
  People live with infrastructure – shaping it as it shapes them – but it 
also exceeds individual capacity to know and act.  Therefore, infrastructure allows 
disparate elements (like the machete and the freighter) to come into communication, but 
does not necessarily organize them according to a fixed cultural, political, or economic 
principle.
109
  The body of my dissertation focuses precisely on the moments when and 
sites where infrastructures are ill-defined and come into conflict with one another. 
 
MAP OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation brings together four shadow histories,
110
 of the Panama Canal.  
The chapters are each organized around an object (water, bananas, concrete, and forests) 
and a theme (control/excess, governance/margins, politics/mobility, 
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nature/infrastructure).  What the chapters have in common is that they use an object to 
examine a moment of transformation in infrastructural and ecological relationships on the 
isthmus during the twentieth century.  These four objects brought together new networks 
of people and, at the same time, engendered conflicts over the appropriate use and 
distribution of natural and economic resources.  I arrived at the events, topics, and themes 
explored in the dissertation chapters through the accounts of a different set of actors than 
those who generally narrate the canal.  I conducted semi-structured interviews, oral 
histories, and participant observation with farmers, bus drivers, maintenance men, and 
state functionaries between 2006 and 2010.  Yet, across this diversity, I found remarkable 
consistency in what people define as the important moments in regional history.  These 
were the moments of breakdown and transformation when region-making projects 
collided with or diverged from one another – when the changing governmental, technical, 
and ecological boundaries of the Panama Canal system suddenly came into tension with 
the trajectories of other groups: the development aspirations of the Panamanian state, the 
logic of banana export agriculture, or the landholding dreams of smallholder farmers.  
 
Chapter One (Water) reorients the history of the Panama Canal by focusing on 
water management rather than soil excavation.  I retrace the transformation of the volatile 
Chagres River and its tributaries into a manageable water source for shipping during the 
first decades of the twentieth century and the concomitant depopulation of the US Canal 
Zone.  I examine key elements of the historical engineering work (constructing locks and 
dams) and calculative practice (watershed surveys, hydrographic data collection, and 
cartography that went into assembling the core infrastructure still in use today.  I show 
how water control was converted into political control, and vice versa by examining the 
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transformation of the Chagres River into a working canal.  I recount two stories upon 
canal waters between 1910 and 1914 – the migration of displaced river communities and 
the research of a team of Smithsonian scientists – in order to highlight forms of control 
and excess produced through this system.  New locks and dams interacted with unknown 
or unacknowledged webs of social and ecological relationships, producing unintended 
consequences.  The aquatic space that emerged at Gatun Lake, the massive artificial 
reservoir flooded to store water for the canal, was neither a replica of engineers' designs, 
nor an elevated version of the lost world along the Chagres River.  A new waterworld 
emerged around the trade route as it opened for business.  I conclude by tracing how the 
water management network shapes the region around the canal in the present. 
 
Chapter Two (Bananas) examines relationships among governance, labor, and 
life at the rural margins of the Canal Zone during the first decades of the twentieth 
century.  I focus on the implementation and effects of a state program (1921-1932) that 
permitted former canal laborers – primarily poor, black West Indians – to lease formerly 
depopulated lands in the Zone for agriculture.  In the decades after the waterway first 
opened in 1914, the enclave was largely rural, practically roadless, and poorly surveyed.  
Isthmian Canal Commission plans for the hundreds of square miles of land not 
immediately necessary for transportation or residential purposes became a critical point 
of tension within and beyond the commission. Who, if anyone, would be allowed to live 
and work on rural Zone lands?  By foregrounding the implementation and consequences 
of the land lease program, I show that the US project was defined as much at its rural 
margins as its urban termini.  The Canal Zone’s rural question – how to best manage 
recently depopulated landscapes – seems minor, but it raised fundamental questions about 
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the ambitions and parameters of the larger US project in Panama.  Moreover, tensions 
between transportation and agrarian livelihoods in the transit zone still persist today 
(Chapter 4).  My strategy for navigating this environmental, technological, and cultural 
history is to retrace the rise and fall of export banana networks in the region.  The banana 
is emblematic of the often unnoticed, or marginal, human and political ecologies around 
modern transportation routes. 
 
Chapter Three (Concrete) investigates tensions around the construction of 
Panama’s first domestic Atlantic-Pacific highway – the Transístmica– during the early-
1940s.  In the first part of the chapter, I use the highway as an entry point into persistent 
problems of mobility in the interoceanic transit zone.  For centuries – beginning with the 
crumbling of the colonial-era Camino Real and ending with the early-1940s construction 
of the concrete highway – there had been no paved road between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.  Even today, transportation remains a critical problem in Panama.  People devote 
an inordinate amount of their time, money, and energy to moving around a space 
designed to facilitate transportation. Why is it so hard to get around a region organized 
around transportation?  By situating Panama’s road system within a more extensive 
networked infrastructure that also includes the canal, I show how the infrastructure built 
to move ships by water across Panama has historically disrupted the establishment of 
routes that would facilitate mobility greater within the region.  Mobility and immobility 
on the isthmus are products of networked infrastructures that channel people and 
materials along routes that reflect the priorities of particular communities.  The second 
part of the chapter draws on ethnographic material about a small road off of the Trans-
Isthmian Highway to explore how, in the absence of formal infrastructure, people work 
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around its edges.  They pressure local representatives for maintenance funding, devise 
micro-transportation systems, and work collectively to repair critical passage points. 
 
Chapter Four (Forests) analyzes land use tensions around the Panama Canal as 
the surrounding watershed – a hydrological basin drained by six major rivers that flow 
into the waterway – became an administrative region during the 1977-1999 transfer of the 
US canal and Canal Zone to Panama.  As the critical region, labeled the Panama Canal 
watershed, came entirely under Panamanian control for the first time,
111
 domestic and 
international institutions pursued new forms of water management that emphasized 
environmental governance over civil engineering.  Whereas canal administrators had 
previously emphasized the control of water in its liquid state, watershed management was 
an attempt to manipulate water flows by transforming land use practices in populated 
forests located as far as twenty-five miles upstream from the interoceanic shipping lane.  
I propose natural infrastructure – socio-ecological forms reimagined as support systems 
for global commerce – as a heuristic device for exploring the practices and politics of this 
momentous phenomenon in Panama and elsewhere.  Natural infrastructure, like that 
made of concrete and steel, is embedded with politics.  The construction of infrastructural 
landforms entails the restriction of alternative forms of land and resource use.  It both 
enables and disrupts other projects.  But building natural infrastructure also differs in 
significant ways from, say, roads.  The objects of new designs are bound up in webs of 
affective and economic relationships that pre-exist their identification as matters of extra-
local concern.  Natural infrastructure is built upon expert knowledge, but its creation is 
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irreducible to more effective technologies of environmental visibility and valuation.  In 
practice, remaking nature as infrastructure entails translational work around its objects: 
navigating webs of human-ecological interdependency, aligning of incongruent 
definitions and boundaries, and negotiating new responsibilities. 
 II.  WATER: CONTROL AND EXCESS ACROSS THE PANAMA CANAL’S 
WATER MANAGEMENT NETWORK 
 
If you want to see the Panama Canal in action, you will likely end up at the 
Miraflores Locks Visitor Center, located in the former United States (US) Canal Zone 
outside of Panama City.  The modern facility – all cream adobe walls, towering plate 
glass windows, and marble floors – is a showcase for the history of the famous trade 
route.  It contains a museum, a theatre, and a gift shop hawking canal neckties and tea 
sets.  But the real action is outside.  From a three-tiered viewing deck, visitors watch a 
slow parade of container ships, oil tankers, and cruise ships pass through locks built a 
century ago.  I spent several afternoons at the locks while conducting fieldwork in 
Panama.  Here, crudely, is how they work.  A ship slides into the lock chamber and 
massive steel gates swing slowly closed.  Then, a lockmaster opens valves in a water 
storage reservoir located above the locks.  Water surges through culverts the size of 
subway tunnels embedded in the concrete walls of the lock chamber, enters cross-culverts 
that run beneath its floor, and then erupts upward.  The surface of the water in the 
chamber bubbles and rises at a rate of two to three feet per minute, improbably lifting an 
enormous ship up from sea level.   
 
The canal releases a staggering fifty-two million gallons of fresh water – equal to 
the daily domestic consumption of approximately five hundred thousand Panamanians, or 
one-seventh of the national population
112
 – from the surrounding drainage basin into the 
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Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with each passing ship.  US and Panamanian state 
institutions have reorganized the Chagres River and its tributaries and created a canal by 
controlling water through infrastructure made of concrete, earth, and steel.  But don’t be 
fooled.  A river still flows through the canal.  Its occasional emergence reminds us that 
infrastructure controls and produces excess. 
* * * 
"Panama doesn't have oil, Panama has water.”  The comparison of national 
economies organized around these two fluids first caught my attention in an 
advertisement supporting a controversial hydroelectric project proposed on Panama’s 
Caribbean coast.  Later, while conducting fieldwork in the campo (countryside), I heard 
similar comparisons.  “Water is the petroleum of Panama,” one woman told me, “desert 
countries have petroleum and we have water.”  Ricardo Aleman Alfaro, the Panamanian 
Ambassador to Mexico framed the canal expansion in similar terms: “The Panama Canal 
is our oil.”  I passed it off as the legacy of some past media campaign and, before long, 
forgot about it.  However, the water-as-petroleum discourse returned to my mind in 
December 2010 – in a much different context – a year after I returned from Panama.  
* * *  
The Panama Canal closed for only the third time in ninety-six years on December 
8, 2010 when water overflowed the infrastructure designed to control it.
113
  The events 
began when an inch and a half of rain, not unusual late in the rainy season, fell around the 
canal on December 7.  However, the downpour became memorable over the next twenty-
four hours as a stationary area of low pressure unleashed another four and a half inches.  
Panamanian meteorologists reported that the rainfall, associated with a La Niña weather 
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phenomenon pounding Colombia, Venezuela, and Central America, exceeded anything 
recorded near the canal in seventy-three years.
114
  
 
When the floodwaters rose, I was back in North Carolina after conducting 
fieldwork in Panama.  The shaky, handheld YouTube clip that played on my laptop 
screen shocked me.  The boundary between land and water was blurred.  Islands of 
unmoored trees and grass floated rapidly over the brown, sediment-heavy surface of the 
Chagres River as it flowed into Gatun Lake.
115
  Moments later, the current propelled the 
island under the Gamboa bridge, splintering trees like matchsticks against metal girders 
(see photo below).  The canal was closed midday on December 8 after the Panama Canal 
Authority reported an excessive volume of water flowing from the Chagres River into 
Gatun Lake and Alhajuela Lake, raising the water storage reservoirs to levels that 
threatened the interoceanic transit of ships.   
 
People in many of the communities located along the banks of the river and the 
lakes – including the two villages where I lived and conducted fieldwork – were 
evacuated due to flash floods that displaced more than fifteen hundred people and killed 
eight in the community of Portobelo on the Atlantic coast.  President Ricardo Martinelli 
announced a national state of emergency and said that populations around the canal 
should expect a reduced potable water supply due to the effects of the rain on purification 
plants.  The canal reopened for business early the next morning – seventeen hours after 
closing – but the region’s communities were unable to normalize so quickly.   
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* * * 
I relate this anecdote about the flood of 2010 to make a point: the infrastructure 
built to manage water for the canal is inextricable from regional socio-political 
organization.  This suggests an interesting parallel between economies organized around 
oil extraction and water management.  Timothy Mitchell points out in the article “Carbon 
democracy” that states organized around petroleum extraction appear to be less 
democratic than other states.  He suggests that the politics of oil and petro-states can be 
better understood by “following the oil itself” as it is produced, distributed, and converted 
into other forms of socio-technical organization, financial circulation, and political 
power.  This is not, he argues, because the material properties of oil determine everything 
else, “but because, in tracing the connections that were made between pipelines and 
pumping stations, refineries and shipping routes, road systems and automobile cultures, 
dollar flows and economic knowledge, weapons experts and militarism, one discovers 
how a peculiar set of relations was engineered among oil, violence, finance, expertise and 
democracy.”116   
 
Water, of course, is not oil.  As Mitchell makes clear, the specificities of fluids 
matter.  Water takes on various appearances and meanings, but answers to a single name 
– except when it answers to others (swamp, steam, mud).117  By paying attention to the 
technical arrangements and engineering work that have – for the most part – regulated the 
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water flows of the Chagres River, I will analyze how a socio-technical system connects, 
excludes, and produces unexpected relationships among human groups and their 
environments.  Attention to the infrastructure that channels water flow reveals something 
important about contemporary politics in this region of Panama.  It is the heart of a socio-
technical system that distributes channels water, but also economic possibilities and 
human vulnerabilities, unevenly across spaces and populations.   
 
The users of large technical systems like the Panama Canal treat them as 
infrastructure, meaning that they are expected to operate smoothly in the background, 
providing support for more immediate projects.  Thus, moments of breakdown like the 
flood of 2010 are also moments of visibility.  They bring complex relationships among 
technologies, political institutions, environmental conditions, and cultural expectations to 
the foreground that are, for most people,
118
 hidden.  “The history of science,” Michel 
Callon observes, “is nothing but the long and interminable series of untimely 
overflowings, of sociotechnical agencements, that have been caught out, unable to 
discipline and frame the entities that they assemble…a badly calculated boat, an ill-
adjusted missile, or a wrongly formulated theorem reveals unsuspected worlds.”  
Overflow raises important questions about the boundaries and scales of large technical 
systems.  Where, for example, does the Panama Canal start and stop?  At the limits of the 
shipping channel?  At the ridgeline of the watershed that drains into the canal?  At the 
edges of the global port network connected to Panama by oceanic shipping routes?  At 
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the dynamic frontiers of the climatic and hydrological systems that shape rainfall and 
drought on the isthmus?  
 
As these questions suggest, the canal is difficult to pin down in the absolute, 
Euclidean space defined by cadastral mapping and engineering practices.  One key 
problem is that scholars often construct their accounts on foundations of dirt.  “Let the 
dirt fly” was a popular media refrain as men and machines excavated thousands of tons of 
earth in the Culebra Cut.  The completion of the canal was held up as an illustration of 
modern man’s triumph over earthly constraints – nature, disease, and even geology – 
recalling a modernist faith in development and technological progress that is now deeply 
troubled.  If soil excavation is the story of canal construction, the canal is a “big ditch” 
between two oceans: a channel completed in 1914.  The frame is frozen.  But, if we put 
fast-forward just one year, a different picture emerges: a large landslide falls into the 
Culebra Cut, blocking traffic and closing the recently opened waterway for months.  The 
canal is never frozen, but fluid, always changing and taking on different forms. 
 
Anthropologists have recently encouraged us to think in terms of waterworlds: 
communities linked through a collective involvement with water.
119
  The canal can be 
understood in terms of managed water, but this does not mean that these waters can be 
reduced to the canal. People in Panama have used the rivers and lakes associated with this 
major trade route for a variety of other purposes: agriculture, fishing, local transportation, 
scientific research, recreation, and household use.  In moments of excess like the flood of 
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2010, the water management network of the Panama Canal reveals the persistence of 
connections around a system that usually seems like infrastructure.  This chapter travels 
across the stories of several communities – engineers, Afro-Panamanian farmers, Canal 
Zone functionaries, and invasive plants – that intersected as a new water management 
network was assembled in Panama during the early-twentieth century.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Panama Canal watershed.  The watershed is comprised of 
the rivers that flow into Gatun Lake, (center) and Madden Lake (right).
120
  
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTER 
The first section of this chapter focuses on water management infrastructure and 
control.  I examine key elements of historical engineering work (constructing locks and 
dams) and calculative practice (watershed surveys, hydrographic data collection, and 
cartography) that went into assembling the core water management infrastructure that is 
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still in use today.  By following the transformation of the Chagres River into a working 
canal, I show how the control of water was converted into political control, and vice 
versa.  The second section of the chapter focuses on water management infrastructure and 
excess.  By following two stories that unfolded between 1910 and 1914 upon the rising 
waters of the canal – the migration of river communities displaced by the flooding of 
Gatun Lake and the field research of a team of Smithsonian scientists studying regional 
ecology – I show how locks and dams interacted with unknown or unacknowledged webs 
of social and ecological relationships, producing unintended consequences.  The aquatic 
space that emerged at Gatun Lake, the massive artificial reservoir flooded to store water 
for the canal, was neither a replica of engineers' designs, nor an elevated version of the 
flooded world along the Chagres River.  I conclude by suggesting how the assembly of 
the Panama Canal’s water management network continues to shape the surrounding 
region in the present. 
 
CONTROL: THE LOCK CANAL DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
In the summer of 1906, the United States Congress opted to fund the construction 
of a lock canal in Panama.  The American route would, for the most part, follow the 
channel where the French Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique worked in 
the 1880s.
121
  But there was one significant change of plans.  Before bankruptcy and the 
death of an estimated 22,000 laborers, the French company had planned to excavate a 
sea-level canal: a channel that, if completed, would have allowed ships to travel 
unimpeded on salt water between the oceans.  By contrast, the US design would move 
traffic over an aquatic staircase of six fresh water locks, where ships would be lifted up 
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from sea level to eighty-five feet and then lowered back down to sea level at the opposite 
side of the isthmus. 
 
The lock canal decision was not inevitable.  During the first two years of 
construction (1904-1906), engineering debates persisted regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of competing canal designs: sea-level and lock-and-dam.  The Board of 
Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal was assembled in 1905 by President 
Theodore Roosevelt and charged with considering plans for the canal and making 
recommendations.  After consulting the existing surveys and reports compiled by the 
French, the 1899-1901 US Isthmian Canal Commission study, and traveling to Panama to 
study the terrain firsthand, the group was unable to reach consensus.  They produced two 
reports.  The majority report advocated a second attempt to dig a sea-level canal and the 
minority report supported the construction of a lock canal.  The proposals differed in 
estimated cost and time.  The construction of the lock canal was expected to cost $139 
million and take nine years, approximately half the estimated time and cost of the sea-
level plan.  Proponents argued that it would be safer for ships under Chagres River flood 
conditions, allow faster passage for large ships, cost less to maintain, and be easier to 
enlarge and defend.   
 
The plans were circulated to the members of the Isthmian Canal Commission, 
Secretary Taft, and President Roosevelt for consideration, who all supported the lock 
canal.  Nevertheless, the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals voted in May 1906 to 
support the sea-level plan.  At a crucial moment when the plan was up for vote before the 
US Senate and House of Representatives, Chief Engineer Stevens sent word of a large 
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rainy season flood on the Chagres, which further convinced him of the navigational 
dangers that a sea-level canal without dams and locks might entail.  The lock canal was 
approved by the Senate in late-June 1906 and, days later, by the House of 
Representatives.  The decision was irreducible to engineering debates and technical 
specifications.  It was also shaped by geopolitical concerns, economic issues, 
construction timetables, and climatic contingencies in Panama.
122
 
 
Infrastructure and Circulation 
The decision to build a lock canal and design of its concrete and steel chambers –
1050 feet long, 110 wide, and 85 deep – would have lasting implications within and 
beyond Panama.  The lock chambers permitted passing ships nine hundred feet of usable 
length, ninety-five feet of usable width, and forty feet of usable depth, or draft.  Why 
these dimensions?  Congress passed a law stipulating that the waterway afford passage to 
the largest ships existing at the time of lock construction and “such as may be reasonably 
anticipated.”  Two commercial ships under construction for the Cunard line – 800 x 88 x 
38 feet – would be the largest afloat.123  However, 95% of ocean-going ships measured 
less than six hundred feet in length at the time.
124
  The Panamax ship standard, a vessel 
that maximizes the permissible dimensions for transiting the canal, continues to influence 
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 52 
ship construction and port design decisions around the world.  Ships shaped the 
dimensions of locks and, over time, locks came to shape the dimensions of ships.   
 
The lock decision fixed another standard with profound implications in the 
surrounding region: water volume.  The canal engineers of the early-twentieth century 
designed a water management network that would meet the needs of contemporary and 
projected future shipping.  The water required by this design – fifty-two million gallons 
per passage – precipitated the technological reorganization of the Chagres River and its 
tributaries to monitor, regulate, and deliver enormous amounts of fresh water.
125
  The 
technical specificities of locks and dams mediated relationships between global 
commerce and regional ecology.  They produced a set of conditions in which water and 
ships had to conform as a condition of circulation.
126
  Relationships among infrastructure 
design, water flows, and ship size were not determinant, but recursive.  Flows of water 
and ships shaped infrastructure, which, over time, shaped flows of water and ships.   
 
The Geological History of Panama 
Topography – the arrangement of natural and artificial features of an area – plays 
a key role in the following discussion.  Before proceeding, then, it will be useful to 
explain current scientific knowledge of the geological history of the Panamanian isthmus.  
As we now understand plate tectonics, the isthmus emerged over a subduction zone 
where two oceanic plates – the Caribbean Plate and Pacific Ocean Plate – met and 
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formed a volcanic arc in a contiguous American tropical ocean.
127
  The deepwater 
connection between the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea began to close in the early 
Miocene, fifteen to twenty million years ago.  Magma rose up through plate fissures, 
creating a broad underwater ridge that was still under a thousand meters of water.  By 
eleven million years ago, an island archipelago with marine and coastal habitats appeared 
across what is today the southern half of Central America.  Sediment runoff gradually 
filled in the spaces between the islands.  Only three corridors remained connecting 
Pacific and Caribbean waters at the end of the Miocene: the Atrato basin in northwestern 
Colombia, the San Carlos Basin in northern Costa Rica and southern Nicaragua, and the 
Panama Canal Basin.  By four million years ago, the water at these points was fifty 
meters deep.  The closure of the Panamanian isthmus took place three and a half million 
years ago, dividing a single American tropical ocean.   
 
The division of the seas was an event of great paleoclimatic, paleogeographic, and 
paleobiological importance.
 
 However, the division of the land bridge between North 
America and South America through the construction of the Panama Canal would also 
prove to be an event of lasting historical, political, and technical significance.  The 
Panamanian isthmus created a barrier to the inter-oceanic movement of marine life, even 
as it facilitated the movement of a flood of terrestrial organisms between the North and 
South America.  The Panama Canal follows the orientation of a northwest-southeast 
depression – roughly 20 miles wide with a maximum altitude of 650 feet – shaped by 
volcanic and sedimentary processes.  As one of the lowest-lying and last connecting 
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points on the Central American land bridge, the basin is defined by marine and terrestrial 
deposits sedimented on top of volcanic basement rock.    
 
The Lay of the Land 
US civil engineers needed to learn about the hydrogeology of the isthmus when 
canal work began.  The French had planned to excavate a sea-level canal with water 
supplied by the connected oceans, so determining the volume of water flowing through 
the river system had not been a priority.  Consequently, they built only three gauging 
stations along the entire length of the Chagres for measuring water flow.  No instrumental 
survey of the river’s drainage basin, or watershed, had been conducted, so its area and 
water runoff were only generally known.  For a lock canal, by contrast, knowledge of the 
volume, speed, and variability of water flows, as well as the overall area of the 
watershed, was critical. “The vital question,” wrote Henry Abbot, hydrologist and retired 
Army Corps of Engineers Brigadier General, in 1905, “was to determine whether the 
Chagres will supply all the needs of the Canal in seasons of low water.  Any reasonable 
doubt here would be fatal to the project of a canal with locks…”128  
 
Abbot’s “vital question” of water supply in the rainforests of Panama seemed 
ludicrous to more casual observers on the isthmus.  The authors of one among a raft of 
books praising the triumphs of the canal project commented on what they understood to 
be excessive water volume in Panama: "The November visitor to the Zone who has seen 
the floods of the Chagres carrying before them trees, houses and bridges, submerging 
steam shovels, destroying miles of railroad, will never question the adequacy of the water 
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supply.”129  Abbot, by contrast, was among the most knowledgeable experts about 
isthmian canal engineering debates.  He served on the Board of Consulting Engineers and 
its predecessor, the Comite Technique, an international body of engineering experts 
assembled by the French New Canal Company in the 1890s to consider the future of the 
canal after the failure of the initial French project.  Precipitation is seasonal in Panama, 
with roughly a nine-month rainy season and a three-month dry season.  Mitigating these 
changes in precipitation and river discharge was critical to engineers’ plans.  
 
In order to make the lock design functional throughout the year, a water 
management network would have to be assembled around the Chagres River and its 
tributaries to ensure a consistent water supply.  Its centerpiece would be a massive 
artificial storage reservoir – Gatun Lake – that would collect water during the nine-month 
rainy season in order to operate the locks through the three-month dry season.  Its 
secondary purpose was to “tame” the volatile Chagres River by absorbing the periodically 
surging floodwaters that might threaten passing ships.
130
  Knowledge of the limits and 
area of the Chagres River watershed was necessary to estimate the flow of water into the 
lake and, by extension, water supply available to the canal.  During the first years of 
canal construction (1904-1908) engineers had been working with piecemeal watershed 
data collected by state- and privately-funded surveys that dated to the mid-nineteenth 
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century.
131
  In order to accurately estimate the volume of water that would flow into 
Gatun Lake, engineers and hydrologists needed hydrographic data and survey data on the 
topography and surface area of the Chagres River watershed.  When Wm. Silbert, head of 
the Department of Locks and Dam Construction wrote Chief Engineer Goethals to 
request funds for a hydrological survey of the Chagres River watershed in 1908, 
engineers were using a “sketch map” at a 1:300,000 scale from the 1899-1901 Report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission, too rough for their purposes. 
 
The Hydrographic Survey, Watershed Maps, and the Politics of Topography 
Silbert wanted to begin the survey quickly.  Caleb Saville, an Assistant Engineer, 
did the logistical work.  He requested letters of introduction to Panamanian politicians in 
upper watershed localities and necessary survey equipment: transits, Y-levels, lining 
rods, compasses, hand levels, barometers, field glasses, and stadia rods.  The first survey 
party entered the field in November of 1908, the year that soil excavation at Culebra Cut 
peaked at thirty-seven million cubic yards.
132
  As thousands of laborers toiled in the cut, a 
small group of three engineers and fifteen laborers pulled their canoes ashore and made 
camp miles upstream on the Chilibre River.  The work of measuring and mapping the 
watershed was humble in terms of manpower, but early surveyors contributed to a body 
of hydrographic knowledge and cartographic representation that was also critical to the 
success of the canal as a technical and political project.  The Canal Record, the official 
newspaper of the Isthmian Canal Commission, described the lands to be surveyed: “The 
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country above Gamboa is so sparsely settled that the surveying parties will be supplied by 
cayuco [canoe]…the country affords a bare living to the few negroes who inhabit it.”133  
This quote may suggest the demographic “emptiness” of the upper watershed, but it also 
illustrates the colonial lens through with through which many early canal administrators 
viewed non-white people, rural livelihoods, and forest landscapes (Chapter 2). 
 
By the end of 1908, four parties with twenty to twenty-five members each were 
surveying the watershed.  They faced constant environmental, social, and technical 
challenges.  Rivers flooded and made boat travel, the only mode of transportation in the 
region, difficult.  The boat operators and laborers who cut trails through the forest to lay 
survey lines quit or left, unexpectedly, to participate in extended New Year’s 
celebrations.  Engineers became sick.  Necessary equipment broke and was sent for 
repair.  Days and sometimes weeks were lost through each of these difficulties.  But, 
ultimately, the parties completed a traverse survey of the Chagres River basin up about 
five miles below the watershed’s ridgeline.  They located basic points on the ridgeline 
and omitted some smaller rivers altogether.  The map produced using survey data was at 
a 1:150,000 scale.  It was still rough, but had twice the detail of the previous map. 
 
The impetus for the 1908 Chagres River watershed survey was to acquire more 
detailed hydrological knowledge for engineering purposes.  But water management and 
politics were inextricable in the transit zone.  Canal administrators instructed the Chagres 
survey teams to expand topographical and landscape data collection to twenty feet above 
and below the surface level of the future Gatun Lake in anticipation of the US managing 
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lands that, at the time, were still Panamanian.
134
   In Article Two of the Panama Canal 
Treaty of 1903, Panama granted the US the “use, occupation, and control” in perpetuity 
of a ten-mile-wide strip of territory – the Canal Zone – bisecting the narrowest part of the 
isthmus.  However, in addition to near-sovereign powers within the Zone, the US had 
authority to expropriate additional lands and waters as necessary for the "construction, 
maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection" of the canal.
135
  This phrase, notable 
for its strategic vagueness, allowed the US to legally expand canal infrastructure and the 
political geography of the Zone in tandem as new conditions demanded.  
 
Water demands transformed the physical geography of the transit zone, but they 
also reshaped political boundaries on the isthmus.  Topographic maps had engineering 
uses, but they also had governmental uses.  Drafted for engineering purposes – the 
control of water – topographic maps were used as tools of political control.  When the 
one and a half mile-long earthen Gatun Dam was completed in 1911, the flow of the 
Chagres to the Atlantic Ocean was interrupted and Gatun Lake began to rise.  US 
politicians invoked treaty rights to expropriate the lands to be flooded for the new lake 
and, in 1912, the Panamanian state recognized the right of the US to administer an 
additional seventy square miles in the future lake region.  The lake would be maintained 
at eighty-five to eighty-seven feet above sea level.  However, Panama ceded land to the 
hundred-foot contour, which would become the new political boundary between the 
Canal Zone and Panama around the lake.  Through this process, topographic contour 
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lines mapped by surveyors for engineering purposes became political and, therefore, a 
site of struggle at the canal’s margins. 
 
The flooding of the lake coincided with the implementation of a depopulation 
policy in 1912 designed to “extinguish” competing private property claims in the Canal 
Zone and efforts to relocate thousands of Panamanians and West Indian laborers living 
below the level of the future lake – now designated by the US government as 
“squatters.”136  The stated motivation for rural depopulation was freedom to construct 
transportation infrastructure.  Canal administrators also framed it as a means of 
improving sanitary control in the Zone.  Autonomous, unmonitored West Indian and 
“native” populations were understood to pose disease threats to white communities.  But, 
in private correspondence, administrators also argued that squatting might prove to be a 
significant problem for canal construction itself.  Some administrators feared that, given 
an opportunity, the labor force would desert difficult construction work “for this easy life 
in the bush.”137  Depopulation, it seemed to administrators, would eliminate all three 
problems at once. 
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Chagres River landscapes looked quite different on the ground than they did at a 
distance.  Far from the political centers in Washington and Panama City, power operated 
in more intimate and incomplete ways.  Topographical contour lines were only legible on 
the maps that Canal Zone police carried into the field.  Policemen attempted to locate 
houses below the eighty-seven foot contour in order to document their occupants and 
distribute resettlement orders.  The Canal Record described the progress of the 
depopulation efforts in 1912 and 1913:  
 
In anticipation of the rise of Gatun Lake the Department of Law has been 
engaged for the past year and a half in removing from the area the native 
families, who lived in detached houses scattered through the jungle, or in 
little villages clustered on the banks of streams or along the line of the 
railroad.  In that time about 70 per cent of the population has moved out of 
the area, going either above the 87-foot contour or entirely out of the lake 
watershed.  Some moved promptly on being notified, other had to be taken 
out when the water was almost at their doors; some have disappeared in 
the higher silence of woods creatures; and some have moved in bodies, 
forming new settlements in which is preserved the community life of the 
old.  Most of the population of old Monte Lirio moved together up the 
Gatun River and formed a village which they call Limon.
138
 
 
EXCESS: LIMON AND THE “LOST TOWNS” OF THE CHAGRES RIVER 
I first arrived in Limon by road – the side of town opposite the lake – in March 
2008.  That morning, I boarded a diablo rojo (a brightly painted former US school bus) at 
a bustling mall on the suburban outskirts of Panama City.  I wedged my knees into the 
torn vinyl of the seat in front of me for four hours and finally stepped off at a bus stop 
next to the Transístmica, the congested highway between Panama City and Colon.  It was 
late in the dry season: hot, dusty, and yellow.  Limon – one of my two ethnographic field 
sites – is located on a peninsula where the Gatun River flows into the lake.  The lake’s 
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calm green waters are interrupted by forested islands and the smooth, white trunks of 
dead forests flooded a century ago.  The peninsula, which rises up abruptly from the lake, 
is covered with a couple hundred
139
 small wood and cinder block homes, and crowned by 
the steeple of a catholic church.  On the lake, you might see men in small motorboats 
fishing around the islands or someone paddling a canoe along the shoreline, but, for the 
most part, the water is quiet and the lake seems very natural.  But, if you come to shore, 
pass through town and walk to a high point set back from the lake, you can see past the 
Panama Railroad line to the far side, where large ships pass through the shipping lane. 
 
Limon attracted me for a couple of reasons.  Before the transfer of the Canal Zone 
to Panama began in 1977, the Gatun River was a political boundary between the Zone 
and Panama.  Limon, situated on the river, was the first Panamanian community on the 
lake’s east bank.  Consequently, I expected that ethnographic and oral historical work in 
Limon would illuminate the everyday lives and histories of Panamanians who have 
occupied this engineered landscape and, I expected, have had sustained socio-economic 
connections with the canal administrators.  I was also attracted by an encounter weeks 
before in a town on the opposite side of the lake, which left me thinking about the 
historical ecology of the lake and the Chagres River. 
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Figure 2.2: Community of Limon with Gatun Lake in the background. 
 
Señor Paulo Ortega
140
 worked thirty-two years for the Panama Canal 
Commission.  “Canal Protection Division,” he said by way of introduction.   He shook 
my hand and then presented – one at a time – three laminated identification cards, each 
with a different photo of a younger, more serious self.  Paulo sat on the covered front 
porch of his house drinking cheap Night Train wine, a near-empty bottle at his feet.  A 
wooden plaque hung on the wall in honor of his years of service to the canal.  Paulo grew 
up here, the town of Escobal, but spent his working years in Colon and returned to his 
hometown after he received his pension.  He explained that Escobal is descended from 
the towns flooded and relocated during the creation of Gatun Lake.  In other words, the 
lower Chagres River valley has a diaspora: the lakeside towns whose founders migrated 
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uphill as the lake was flooded.  The founders of Escobal came from the town of Limon 
Viejo (Old Limon), now underwater on the east side of the lake.  Some of its inhabitants 
moved to the west bank and founded Escobal, others moved to the east bank and founded 
a new Limon.   So, the two towns are “brothers,” he said.  The pueblos perdidos (lost 
towns) share more than a collective historical trauma.  Even today, Paulo said, Escobal 
and Limon are connected through festivals, family lines, and the old culture of the river.  
 
Fifteen minutes later, I was eating dinner in a small restaurant down the street 
when Paulo’s granddaughter ran up to my table and handed me a scrap of paper with a 
scrawled note: 
 
CUANDO EL 
LAGO GATUN 
SE FUNDO QUEDARON 
EN LA PROFUNDIDAD  
DEL LAGO 
SON MONTE VISTOSO 
CALLE BRUJA LIMON 
SAN JUAN Y MONTE LIRIO 
 
English translation: “When the lake was created, Monte Vistoso, Calle Bruja, Limon, San 
Juan, and Monte Lirio remained in its depths.”   
 
Back in Panama City, I filed the note away.  But the story of the pueblos perdidos 
(lost towns) stuck with me, as did Paulo’s reminder that the world of the river is not 
completely lost.   
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Gil-Blas Tejeira, a Panamanian journalist and author, popularized the term 
pueblos perdidos in a historical novel with that title published in 1962.  Tejeira – a 
former teacher, librarian, provincial treasurer, and ambassador – captures the rhythms of 
everyday life and language among the national, economic, and ethnic groups that 
intersected during canal construction.  The work is important, because but it gives the 
people displaced by Gatun Lake names, dreams, and stories. The flood was known as the 
“time when the lake killed the river” in lakeside communities that, sixty years later, still 
thought of themselves as pueblos del río (villages of the river).
141
     
 
Nobody alive in Limon today ever saw the lower Chagres River.  But, in oral 
history interviews, men and women in their seventies and eighties recounted stories of 
flooding, migration, and settlement passed down from their parents’ generation and 
pointed the lake’s surface above the former townsite.  They talked about river life, old 
towns, and, in many cases, the places – Colombia, France, the Caribbean, and even 
Africa – that their ancestors had migrated from.  The pueblos del río were populated by a 
variety of people attracted by jobs associated with the construction of the Panama 
Railroad in the 1850s and the French Canal in the 1880s, but especially Afro-Colombians 
and Afro-Panamanians. Many people in Limon trace their families to a town on the west 
bank of the Chagres River.  Gatun was the largest and most important river community 
between 1849 and 1855 when railroad laborers lived there and, again, during the French 
canal project of the 1880s.  Tejeira described the town before the flooding of the lake: 
 
The houses of Gatun were small and covered with zinc roofs, shaded by 
fruit trees and coconut palms.  A church of wood and zinc was erected on 
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a cement platform with steps.  Perhaps because the bell tower, also of 
wood, was not strong enough to support the weight of the bells, the two 
which, according to the pueblo, had been hung by a beam supported by 
two strong pillars.  The economy of the gatuneros depended primarily on 
the bananas cultivated on the banks of the Chagres and its immediate 
tributaries…There were few whites, many mulattos, and mostly blacks, all 
well integrated.
142
 
 
The flooding and depopulation have receded far enough in time that memories are 
hazy.  But the pueblos perdidos still shape the present in other ways.  One linkage 
between the world along the river and Limon today is Santa Rita, the town’s patron saint.  
Every May 22, Limon celebrates the fiesta patronal, honoring Santa Rita with a 
procession, dancing, and music.  One woman I interviewed remembered that, as a child, 
“The people came from far away and stayed for days.  There were cars parked from my 
house down to the end of the street on both sides for the fiesta and the dances.  The 
dances got so full!”143  The official festivities, especially the Sunday procession, 
emanated from Limon’s Catholic church, Santa Rita de Castilla, which was built through 
community subscriptions during the first decade after the flooding.  Limon inherited this 
festival from Gatun Viejo, which also had Santa Rita as a patron saint.  Tejeira wrote that 
Gatun would fill up with people that came to celebrate.  Pilgrims attracted by a mix of the 
religious and the profane – a procession, cock fights, bowling, and dancing – came from 
along the train line, Colon, and the Caribbean coast.  Celebrations began on the 
nineteenth and lasted most of the week.
144
  The population of the lake region has 
historically been ethnically and culturally linked with that of Panama’s predominantly 
black Atlantic coast around Colon.  The Santa Rita festival illustrates a sense of 
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collectivity and community that is also manifest in other shared cultural features across 
the region:  a shared idiom, home construction style, and diet.
145
 
 
They say that this is the third community called Limon.   The first, Limon Viejo, is 
now beneath thirty feet of water near where the Panama Railroad line runs over a steel 
bridge over the lake.  It was near the confluence of the Gatun and Chagres Rivers before 
the flood.  Oral histories make one thing clear.  From a certain distance, the reservoir-
making process around Gatun Lake seemed straightforward: survey, expropriate, 
depopulate, and flood.  In practice, however, the reorganization of land, water, and 
society across hundreds of square miles or rural territory was a difficult, drawn-out 
process.  The Canal Zone police and people they identified as “squatters” played a game 
of cat and mouse during the years of the flooding.  I began to learn about these 
encounters in more detail after a schoolteacher in Limon turned up a wrinkled photocopy 
of a 1914 article, “Vox climantis in deserto,” that appeared The Independent, a Spanish-
language newspaper.  The author, Benigno Palma, draws heavily on biblical allusions in 
his descriptions of the people of Limon as a nomadic tribe unjustly displaced by the lake 
and the Zone police. 
 
At first, there were only eight Zone policemen working on depopulation in the 
lake basin.  They reported destroying three hundred native houses below the eight-seven 
foot contour by early 1912, burning them to discourage future resettlement.  Officials 
estimated seventy percent of the population was removed from the area by late in the next 
year.  But that estimate was probably too high.  So-called squatters abandoned their 
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houses for other locations in the Zone, especially the new islands and forested banks 
formed by the rising lake.  The story of Limon provides a good example of how difficult 
and politically charged depopulation was.  Villagers in Limon Viejo were, according to 
officials, compensated for their land and improvements.  Unbeknownst to the authorities, 
however, they quickly established a new townsite on the island that is now referred to as 
the second Limon.  Around seventy-five people settled the island and began to farm 
neighboring islands.  On December 17, 1914, representatives of the Mayor of Colon and 
the Canal Company selected a location for Limon on a peninsula above the hundred-foot 
contour line – in the Republic of Panama – on the north bank of the Gatun River.  Police 
ordered the Limoneses (people of Limon) to move again, paid them to dismantle their 
houses and rebuild them at the location where the community is located today.
146
   
 
When Gatun Lake reached its operating level in early 1914, it was the largest 
artificial reservoir in the world, spreading out over 164 square miles.  Engineers’ 
knowledge of topography, climatology, and hydrology proved sufficient to design and 
build a lock canal.  However, as the challenges of depopulation suggest, little was known 
about the flooded region’s social worlds.  Less still was known of the area’s ecology.  
The rising waters of the lake did not completely erase the world of the Chagres River 
valley.  Instead, they also lifted people, fauna, and flora up to eighty-five feet above sea 
level.  Plans interacted with unknown and unacknowledged webs of relationships, often 
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with unintended consequences.
147
  The aquatic space that emerged was neither a replica 
of engineers’ designs, nor an elevated version of the world along the river.   
 
Historical Ecology at Gatun Lake 
There are flooded forests beneath the surface of the lake.  The smooth, white 
trunks of dead trees reach up from below the surface like bony arms.  Soon after I began 
conducting fieldwork in Limon, my research assistant, Andres, brought me in his 
rectangular motorboat to the locations of Limon Viejo and the second townsite – an 
unpopulated, forested island.  The boat’s turquoise paint had flaked off in patches, 
revealing a red base coat and, where that too had flaked, rusted metal.  Hawks flew 
overhead, scanning the water for fish.  The sun overhead was bright, but mild.  We 
motored around the islands and Andres brought my attention back to the dead forests.  
His right hand gripped the steering rod attached to the sputtering outboard motor as he 
leaned and pointed with his left hand to trunks visible just beneath the surface.  The 
islands were hilltops above eight-five feet.  Other high points rose are dangerously close 
to the surface, delimiting a network of passable aquatic trails across the lake.  Developing 
a mental map of the underwater topography, Andres explained, is a critical part of being a 
lanchero (boat driver).   Snags have sunk many boats, particularly those of the 
inexperienced, inattentive, and drunk.  
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Figure 2.3: Dead forests break the surface of Gatun Lake. 
 
What lies beneath the waters of the lake?  The Panamanian historian Guillermo 
Castro Herrera has written that the flooded landscapes were critical in the formation of 
historical identity on the isthmus and, as such, their reconstruction is among the most 
important pending works in Panamanian environmental history.
148
  The textual data that 
Castro Herrera suggests for this reconstruction – technical documents and literary works 
– provide a specific type of information about the landscapes around the river shaped by 
the character of their authors’ ecological knowledge and practice.  Upper-level engineers 
and administrators often couched regional ecology in the broadest terms: jungle, swamp, 
and forest.  By contrast, rural functionaries – land agents, policemen, and sanitation 
workers – displayed a more nuanced understanding of the landscapes that they spent their 
days patrolling, noting, for example, stands of “virgin” and secondary forest.  The literary 
works like Tejeira’s Pueblos Perdidos that focus on rural people and places – and these 
are limited – provide a sense of vernacular ecology.  However, some of the best 
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descriptions of these landscapes and their plants and animals come from natural scientists 
attracted by the rapid ecological transformations associated with canal construction.   
 
In 1904, the year that the US began canal work, SP Langley, the Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, contacted President Theodore Roosevelt to inquire about the 
possibility of conducting scientific work in conjunction with construction.  “It seems 
likely,” he wrote, “that the work in connection with the digging of the Panama canal will 
offer an opportunity for scientific research in various fields, such as geology, mineralogy, 
ethnology, archaeology, natural history, and other branches of science, which opportunity 
may never occur again in that region.”  Large civil engineering projects in the US had 
proven productive for the institution.  “About the middle of last century, when the great 
western railway and boundary surveys were undertaken, such works of practical 
importance had usually attached to them members of the staff of the Smithsonian 
Institution and of the other scientific branches of the Government, who were thereby 
enabled to add greatly to our knowledge of various sciences and to increase our national 
collections, without in any way hampering the work and without considerable expense.  
Such scientific work has also been done by other countries in connection with their 
extraterritorial surveys and notably at the time of the construction of the Suez Canal.”  He 
concluded by asking that the president to authorize the Isthmian Canal Commission to 
support the project.
149
 
 
                                                        
149
 SP Langley, Smithsonian Secretary to President Theodore Roosevelt, Smithsonian Institution Archives 
(SIA), Washington DC. Office of the Secretary Records, 1903-1924, Record Unit (RU) 45, Panama Canal 
Zone Biological Survey Project, Box 42, Correspondence 1904-1914, Folder 14.  
 71 
There were two motivations behind calls for a biological survey of the Canal 
Zone.  The first, as Langley made clear, was professional opportunism – or, perhaps, 
parasitism.  Scientists “attached” themselves to civil engineering projects.  In particular, 
the extension of modern transportation lines into unstudied areas facilitated scientific 
fieldwork.
150
  Infrastructural projects also provided comparatively comfortable fieldwork 
accommodations: clean beds, dining halls, and clubs.  The second, more public, 
motivation was a nascent concern for salvaging and cataloguing the biological diversity 
that was being transformed through these very projects.  In 1907, the American Society 
of Naturalists urged President Roosevelt and Congress to make provisions for a 
Biological Survey of the Canal Zone.  The Society’s stated concern was that the linkage 
of Atlantic and Pacific watersheds through excavation would precipitate the mingling of 
freshwater species from the two slopes and that marine species would travel over the 
waterway.  This was an old concern expressed in new language.  In 1567, King Philip II 
of Spain allegedly abandoned the idea of building a canal through Panama after the 
Dominican Friars he consulted returned with an apt biblical verse: “What God hath 
joined together, let no man put asunder.”151   
 
Twentieth-century naturalists, by contrast, had neither the power, nor the will to 
halt the canal project.  The Society proposed a proto-environmental impact assessment 
that was politically toothless.  They framed their project as ecological salvage, rather than 
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conservation.
152
  Smithsonian Secretary Walcott restated the importance of the survey 
before Congress: “Such a survey is necessary before the canal is completed, for it is 
believed that conditions of life will be changed after the canal is opened to commerce, 
and the waters of the Atlantic thereby joined with those of the Pacific.  The organisms of 
the various watersheds would then be offered a ready means of mingling together, the 
natural distinctions would be obliterated, and the data for a true understanding of the flora 
and fauna placed forever out of reach.”153  President William Taft approved the plan for 
the Smithsonian Biological Survey of the Canal Zone in 1910.  Secretary Walcott 
requested assistance from the United States Departments of Agriculture and Fisheries to 
assist a survey team of botanists, biologists, entomologists, ornithologists, and zoologists.  
 
Henri Pittier, chief botanist, was the first to arrive in Panama.  He had an ideal 
background for studying plants in the Canal Zone: a degree in civil engineering from 
Lucerne, Switzerland and a doctorate in natural sciences from Jena, Germany.
154
  Pittier 
began collecting specimens on New Year’s Eve 1910.  He observed a “profusion of 
plants” flowering, far too many to collect without an assistant.  “I stopped at the first 
plant that interested me, and there…within a radius of less than fifty meters, I collected 
eighty-four species in full blossom.  And many more were in sight!”155  Pittier observed 
that the flora of the transit zone, though diverse and uncatalogued, was far from pristine: 
“Most vegetation seen along the railroad is secondary and partly adventitious growth.  It 
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will [be] necessary to go to more remote districts to study real primeval conditions.”  As 
his first field report traveled by steamship to Secretary Walcot in Washington, four other 
Smithsonian Biological Survey scientists departed from New York to travel to Panama. 
 
Pittier and the other scientists described anthropogenic landscapes all around the 
canal works.  Plant ecology was radically transformed by excavation and sanitation work 
on the Pacific side around Culebra Cut and, more subtly, in the marshes that began to 
grow in the bottomlands of the Atlantic side that would soon be flooded to create Gatun 
Lake.   Grass specialist AJ Hitchcock provided detailed descriptions of these landscapes.  
He arrived in Panama with his son in August of 1911.  It was his first trip to the tropics.  
They were assigned two plain rooms on the second floor of the Old Hotel, on the edge of 
Culebra Cut. The Isthmian Canal Commission provided Hitchcock, like the other 
scientists, with free living quarters, railroad transportation, a book of coupons to shop in 
government commissary stores, and a Canal Zone map.  In his initial report to the 
Department of Agriculture, he described his initial fieldwork as “very successful” – forty-
two grass species collected in two days – but he was amazed by scale of the 
environmental transformations around the construction works: “the whole region is 
soaked with oil.  It forms a scum on pools.  Every water course and drainage is black with 
the destroyed vegetation.  The jungle is cut away from along all the lines of drainage and 
a ditch dug to carry away the water rapidly, these ditches being oiled.”156  Hitchcock 
seems impressed by, rather than critical of, the sanitation work that had covered an entire 
region in oil scum and destroyed its vegetation.  He, like the other survey scientists, 
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found that sanitation efforts and trains – if destructive – made fieldwork easier: “These 
clearings facilitate collecting for the jungle is impenetrable.”   
 
Hitchcock and his son extended their collecting efforts away from Culebra Cut via 
the Panama Railroad.  They caught the 7:00 AM train every morning and rode to a 
different station, where they would get off and walk five to ten miles to the next.  They 
carried cameras, a tripod, seed collection bags, and a notebook.  The moist cleared areas 
around Culebra were dominated by an aggressive Para grass (Panicum barbinode) that 
Hitchcock described as a great boon for animal forage.  They found new grass specimens 
as they walked along the railroad tracks: sixty-five species in a week.  Hitchcock proudly 
noted that Esenbeck, the author of Flora of Panama, had listed only twenty-seven 
species, but allowed that many of the specimens he had collected on this trip were 
probably recent introductions.  The most conspicuous grass in the future Gatun Lake 
basin was a tall reed (Gynerium) more than thirty feet high and terminated by a four foot 
long plume.  Hitchcock reported that it formed “great areas,” along the lower Chagres 
and adjacent bottomlands known as the Black Swamp.
157
   
 
 
Gatun Lake was only fifteen feet above sea level when Hitchcock first saw it.  
Chief Engineer Goethals had asked him to examine grass vegetation on the rising lake to 
see if it might restrict navigation.  Hitchcock was astonished by what he found.  The plant 
life from the riverbed was floating to the lake surface and forming new ecologies:  
Thursday we went to Gatun to examine the Lake.  We went to various 
points in the launch which drew 3 ½ feet, and made detailed examinations 
in a skiff.  I was very much surprised to find Para grass (Panicum 
barbinode) growing in 7 feet of water.  It was throwing out vigorous 
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stolons on the surface of the water.  Below the surface there was a tangled 
mass of branching runners.  I pulled up some that were twenty feet long 
and an indefinite length in addition…At another point I found 
Hymenachne auriculata in dense masses growing in 3 to 4 feet of water 
and producing vigorous runners.  I had not previously observed this 
species any where on the zone, though it was abundant here.  Certain other 
vegetation was growing in ten feet of water.  A common species of 
Paspalum, P. fasciculatum was found occasionally here, the point of 
interest being the runners, which ordinarily have tight sheaths but in this 
case they ran along the surface of the water, the sheaths being inflated, 
supporting the runners like bladders.  As you will remember this 
adaptation is conspicuous in the water hyacinth of Florida.  It is a question 
how these grasses came to be growing in such deep water…Ultimately 
this dam will raise the water to the 85 feet contour line, but has now been 
raised about 15 feet…The grasses in many cases were growing on logs.  
When the water rose, the logs floated and thus became a centre for a mass 
of vegetation…The masses of vegetation growing in deep water, 6 to 10 
feet have produce a substratum extending to the depth of a foot or two 
below the surface.  This is made up of roots, rootstocks and accumulated 
dirt and debris.  The measuring staff would meet with resistance until it 
was forced through this then would drop easily to the bottom.  There was 
no evidence that the masses were in motion so I suppose they were still 
anchored by the original stump.  This point could not be decided.  If they 
ultimately became detached they would form floating islands. The 
economic question involved is of course is there danger that these grasses 
may threaten to interfere with navigation…But from the examination I 
have made and from what is know concerning the involved I did not 
anticipate trouble from this source.
158
 
 
 
The invasive grasses turned out to be more of a problem than Hitchcock expected.  
They spread across Gatun Lake and up its river tributaries.  Identified as Eichornia 
azurea, a close relative of the water hyacinth that had choked transportation on 
waterways in Louisiana, Florida, and Egypt, the rate of its proliferation alarmed 
administrators.  Rafts of floating wood and dead plants exceeding a hundred feet in 
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diameter – legacies of the river valley – were scattered over the lake surface.  Water 
hyacinth spread over these “floating islands,” binding the debris securely.159 
 
Administrators pursued information on the invasive plant’s introduction and 
dispersal, as well as treatments employed successfully elsewhere.  Otto Lutz, Professor of 
Natural Science at the National Institute, Panama, wrote Goethals describing the 
hyacinth’s twin dangers to the canal enterprise: not only did it threaten navigation, it 
provided an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes.  It should, he emphasized, be 
destroyed “wherever it occurs in the navigable waters of the Canal.”160  The lake was not 
only the future Canal route, but also provided the only means of transportation for rural 
people living in the vicinity.  Farmers from Limon and nearby communities, who traveled 
over the lake to their fields and to market, complained that their canoes were unable to 
pass through the fields of water hyacinth.
161
  Canal administrators debated their 
responsibility to rural agriculturalists, but conceded that the flooding of Gatun Lake – 
created to facilitate transportation – had, ironically, restricted local movement.  The old 
foot trails that provided local access to the railroad line were flooded.  And, now, 
hyacinth-choked channels restricted aquatic movement.  A simple plant threatened to 
choke the waters of the mighty canal before it even opened.   
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Waterworlds at Gatun Lake 
When Gatun Lake reached its operating level in early 1914, it was the largest 
artificial reservoir in the world, spreading out over 164 square miles of the Chagres River 
valley.
162
  Even then, engineers recognized that its storage capacity would prove 
insufficient for canal purposes as traffic increased.
163
   President Calvin Coolidge signed 
an executive order in February 1922 to create a second dam and water storage reservoir 
located on the upper Chagres River.  The twenty-two square miles that would become 
Madden Lake were expropriated from Panama – again under the terms of the 1903 
Panama Canal Treaty – and appended to the Canal Zone.  The reservoir-making process 
enacted on the lower Chagres River at Gatun – survey, expropriate, depopulate, and flood 
– was then repeated on the upper Chagres.  Water and politics came together around 
topographic contours that proved useful for engineering and administrative purposes.  
The assembly of the Panama Canal entailed two intersecting types of infrastructural 
work: civil engineering and human depopulation.  The Chagres River system was 
reorganized according to the water demands imposed by the lock design, the climatic and 
hydrological specificities of Panama, and the increasing volume of traffic passing through 
the waterway.  As water flowed downstream, a network of water management 
technologies were built further upstream.  The human side of the story was primarily 
displacement and dispossession from the Canal Zone.   
 
                                                        
162
 Haskin 1914, 39-40.   
163
 Kirkpatrick 1934, 84 
 78 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the Panama Canal’s water management network illuminates how 
political and ecological forms accrete around the material specificities of infrastructure.  
In this chapter, I have attempted to recover the establishment of a system that channels 
and distributes water, but has also shaped the social relationships that have traditionally 
interested social scientists.  By tracing the infrastructure that channels water for 
transportation purposes, I have attempted to show how a socio-technical system connects, 
excludes, and produces unexpected relationships among human groups and their 
environments.  Engineers reorganized the Chagres River, but, as they did so, created a 
waterworld that exceeded their intentions: a techno-natural hybrid akin to what Richard 
White calls an organic machine.
164
  This is an entity in flux where, over time, the 
combination of scientific, technical, and quotidian work, make the boundaries between 
the natural and the human, as well as the material and the political, difficult to 
distinguish.  The canal, then, is unfinished.  Even today, it surfaces and edges bear the 
marks of the hydro-political work done nearly a century ago: the eighty-five-foot surface 
water level, the boundary markers at the hundred-foot contour, the displaced towns 
perched on forested banks above a hundred feet.
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 III.  BANANAS: INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, AND LABOR AT THE 
MARGINS OF THE US CANAL ZONE 
 
Official photographs taken around the Panama Canal during the early-twentieth 
century are often similar in composition.  At the center of the frame is a passing ship, a 
freshly paved road, a steel bridge, or railroad tracks stretching into the distance.  People 
are often gathered around these modern technologies, elements of material culture that 
traveled, like most of them, to the isthmus in connection with a sprawling infrastructural 
project.  Other photographs focus on people: white North American administrators posed 
in front of offices, black West Indian laborers at work, and many others.  A visual pattern 
emerged as I sorted through thousands of Canal Zone photographs at the US National 
Archives.  Banana plants cluster in the background reflecting the tropical sunlight.  Their 
wide, tattered leaves slope across the edge of the frame.  What can we learn about the 
canal by focusing on its human and ecological margins?  What might the rise and fall of 
banana networks along this trade route reveal about the interplay of transportation 
infrastructure, governance, and taxonomies of labor at the margins of American Empire?   
* * * 
In a word, then, here in the most important country of its size in the world, 
the Panama Canal is meeting an unprecedented problem: in three hundred 
twenty-five square miles of moderately suitable territory, more or less 
isolated, how nearly self-supporting shall this area be made, what sort of 
horticultural development should it have and how much?  The foreground 
is somewhat out of focus at the present, but there are certainly some 
interesting possibilities in the perspective. 
- OW Barrett, Horticulture in the Canal Zone, 1915
165
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In 1903, Panama granted the United States near-sovereign power over a ten-mile-
wide strip of territory for the future Panama Canal.  That space, the US Canal Zone, has 
often been represented in both popular and scholarly writing as a massive construction 
site remade as a manicured, tropical North American suburb.
166
  This narrative is 
somewhat misleading.  In the decades after the waterway first opened in 1914, the 
enclave was largely rural, practically roadless, and poorly surveyed.  The US Isthmian 
Canal Commission’s plans for the hundreds of square miles of land not immediately 
necessary for transportation or residential purposes became a critical point of tension 
within and beyond the commission.  Yet we know remarkably little about the role of rural 
governance in the canal enterprise.  This gap is historically significant because the Canal 
Zone’s rural question – how to best manage recently depopulated landscapes – raised 
fundamental questions about the ambitions of the US project in Panama.  The account 
also suggests a shadow history
167
 of the canal, an alternative way of conceptualizing the 
trade route’s relationship to the nearby peoples and landscapes – a problem that resonates 
in Panama today.
168
 
 
In this chapter, I examine the dynamic relationships among labor, life, and 
governance at the rural margins of the Canal Zone during the first decades of the 
twentieth century by analyzing the implementation and consequences of a state program 
(1921-1932) that permitted former canal workers – primarily poor, black West Indians – 
to lease formerly depopulated lands for agriculture.  Why reconsider the Canal Zone from 
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its margins?  As Anna Tsing writes, “An out-of-the-way place is, by definition, a place 
where the instability of political meanings is easy to see.”169  The changing parameters of 
the US project in Panama were particularly visible across the hundreds of square miles of 
rural lakes, rivers, forests, and fields that comprised much of the Canal Zone.  State 
authority was unstable across this region in political and ecological flux.  
 
Marginality occupies an important place in anthropology.  The discipline began as 
the study of marginal peoples, classified as such according to their distance from a 
perceived Euro-American geographical center or cultural norm.  In this sense, 
marginality is positional: an ethnographic feature that marks human groups as different 
and thus implies a bounded notion of culture.  By contrast, post-colonial theorists and 
other critical scholars have, since the 1980s, seen marginality as relational.  They argue 
that asymmetries are not prior to, but produced within and through, Western humanist 
standards.
170
  Difference is recognized as historically constructed and, as a corollary, a 
political position from which to interrogate colonial and imperial categories.  My 
approach to marginality is infrastructural.  I draw on scholarship exploring the intimate 
frontiers of colonialism and empire, particularly work examining quotidian sites – in this 
case, rural land use in the Canal Zone – where governmental techniques used to organize 
life were implemented, developed, and negotiated.
171
  Access to land in the Zone was 
inextricable from the racial, cultural, and economic taxonomies constructed and 
reinforced by administrators.  Access to a range of basic infrastructure – food 
commissaries, hospitals, housing, and transportation – turned on one’s location in this 
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taxonomy.  What emerged in the case of rural land use, in particular, was a situation in 
which access to critical transportation infrastructure was embedded in political control.  
Agricultural products – especially a time-sensitive crop like bananas – had little value if 
passing trains did not stop and the boats of purchasers could not enter Canal Zone waters.  
 
The chapter is organized in four sections.  First, I retrace the historical extension 
of bananas and transportation networks together across Central America.  Second, I 
examine the symbiotic relationship between transport and agrarian economies on the 
Panamanian isthmus prior to the initiation of the US Panama Canal project in 1904, 
foregrounding the role of banana production in sustenance during downturns in the 
transportation economy.  This section highlights the rise and fall of banana networks 
around the Chagres River.  Third, I describe debates around food, labor, and the 
agricultural possibilities of rural lands in the Canal Zone during the 1904-1914 canal 
construction period.  This section foregrounds early tensions in the enclave around rural 
land use.  Finally, the bulk of the essay examines transformations that took place after the 
Canal Zone was “thrown open” to agriculture in 1921, ushering in a banana boom that 
brought together actors pursuing diverse, but often overlapping, projects.  I conclude by 
returning to my claim that the banana allows us to examine the history of rural landscapes 
in a manner that sheds a different light on the trajectory of the Panama Canal enterprise.   
  
BANANAS AND THE MARGINS OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS 
Botanists believe that the wild ancestor of the modern banana was domesticated in 
highland New Guinea around 5000 BC.  Edible varieties spread across the Old World 
 83 
tropics and accompanied European colonists as they arrived in the Caribbean.
172
  In his 
Natural History of the West Indies, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo reported that bananas 
were introduced to the Americas in 1516.  A decade later, the plants “…multiplied so 
greatly that it is marvelous to see the great abundance of them on the islands and in Tierra 
Firme where the Christians have settled.”173  Bananas were (and remain) plants of 
empire.  The environmental historian Alfred Crosby has shown that colonial conquest 
was a collective effort by old world portmanteau biota (dominated by the European 
human) that evolved in conflict and cooperation.
174
  The banana, a tropical perennial, was 
not technically part of temperate European invasive networks, but its corms (rhizomes) 
traveled with them, benefitting from and supporting the ecological reorganization of the 
neo-tropics. Bananas were a key subsistence crop for the slaves
175
 and laborers who built 
transportation networks and worked on the plantations that supported extractive colonial, 
imperial, and post-colonial political economies in Central America and the Caribbean. 
 
Why use bananas to think about governance and labor at the margins of the Canal 
Zone?  The modern banana is sterile and rhizomatic.  It depends on human labor and 
transportation networks for propagation and dispersal.  This means that it thrives along 
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edge environments, particularly the borderlands where modern transportation lines and 
lowland tropical ecology meet.  In both a technological and ecological sense, then, the 
Canal Zone provided an ideal habitat for bananas.  But transportation networks are 
inextricable from the cultural and political institutions that they draw on and reorganize.  
The success of the banana depends on infrastructure, ecology, and socio-political 
priorities.  For the governments of the so-called banana republic nations in Central 
America, including Panama, banana exports were often seen as a path to economic 
development.  The Zone, by contrast, was a transportation enclave with very different 
governmental issues.  For some white administrators, banana cultivation had positive 
associations (self-sufficiency and poverty relief), but, for others, the fruit had negative 
associations (black, unsanitary, backwards).  
 
Let me explain how I became interested in understanding the histories of banana 
networks around the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.  The prominence of the banana trade 
in oral histories of the region around the waterway initially surprised me.  Before 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork in Panama in 2008 and 2009, I had never encountered 
in the historiography what the oldest villagers living along the banks of the waterway 
today call the era of green gold. “To’o eso era puro guineo” (this all used to be bananas), 
old Afro-Panamanian men wearing guayabera shirts reminded me whenever I asked 
about regional history.  Ethnography and, later, archival work confirmed that during the 
1920s and early-1930s, the banana export trade dominated landscapes and livelihoods 
around Gatun Lake, the canal’s artificial storage reservoir.   
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In 1927, the height of the boom, the quantity of bananas produced regionally and 
shipped from Canal Zone ports reached nearly 2.8 million bunches, an increase of more 
than 1200% in five years.  Although this figure did not approach exports from so-called 
banana republics,
176
 led by Honduras, it was significant given the Canal Zone’s limited 
area, predominance of smallholder production, and unique political configuration.  
During the banana boom, diverse groups – smallholder farmers, compradores 
(middlemen), state functionaries, and capitalists – came together to negotiate the 
production, transport, and sale of “green gold.”  A shared investment in bananas 
temporarily brought these seemingly disparate actors into negotiation with one another.  
 
 
Bananas and Railroads Expand Together across Central America 
During the late-19
th
 and early-20
th
 centuries, railroad lines were built across 
Central America and large swaths of adjacent forest cleared and planted with banana 
monocultures.  The construction of transportation infrastructure and expansion of banana 
production were mutually reinforcing – even coextensive – projects.  This connection is 
exemplified by the prominent origin myth of Central American banana capitalism.  Minor 
Keith, like many of the banana capitalists of the period, entered the fruit trade via the 
shipping business.  He came to Costa Rica from the US in 1871 to work for his uncle, 
Henry Meiggs, who was under contract with the national government to build a railroad 
between San Jose and the Caribbean port city of Limon, Costa Rica.  Keith took over in 
1877 after Meiggs passed away.  When the Costa Rican government defaulted on 
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payments and construction funds ran out in 1882, Keith offered his idle work force – 
predominantly black West Indians – small agricultural plots to cultivate along the tracks 
to keep them from abandoning the project.
177
  He recruited heavily and successfully in 
Jamaica, after failed experiments with Chinese and Italian workers unwilling to endure 
yellow fever and malaria for low wages.   Costa Rica later met its financial obligations by 
giving Keith 800,000 acres along the train route.  His “discovery” was that the bananas 
his West Indian laborers grew for subsistence might become profitable freight for the 
unfinished railroad.
178
   
 
The geographical development of the banana-railroad union varied across Central 
America.  In Costa Rica and Guatemala, railroad lines were built between major cities 
and ports.  Bananas followed the tracks after they were laid.  With the financial success 
of initial banana exports, however, the process was often inverted elsewhere.  In 
Honduras, railroad lines traversed fruit districts and left important cities disconnected.  
The territorial logic of banana exports shaped the orientation and distribution of railroad 
lines that were constructed to facilitate production and transport.  It is not my intention 
here to develop – or revise – the increasingly sophisticated and transnational 
historiography of banana production, export, and marketing,
179
 but to emphasize that 
transportation networks and banana production extended in tandem across the region.  
The key point is that the landscapes that emerged were neither technologically 
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preformatted (railroads producing homogeneous tropical space), nor geographically 
predetermined (reflecting “natural advantages”), but the hybrid products of a techno-
ecological network extending across political, economic, and cultural difference.  
Guatemala was not Honduras.  The Canal Zone was neither.  
   
TRANSPORTATION AND AGRARIAN ECONOMIES ALONG THE CHAGRES RIVER 
Panama’s economic advantage, it has been widely asserted, is its geographic 
position.  From colonialists to capitalists, path-builders have seen the isthmus – and, in 
particular, the Chagres River valley – as a space of connection, not agricultural 
production.  Over the past five hundred years, interoceanic transportation has been 
enabled through large transportation projects (the Spanish colonial Camino Real, the 
Panama Railroad, and the Panama Canal) that require a large labor force, which the 
region historically lacked.  Path-builders largely recruited laborers elsewhere, often in 
impoverished Caribbean locales.  Consequently, periodic, large-scale in- and out-
migrations of laborers has fundamentally shaped regional demography (Table 3.1).  We 
commonly think of transportation networks as a critical infrastructure for agricultural 
development.  However, in this transit zone, the inverse has been equally true: agriculture 
has supported the transport economy by providing sustenance for a past and future labor 
force through economic boom and bust cycles.  Agriculture has a long history along the 
Chagres River and its tributaries, where smallholders have cultivated tubers, rice, fruits, 
and vegetables within swidden production systems for millennia.  During the late-
nineteenth century and early-twentieth century, the social boundary between transport 
and agrarian economies was permeable.  The ethnically and culturally heterogeneous 
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population that North Americans glossed as “natives” moved periodically between wage 
labor and farming as regional socio-economic conditions changed. 
 
Table 3.1: Estimated Population of the Chagres River Watershed, 1790-1896
180
 
 
Year Population Density (people/km) 
1790 1,500 0.5 
1851 2,000 0.6 
1896 20,000 6.0 
 
Banana production, for export and subsistence, was a means of mitigating the 
livelihood risk associated with the transport economy during the late-nineteenth century.  
When the Chagres River region was enclosed within the Canal Zone in 1903, 
smallholders in the region had intermittently participated in international banana markets 
for nearly forty years.
181
  In fact, they grew some of the first bananas exported to North 
America.  In 1866, Carl Franc, a steward for Pacific Mail Steamships, entered an 
agreement to ship bananas from Aspinwall (later renamed Colon) to New York City.
182
  
Aspinwall was the Caribbean terminus of the new Panama Railroad – built between 1850 
and 1855 – and a port city.  In a development that foreshadowed Minor Keith’s 
“discovery” of banana production in Costa Rica, Franc recognized that banana exports 
thrived under the social, technical, and ecological conditions along the Chagres River.   
 
Frederick Adams, United Fruit Company historian and eulogist, wrote of Franc 
and company, “They had preempted the only known spot in the American tropics where 
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it seemed safe to raise and export bananas.  The great stream of the world's commerce 
beat up against Colon.  The Panama railroad was in operation, and the demands of 
international trade automatically decreed that peace and order should prevail in the 
territory adjacent to that natural pathway of commerce.”183  He was correct, in an obvious 
sense.  The plants flourished in the rich alluvial soils along the line and their fruits could 
be easily transported to port in Colon via the railroad. But this framing neglects the 
marginalized human communities that made banana exports possible.  Thousands lives 
were lost building the region’s roads, railroads, and waterways, making this far from a 
“natural pathway.”  Among the region’s principal economic advantages in the 1860s 
were the numerous unemployed former railroad laborers – whose numbers reached an 
estimated seven thousand during construction – who might be mobilized for banana 
production.  According to historian Lancelot Lewis, “Completion of the railroad in 1855 
left many laborers stranded on the isthmus of Panama.  Some settled and prospered in the 
larger cities of Colon and Panama City…many resumed their rural way of life in the 
interior towns of the country and through their efforts the agricultural production of the 
republic increased rapidly."
184
 
 
The village of Gatun – the first Panama Railroad stop traveling south from the 
Caribbean – was the hub of the rural banana trade, but North American travelers saw only 
a marginal community and a historical footnote.  Historian F.N. Otis wrote, “[T]he 
ancient native town of Gatun, which is composed of forty or fifty huts of cane and palm, 
and situated on the edge of a broad savanna that extends back to a range of hills a mile or 
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two distant.  The place is worthy of mention as a point where, in the days by-gone, the 
bongo-loads of California travelers used to stop for refreshment on their way up the 
river...”185  Within the riparian social world that stretched along the banks of the Chagres 
and its tributaries, however, the town occupied a prominent position.  The intimate 
economy of the diverse Gatuneros – “few whites, many mulattoes, but blacks 
predominated”186 – revolved around transportation, but became increasingly linked to the 
nascent banana trade after the completion of the railroad in 1855.  Smallholders arrived 
by river one day each week from farms in the vicinity in long wooden canoes stacked 
high with bananas.  From Gatun, bananas were shipped to Aspinwall and loaded on 
steamers bound for the eastern US.  Franc’s Aspinwall Fruit Company flourished during 
the late-1860s and 1870s, the period of economic decline between the end of the railroad 
construction and the French canal project.   
 
Exports from Gatun practically ceased when, in 1881, the French Canal Company 
began paying wages high enough to motivate banana farmers to abandon their fields 
around the Chagres River and as far as Costa Rica.
187
  Farmers returned to bananas after 
the failure of the French project.  As late as 1904, Panamanian officials reported that the 
village of Gatun continued to participate relatively heavily in the banana trade.
188
  Seven 
to nine railroad carloads of bananas were shipped from town weekly.  But that same year, 
transportation construction took center stage again as the US Panama Canal project 
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began. Gatun persisted a few years as a regional trading center, but farmers abandoned 
their fields for wage labor.  The town was relocated to higher ground in 1908 in 
anticipation of the flooding of a water storage reservoir – Lake Gatun – for the future 
canal.
189
 
 
THE “AGRICULTURAL POSSIBILITIES” OF THE CANAL ZONE 
On November 15, 1909, US soil scientist Hugh H. Bennett and horticulturalist 
WA Taylor arrived in Panama to conduct field investigations on “the climate, soil, crops, 
and other conditions bearing upon the development of agriculture in the region bordering 
the canal.”190  The scientists were sent to the isthmus at the request of Chief Engineer 
George Goethals, who had appealed to the United States Department of Agriculture for 
expert assistance in assessing the possibilities for agriculture and food production within 
the Canal Zone.
191
  Bennett and Taylor described the food supply in 1909: “Canned 
fruits, vegetables, fish, meats, and butter are largely used, though these more perishable 
products are supplied in large quantities in the fresh state from the United States.  This is 
accomplished by shipment in refrigeration from New York and New Orleans to Colon, at 
which point such articles as require it are placed in cold storage, where they are available 
for daily distribution by supply trains across the isthmus as required.”192    
 
Feeding an enormous labor force had been a persistent problem for administrators 
intent on completing construction.  Delivery logistics – moving calories in bulk from 
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agricultural areas to construction sites – was only one aspect of the food problem.  Food 
consumption was also shaped by the diverse cultural backgrounds of the work force.  
Workers ate in mess halls and paid for meals with coupons that cost 30 cents each.
193
  
Despite the availability of affordable meals in mess halls, West Indian laborers were 
reluctant to spend wages on food and skimped on eating to save money.  This alarmed 
administrators concerned about the productivity of the largest population in the labor 
force.  Laborers’ relationship with food was irreducible to money.  West Indians, in 
particular, were accustomed to growing food in their own garden plots, an option not 
available to them in the Canal Zone.
194
  For white North American employees, by 
contrast, food problems often revolved around quality and nutrition.  “Too much canned 
food and solid diet is being used at the present time,” the Chief Sanitary Inspector wrote 
Colonel William Gorgas, head of the Department of Health, in 1906, “Green vegetables 
are very scarce and high priced at most places in the Canal Zone, and at many places 
cannot be had…I am also informed by various District Physicians that it would be very 
advantageous for the physical condition of the ICC [Isthmian Canal Commission] 
employees and laborers to have sufficient vegetables available at a reasonable price so 
that the employees would not be compelled to use canned stuffs daily.”195  His call for 
local food production would become ironic because, in subsequent decades, the 
Department of Health would become the most vocal critic of agriculture in the Zone. 
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Five years into the canal project, rural land use was emerging as a highly 
politicized issue in the Zone.  Goethals expressed enthusiasm about the potential for the 
agricultural development of lands away from townsites and canal installations in a letter 
to the Secretary of War.  “These lands,” he wrote, “derive practically their entire value 
from their agricultural possibilities.”196  But he and other administrators also questioned 
whether agriculture was a suitable use of canal appropriations.  In a letter written that 
same day to a subordinate in Panama, he expressed ambivalence about agriculture as it 
related to the still undefined parameters of the canal project and concluded that it was too 
tangentially connected with construction to be funded, but should nevertheless be handled 
with care.  “[A] sentimental interest attaches itself to the development of the agricultural 
possibilities of the Zone that must be taken into consideration,” he explained, “and if we 
dropped this work entirely it would put us continually on the defensive and possibly 
subject us to some unfavorable criticism.”197  Goethals recognized, presciently, the 
powerful moral-economic force located at the nexus of food, agriculture, and labor.
198
 
 
Early efforts to develop Canal Zone agriculture proceeded, haltingly, through 
horticultural experimentation and land lease programs.  The first working horticulturalist 
in the Canal Zone, Henry Schultz, was hired by the Department of Health upon the 
recommendation of Department of Agriculture “plant explorer” David Fairchild in 
                                                        
196
 Goethals to Secretary of War, June 22, 1909, NACP RG 185, Entry 30, Folder 33-D-37(1). 
197
 Goethals to Major Milson, Subsistence Officer, June 22, 1909. NACP RG 185, Entry 30, Folder 33-D-
37(1). 
198
The classic formulation of moral economy is in EP Thompson 1971.  He suggests that food riots in 
eighteenth century England should not be explained through “an abbreviated view of economic man.”  
People participated in food riots, he argues, not simply because they were hungry, but because they were 
“informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights and customs…that they were supported 
by the consensus of the community.” (1971, 78). 
 94 
1906.
199
  Schultz began work as a landscape gardener on the grounds of the Ancon 
Hospital.  As his title and department suggest, his work was not agricultural development.  
There was limited support for agriculture in the Department of Health – which 
emphasized the creation of sanitary, “homelike” landscapes around buildings in Zone 
communities.
200
  Schultz was transferred to the Department of Labor, Quarters, and 
Subsistence – the department charged with feeding and housing the workforce.  The 
Chief Quartermaster, his new boss, wanted to experiment with gardens near townsites 
that would supply fresh vegetables – tomatoes, cucumbers, beans, eggplants, okra, 
radishes, and lettuce – recognizable to North American residents, but the gardens 
received limited institutional support.  Whereas “healthy landscapes,” associated with 
manicured lawns, ornamental plants, and an absence of mosquitoes, were seen as vital to 
the well-being of white employees from the temperate zone and, thus, an appropriate use 
of canal appropriations, vegetable gardens were seen as increasingly unnecessary as fresh 
foods from the US became more readily available due to changing transportation and 
refrigeration technologies.
201
  The Isthmian Canal Commission allowed its gardens to go 
fallow until receiving Bennett and Taylor’s recommendations on the agricultural 
possibilities of the Zone.  
 
The United States Congress authorized the first public land lease program in the 
Canal Zone in February 1909.  The impetus was to develop a policy that would motivate 
                                                        
199
 David Fairchild, United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural Explorer in Charge, had an active 
and long-term interest in the development of horticultural work in the Canal Zone.  See his correspondence 
with Zone horticulturalists in Record Locator 185, Entry 30, Horticultural Work on the Isthmus, Folders 
33-H-3; and also Entry 34, Folders 33-H-3. 
200
 Henry Schultz, Landscape Gardener, to JA LePrince, Chief Sanitary Inspector, Sept. 5 1907, NACP RG 
185, Entry 30, Folder 33-H-9(1). 
201
 See NACP RG 185, Entry 30, Gardens – Operation by the Panama Canal, Folder 33-H-9(1)  
 95 
private individuals to take the initiative for agricultural development. “There is a general 
opinion,” Goethals concluded, “[that] with proper instruction and information lease 
holders should be able to secure sufficient returns to make the cultivation and settlement 
of the Canal Zone very attractive.”202  His opinion was not universal.  Invoking a 
determinist discourse that conflated tropical fecundity and racialized laziness, 
Subsistence Officer Eugene Wilson wrote, “[T]he permanent population of the Canal 
Zone does not desire to be educated and has no interest in agricultural pursuits whatever.  
Agriculture cannot be stimulated in a population whose sole desire is to accumulate a 
dozen bananas, two quarts of rum and a bolt of calico and then call themselves 
merchants.”203  The land lease program was on the books, but leases remained 
unavailable.  Ironically, for a region that had been heavily surveyed for decades, there 
was still no triangulated, accurate map.  Three maps had been made, wrote engineer W.B. 
Nichols to Goethals, but “no two…will probably agree in distance between prominent 
points.”204  Thus, the lands and peoples of the rural Canal Zone were poorly known and 
mapped when Bennett and Taylor arrived in November 1909 to conduct the anticipated 
survey on the agricultural possibilities of the region. 
 
“In so far as the Canal Zone is concerned,” Bennett and Taylor wrote, “the total 
present crop production barely supplies the simple needs of the scattered rural 
population.”205  They identified important agricultural features of the region as follows: 
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humid tropical climate, broken topography, clayey soil, production dominated by mixed, 
migratory cropping, a population dominated by Panamanians and West Indian laborers, 
and public lands held by the US government that could not be titled.  Regional agriculture 
was “confined mainly to the meager efforts of the native and West Indian population and 
they are restricted to patch farming.”206  Smallholders reportedly practiced “migratory 
cropping” with machete and sharpened stick on one-half to two acre plots, neither 
plowing nor rotating crops.  For Bennett, such “primitive” techniques were a natural 
outcome of the bounty and enervating effects of the tropical climate.  “The native,” he 
wrote, “is an independent person who is not always ready to work, even for the best of 
wages, because of the contentment he finds upon his small clearing in the midst of 
sufficient fruits and vegetables to meet the food requirements of his family, with a small 
surplus for providing the few additional wants.”207 What Bennett and Taylor did not see 
when they arrived on the isthmus was the banana export economy that had thrived around 
the Chagres during the previous half-century.  They encountered a rural landscape 
emptied out by another transportation construction boom.  By 1909, the regional banana 
networks were nearly dead – or, more accurately, dormant.  This transformation would 
have shaped the agricultural production the experts described in their 1912 report “The 
Agricultural Possibilities of the Canal Zone.” 
 
“The most promising line of attack upon the agricultural problem of the Canal 
Zone” the scientists concluded, “will apparently be to develop a permanent mixed 
tropical agriculture with a distinct horticultural trend, in which hand labor of tropical 
                                                        
206
 Bennett and Taylor 1912, 11.  
207
 Bennett and Taylor 1912, 20. 
 97 
origin will be the main dependence for tillage. [It should] favor the production of high-
priced products requiring regular and frequent transportation service, such as will 
doubtless be available promptly after the opening of the canal for use.”208  The other 
service that promised to be abundantly available after construction ended, they 
recognized, was West Indian labor.  Bennett and Taylor identified West Indians as more 
industrious agriculturalists than Spanish-speaking people.
209
  Indeed, they were relatively 
optimistic about West Indians’ production potential under “competent supervision.”  “[A] 
considerable part of the population of this character could maintain itself on the products 
of the soil if either encouraged or permitted to remain when the completion of the canal 
ends the need for labor on construction work.”210  Indeed, the question of rural 
governance – would laborers be permitted to farm the Zone after construction? – and 
unresolved future uses for these lands distinguished them from others adjacent to 
transportation in Central America.   
 
THE CANAL ZONE “THROWN OPEN” TO AGRICULTURE 
The Panama Canal opened in August 1914, during the beginning of the First 
World War.  The war precipitated a global economic recession compounding an already 
dire employment situation in Panama.  The canal labor force peaked the previous year at 
56,654 laborers, one-third of an estimated 150,000 total employed during construction.
211
  
With construction complete, only a small portion of the massive labor force was still 
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needed.  In 1914, the Isthmian Canal Commission laid off an astounding thirty-eight 
thousand employees.  Between 1914 and 1917, approximately thirteen thousand West 
Indians accepted free trips home courtesy of the US government.
212
  Others migrated 
elsewhere in Central America, many to work at company-run banana plantations.  But 
most Caribbean migrants – an estimated forty-thousand to fifty-thousand – remained.  
Moreover, people continued to arrive from the Caribbean, where the economy was even 
worse than Panama’s.213  There were few jobs and wages were lower for the employed.  
Economic, racial, and class tensions were on the rise in Panama City and Colon.  As 
urban populations grew, the rural lands of the Canal Zone remained depopulated, as they 
had been for a decade.  West Indian leaders campaigned to have them opened to 
agriculture to mitigate the effects of unemployment.  Reverend S. Moss Loveridge, a 
black Baptist leader, pleaded with Governor Chester Harding to open the Zone to 
agriculture:  
Just now, when in the United States and Europe, so much stress is being 
laid on the question of intensive cultivation, and when the soldier makes 
preparation for any possible eventuality it seems to me that – (a) With tens 
of thousands of acres of uncultivated land on the Isthmus.  (b) With 
thousands of unemployed at the present time in the cities of Colon and 
Panama, both of the ‘out-of-work,’ and ‘won’t work,’ classes.  (c) With 
the present organization and agricultural experts of the United States 
Government on the Isthmus.  (d) With the planting season just before us, 
and (e) Cooperation between the Governments of the United States and 
Panama; That it would be a splendid opportunity to utilize the idle labour 
and idle land, if the United States would furnish the appropriation to cover 
same, and if necessary conscript all unemployed labor for the purpose of 
placing the Isthmus, with its present military and civilian population, a 
long way towards becoming self-supporting so far as vegetables, fruit, 
etc., are concerned.
214
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Resettlement was considered in earnest in the wake of a massive worker strike in 
1919, before an additional 5,500 employees were laid off.
215
  Proponents within and 
outside of the Canal Zone government argued that an agricultural land lease program 
would reduce mounting agitation on the isthmus, establish a labor reservoir that could be 
tapped for future canal work, and provide better food for employees.
216
  This was along 
the lines that Loveridge and others had argued for some time and also replicated the flow 
of laborers between transportation and agriculture in previous decades and centuries. It 
was within this charged context that, in 1921, the US Secretary of War appointed a 
commission to investigate and make recommendations related to the future of the Panama 
Canal.  Their report recommended that the Canal Zone be reopened to agriculture  
 
Since 1912, depopulation had been the official Canal Commission policy towards 
rural Canal Zone lands.  Governor Jay Morrow expressed dissatisfaction with the 
mounting pressure to allow West Indians – whom he considered ignorant, lazy, and 
myopic – to populate the rural Canal Zone.  “These people have no money to put up 
proper houses or to do any proper cultivating,” he wrote, “and I would be reluctant to see 
the Canal Zone again covered with the unsightly and unsanitary shacks which once 
existed in the neighborhood of all Canal Zone towns.”217  Nevertheless, in October 1921, 
he received instructions from the Secretary of War to implement the policy.  The land 
lease program would “throw open” rural lands to agriculture.  Land leases would be 
restricted to former canal laborers, largely West Indians, excluding most Panamanians. 
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This restriction reflected the fact that the main objective of resettlement was not 
agricultural development, but the placation of an unemployed and potentially unruly 
labor force. It also echoed Bennett’s call for providing preference to “industrious” West 
Indian farmers.  Governor Morrow curtly denied a Los Angeles man who inquired about 
a lease for banana production: “[T]he provisions of this circular were not intended to 
apply to non-residents.  Owing to reductions of force on the Canal, there were 
congregated in the cities of Colon and Panama in the Republic of Panama a large number 
of West Indian ex-employees who were without means of subsistence and dependent on 
charity; and the policy of allowing settlement on small plots of land in the Canal Zone 
was inaugurated for their relief.  The land in the Zone is suitable for the cultivation of 
bananas and other tropical fruits, but it would not be wise for an American to come here 
for that purpose, and our relations with the Republic of Panama are such that settlement 
on the Zone by non-residents for extensive agricultural operations could not be 
permitted.”218 
 
The land lease program inverted agricultural development projects in the Republic 
of Panama.  Under President Belisario Porras, the Liberal government gave massive 
concessions to European and North American capitalists in the rural interior in exchange 
for commitments to build transportation networks and employ rural people.  Bananas, 
more than half of the nation’s exports, were central to this initiative.219  But extensive 
private farming was not politically tenable in the Canal Zone given mounting tensions 
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between the US and Panama over appropriate land use around the waterway.  
Paradoxically, the valuable agricultural lands at the margins of this archetypal modern 
project would be distributed almost exclusively to West Indian smallholders. 
 
Latent Banana Networks are Revived on Gatun Lake 
The terms of the lease program were excellent for former canal laborers: no rent 
for the first two and a half years, free treatment in Canal Zone hospitals for seven years, 
and free home construction materials.
220
  One newspaper columnist wrote, “the bushman 
had been allowed to come back to his native habitat.”221  But, in reality, both “bushman” 
and “habitat” were quite different.  Most of the new lessees were foreign-born: 87% of 
the nearly nine hundred leases were awarded to West Indians during the first six months 
of the program.
222
  If the lessees were largely new to Panama, they were not new to 
bananas.  Many of the West Indian settlers had previously worked in commercial banana 
cultivation in the Caribbean or elsewhere in Central America.
223
  Here, as elsewhere, their 
intimate knowledge facilitated the reestablishment of latent banana networks.  The rural 
Canal Zone landscapes they encountered in 1922 might have been unrecognizable to 
someone who had lived along the Chagres River when the US first arrived.  The riparian 
bottomlands farmed by previous generations of banana producers were now beneath the 
green waters of Gatun Lake.  Former hillsides and hilltops had become the lakeshores 
and islands that gave form to the lacustrine world.  The terrestrial landscape was also 
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changed.  Following the depopulation policy of 1912, secondary forest cover increased 
dramatically.
224
   
 
According to Tomas Ramos, whose father was a farmer on the lake, the story that 
unfolded when the lands were opened to settlement was yet another iteration of a 
ubiquitous process of smallholder banana colonization.  “Subió la fiebre del banana de 
nuevo [the banana fever arose again],” he explained to me, 225 almost impatiently.  “When 
the settlers came, they said, ‘One can plant bananas here.  Here is the lake, and there are 
forests nearby to cut and replant with bananas, too.  They won’t have to be carried far, 
only cut down and thrown in the canoe.’ So that’s how they started to sell bananas and 
drink aguardiente [sugar cane alcohol] and live easy.”  
 
Even as transportation within the terminus cities and contiguous Canal Zone was 
channeled by a growing system of roads, the hundreds of square miles between remained 
an aquatic space dominated by canoes, launches, lighters, and the Panama Railroad – 
which ran over a raised causeway that split Gatun Lake.   Canal Zone bananas circulated 
over a heterogeneous transportation network that linked white and black, English and 
Spanish, rich and poor, modern technology and machete, and, eventually, tropical and 
temperate climates. “Everybody was planting, and everybody expected to make from 50 
to 100 per cent on the investment,” one journalist recalled.  “More than one prospectus 
was issued describing bananas as ‘green gold’.” 226  Participants in the diverse community 
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of practice that came together around the production, transport, and sale of bananas 
shared a terminology, body of knowledge, and set of concerns. 
 
By 1925, nearly all of the available Canal Zone land with river or lake access had 
been leased and planted in bananas.
227
  Old men and women in the small towns around 
Gatun Lake still remember the banana boom years fondly as the most prosperous of the 
century.
228
  Bands of musicians traveled around the lake, playing a night or two in each 
town.  People had cash to buy necessities from the store, but still planted subsistence 
plots of corn, rice, plantains, and various root crops alongside their small banana 
plantations.  Local bananas became, once more, global commodities.  Reviving a regional 
practice that dated to banana markets in the flooded town of Gatun decades before, 
lakeside communities held at least one weekly market day.  Smallholders that farmed 
nearby would cut enough bunches – often fifteen to twenty – to generate the cash 
necessary for the week, while usually leaving enough to ensure some for the following 
week.  Despite the proximity of most farms to waterways, the trip from plant to market 
was not easy.  Wrapped in leaves so they would not bruise – after all, buyers would not 
accept bruised bananas – people carried bunches on their backs to a canoe.  In lake 
villages, these buyers might arrive to find as many as a hundred canoes lined up with fruit 
to sell.   
The term “green gold” did not apply to just any banana, but to a standardized fruit 
that could be transported to and marketed in North America.  Picked green and sold to 
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temperate consumers yellow, Gros Michel bananas for export had to be unbruised and 
seven to ten “hands” in size.  Standards shaped the manner in which people interacted 
with bananas, one another, and the world beyond the lake.  One woman told me that, at 
the time: “The people didn’t eat [export] bananas.  If you saw a person eating a banana 
you’d say ‘pig’!  You’d criticize the person…the gringos bought bananas to bring to the 
United States because they were worth a lot of money.”  The fruit allowed marginalized 
actors to access a global – or, better, globalizing – transportation network that extended 
out from the Panama Canal.  But that access was contingent on their recognition by Canal 
Zone authorities as legitimate users of those networks and adjacent land. 
 
Smallholders dominated production around Gatun Lake and banana capital was 
embodied not by large companies but local compradores – middleman buyers – whose 
launches towed flat-bottomed lighters around the banks of the lake.  Typically 
independent contractors, compradores mediated the relationship between banana 
companies and smallholder producers.  Their influence within this network was multi-
directional.  On the lake, they provided start-up loans to small farmers to hire laborers to 
clear the forest with machetes and plant bulblike corms (a few cents each).  The first crop 
of Gros Michel bananas, harvested as little as eleven months after planting, was usually 
the best, producing the large bunches desired by foreign companies and consumers.  
Nothing less than seven “hands” would be purchased.  Banana standards were significant 
in negotiations between farmers and compradores: it was not uncommon for farmers to 
be unable to sell the fruit they had cut, carried, and canoed to market due to quality 
issues.  In practice, standards were malleable and negotiated, depending as much on the 
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farmer as the bananas.  A 1935 description of Standard Fruit’s buying practices resonates 
with oral histories of Canal Zone banana negotiations. 
No matter how conscientious an individual inspector may be, it is hard for 
him not to be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by various 
psychological factors in drawing the fine distinction between good and 
bad quality or between one grade of maturity and another.  When the 
company is clamoring for more fruit, or when a planter influential in 
politics is concerned, the inspector tends to be more lenient than usual in 
inspecting the fruit.  Sometimes, however, there is more available fruit that 
the steamer at the dock can carry, or market prices are dropping and a 
sizzling radio message arrives from Boston, saying, 'Reduce your cargoes,' 
or 'Ship only good fruit.'  Then the tropical division manager and his 
superintendent of export, who do not want to be blamed for payments for 
large quantities of fruit that the company prefers not to accept and market, 
check up the inspectors, who often work 18 to 24 hours at a stretch, 
ordering them to be especially careful not to receive any but 'the best 
fruit.'
229
  
 
One man, known as the Banana King of Panama, exerted disproportionate power 
over banana networks on Gatun Lake in the early-1920s.  John “Johnnie” Walker arrived 
in Panama from the US around 1907 – the early years of canal construction – intending to 
explore the country’s commercial possibilities.230  He first worked in the lumber trade, 
selling mahogany and other trees harvested in Panama within the Canal Zone.  By 
participating in this business, he recalled, he came to understand the “natives of the little 
jungle towns…their problems, their life, and their feeling.”  Walker was the embodiment 
of the North American managerial type that Bennett and Taylor believed would make 
agriculture successful on the isthmus – transforming labor, soil, and rain into profit.  In a 
1925 newspaper profile, he was credited with establishing the regional banana industry 
“on a successful, business-like status…justifying the hopes reposed in soil and 
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climate.”231  He owned and operated a plantation in Panama – outside the Canal Zone – 
that had access to the western shore of Gatun Lake.  He paid his laborers by “piece work 
or hourly, in some cases, for no one but a theorist would ever think of paying a Central 
American native or West Indian help by any other contract.”  The natives, he explained, 
have little use for paper money, but were “buying $15.00 shoes and tailored clothes” after 
Walker “taught” them how “to grow bananas in quantities to sell.”232 He also made loans 
to smallholders to cover input costs.  By operating a plantation and trading posts in 
nearby villages, Walker embodied the strain of intimate, paternalistic capitalism briefly 
controlled much of the banana traffic on the lake, but changed as more powerful 
capitalists attempted to exert control across the region. 
 
In 1922, when the land lease program began, only one company – The Panama 
Railroad Steamship Line – shipped regional bananas from the Canal Zone to the Colon 
port.  The Panama Railroad, unlike many banana exporters in Central America, focused 
on transportation and was not directly involved in production.  Regional exports 
amounted to a humble eight thousand to nine thousand bunches monthly.
233
  At the time, 
the only mature plantations in the region were located beyond the Canal Zone boundary 
in Panama.  But this changed rapidly.  In April 1922, the United Fruit Company began 
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shipping bananas from Colon to New York weekly.  A year later, after the first Zone land 
lease bananas were harvested, they shipped twice weekly.
234
   United Fruit was both the 
world’s largest banana company and its largest agricultural enterprise.  In the 1920s, the 
company was transitioning from buying mainly from private producers to integrated 
company production.   More than 60% of its fruit was purchased by “smaller” planters, 
ranging from West Indian smallholders to larger foreign and domestic capitalists.
235
   
 
Johnnie Walker was the company’s main buyer in the Gatun Lake district.  In 
1924, he traded twelve hundred to fifteen hundred bunches weekly.
236
  At the time, both 
United Fruit and smallholders around the lake depended on compradores as mediators for 
their ability to align the goals and perspectives of diverse human communities.  After all, 
the social worlds that bananas brought together around the Panama Canal possessed, in 
the words science and technology scholar Susan Leigh Star, “mixed economies of 
information with different values and only partially overlapping coin."
237
  Nevertheless, 
the company did not like the power that Walker exercised on the lake.  In a letter to 
United Fruit headquarters in Bocas del Toro, Panama, DO Phillips concluded, “…it is out 
of the question for Mr. Walker to control the production in Gatun Lake Region.”238  
Phillips went on to suggest that the company buy directly from producers, cutting out 
Walker and independent compradores.  He also argued that they strengthen their position 
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vis-à-vis competing companies on the lake by buying less mature fruit and locking 
producers into contracts.  The idea was that, by purchasing fruit less mature than the 
standard export banana, they would undercut compradores and break their connections 
with producers.
  
 
By the end of the first year of the land lease program, 1923, the quantity of 
bananas destined for the Colon port continued to increase, overwhelming available 
transportation infrastructure. The Panama Railroad did not have enough dedicated banana 
cars to handle shipments.
239
  In October 1923, perhaps as a response to transportation 
problems, small boats carrying bananas from the lake began to pass through the Gatun 
Locks for the first time.
240
  In addition to land lease bananas coming to market, the 
Panamanian government gave concessions of thousands of hectares to capitalists who 
promised to plant bananas, build roads, and employ Panamanian laborers.  Spanish-
speaking farmers from the province of Cocle, to the west, began to migrate seasonally to 
work as banana laborers.
241
  Two new export companies – San Blas Development 
Corporation (owned by Standard Fruit) and American Banana Company – entered the 
fray as the rural landscape was being transformed.  Smallholders cultivated forested, 
sparsely populated lands located farther and farther up the Chagres River and its 
tributaries.  The number of bananas exported from the Gatun Lake region doubled almost 
every year between 1922 and 1925.
242
  By 1925, the Panama Railroad had dedicated 
entire trains two to three times every week to transporting bananas purchased on Gatun 
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Lake.
243
   That same year, United Fruit brought the first steamer to buy bananas on Gatun 
Lake – a practice previously forbidden on Panama Canal waters – cutting the train and 
compradores out of the network.
244
  This, combined with continued efforts to lock 
smallholders into contracts,
245
 fit the company’s strategy of squeezing the middlemen off 
the lake.  Regional growers were concerned about the growing power of the three big 
banana companies, and particularly suspicions of price-fixing arrangements.  The Panama 
Fruit Growers Association was organized to help independent growers with marketing.  
The banana companies, whom the producers accused of price-fixing, responded with 
counter-accusations.  They argued publicly that producers played them one against 
another in negotiations and also failed to honor contractual agreements.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Banana corm (rhizome) on a farm near the Panama Canal today.  
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Even as production continued to increase, there was a sense that the end of the 
boom was approaching.  Anxiety began to snowball when, in January 1926, regional 
newspapers announced the “arrival” of Fusarium oxysporum, a fungal pathogen that had 
decimated plantations elsewhere, at Gatun Lake.  The Panama American newspaper 
reported, “There is reason to believe that the banana growers about Gatun Lake are in a 
pessimistic mood.  There has been no falling off as yet in total production, and there may 
be none for some time to come, but the blight is spreading rapidly, and various planters 
who expected large returns on their investments will now be satisfied if they ultimately 
recover what money they expended.”246  
 
The first visible symptom of the infection – commonly referred to as Panama 
Disease, but called “banana blight” at that time around Gatun Lake – was the yellowing 
of the oldest leaves, followed by a wilt and buckling of leaves at the base.  As the disease 
persists, younger leaves wilt until the entire plant is covered in dying leaves.  The plant 
may buckle near the stock, or pseudostem
247
 Panama disease does not immediately 
devastate the plant, but decreases the quantity and quality of the fruit produced.  By the 
late-1920s, the disease had devastated the Panama’s large Atlantic plantations to the point 
that production ceased completely.
 248
  The plantation model facilitated the expansion of 
the epidemic in two ways.  First, the soil-borne fungus remained isolated as long as plants 
– and plantations – were not located directly next to one another.  The transformation of 
landscape mosaics into banana monocultures enabled it to spread more easily locally.  
Second, the flow of rhizomes across the extensive transportation infrastructure of banana 
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companies allowed Fusarium oxysporum to leap between countries and ecosystems.  
Companies establishing large banana plantations in new areas would routinely import 
hundreds of thousands of rhizomes from production zones in other countries.
249
   
 
Fusarium oxysporum was probably not a new arrival in Panama.  It probably 
existed in some of the soils of the riparian bottomlands cultivated along the train line in 
the late-nineteenth century.   But many of the lands cultivated during the 1920s – former 
hilltops and hillsides that became islands and banks – were marginal agricultural land 
before Gatun Lake was flooded, so farms were often in new locations.  Nevertheless, the 
distribution of the fungus accelerated through the 1920s as banana monocultures came to 
dominate the regional landscape and disparate soils were biologically interwoven through 
inter-farm corm transfers.   As an infrastructural species, the banana was threatened by 
the very socio-technical system that had enabled its widespread dispersal and 
propagation.  The historical flow of corms within the Canal Zone is difficult to retrace, 
but a 1926 advertisement in the Panama Times offering 2500 hectares of titled, “Virgin 
Banana Land” near the lake provides a clue. 250  For the purchaser of the tract, corms 
would be “cheaply and conveniently obtained” locally.  One producer recognized this as 
a problem, attributing the blight to “certain unscrupulous parties operating on the Lake 
[that] sold suckers from old diseased plantations to unsuspecting planters, and widely 
spread the blight.”251   
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Banana exports from Canal Zone ports 
Year Number of bunches 
1922 208,688 
1923 309,716 
1924 840,321 
1925 1,727,491 
1926 2,182,688 
1927 2,773,792 
 
The Decline 
The quantity of bananas shipped from Canal Zone ports peaked at 2.8 million 
bunches in 1927.
252
  This was the high water mark.  There is no easy answer as to why 
banana networks around Gatun Lake fell apart.  There was no massive influx of wage 
labor opportunities, as there had been in the region with the initiation of the French canal 
project in 1881 and US canal project in 1904.  Ecological, economic, and governmental 
factors all came into play in the decline.  Ecological change led to decreased production.  
Five short years after the Zone was thrown open, Land Agent NA Becker reported 
“exhausted soil” across six hundred hectares, nearly ten percent of all leased land in 
production.  This too might have been an unrecognized effect of F. oxysporum, as the 
basic symptoms of infection – leaf wilt and decreased fruit production – were similar to 
soil deficiencies.
253
  He recommended that the 257 lessees in the denuded region – mostly 
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“aging West Indians” – be allowed to relocate elsewhere in the Zone.  Gatun Lake banana 
production did not immediately decrease, but the exponential growth of previous years 
leveled out. Production was spatially redistributed as smallholders abandoned farms near 
the lake for more productive “virgin” lands higher in the Chagres River watershed.254  
Proximity to markets and transportation decreased as they moved up beyond the Canal 
Zone boundary.  There were rumors, however, that a Trans-Isthmian highway (Chapter 3) 
might soon be built across the region.  
 
United Fruit moved to consolidate its economic domination of the banana trade on 
the lake.  Tensions between the company and small producers came to a head in June 
1927 when weekly purchases were unexpectedly cut by half – from thirty-two thousand 
to fifteen thousand bunches – and the company announced that it would buy only from 
contract producers thereafter.
255
  Devastated independent producers accused the company 
of leveraging its clout to force them into unfair contracts.  United Fruit responded that it 
no longer had the capacity to buy low quality bananas grown around the lake as 
production increased at its company-run plantations.  The market was drying up, even as 
smaller companies continued to buy.  More problems emerged as the 1930s began.  The 
onset of the global economic depression led to decreased demand for bananas in US 
markets.  Prices fell to less than half of their levels in the mid-1920s. 
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The Canal Zone Land Lease policy legally restricted the size of banana farms to 
fifty hectares, but the average land area leased was around four hectares per licensee.
256
  
In this sense, it was a holdover of a more smallholder-oriented business model that 
banana historian John Soluri calls “vernacular agriculture.”  Zone land agents reported in 
1931 that farmers were unable to pay for their leases due to the difficulty of selling their 
fruit: “Most of our licensees are ex-canal employees, advanced in years, and very poor, 
and the collections are more difficult to make than formerly, the greater part of the rentals 
being collected by the land inspectors only after repeated calls on licensees in 
inaccessible locations.”257  Many renters were on the banks or islands of Gatun Lake, so 
the land inspectors used a canoe to collect rents, often with great difficulty.
258
 
 
Governing populations at the rural margins of the Canal Zone was not merely 
inconvenient.  Some administrators considered them to a menace to public health.   The 
land lease program was permanently discontinued in 1932 when, after years of debate 
over the costs and benefits of allowing people to occupy rural Zone lands.  Predominantly 
black, West Indian populations were thought to present a malarial threat to white 
suburban settlements and to be too expensive as lessees were able to draw on Zone 
hospitals and social services.
259
  Sanitation was the larger issue.  The Canal Zone 
Governor’s decision to depopulate rural areas once again and to end the practice of 
issuing land leases was based on the recommendation of the Health Department.  The 
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Governor of the Canal Zone described the decision in his 1932 annual report: “It is not 
practicable to care for any number of these people by allowing them to settle on land in 
the Canal Zone; many could not make a living in the jungle and the increases in malarial 
infection which have resulted in the canal towns from the presence of settlers on the land 
have led to the decision to license no more settlers.  The most obvious form or relief is an 
increase in public works."
260
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a letter to a colleague in 1930, Canal Zone horticulturalist Higgins explained 
that migratory banana agriculture around the canal was not simply a case of backward 
resistance to modern agricultural methods, but a rational reaction to the conditions 
created at the intersection of banana, transportation systems, and markets.  His analysis is 
sophisticated and anthropological, linking infrastructure, ecology, export markets, and 
local land use practices.  Smallholders around Gatun Lake were locked into a cycle of 
deforestation, cultivation, and migration to produce the standardized Gros Michel banana 
demanded by North American consumers – a variety highly susceptible to infection by 
Panama Disease.   These farmers, Higgins explained, failed to invest intensive labor and 
capital in banana cultivation because they knew they would farm a plot for only a few 
years before it was decimated by the blight.  Panama Disease diminished production, 
rendering producers’ bananas less attractive to buyers.  Growers constantly sought edge 
environments (along railroads, bodies of water, and highways), where the soil was 
“fresh” and transportation accessible.  The symbiotic relationship between the banana and 
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transportation infrastructure was its blessing and its curse.  Its future as a variety was 
threatened by the same delivery and production system that supported its success. 
 
The banana grounds the Panama Canal, literally, illuminating the contested 
history of land use in a transportation environment.  Agriculture is not peripheral to, but 
intimately related with, the history of transportation on the isthmus.  It has long been an 
economic buffer for transportation, providing a livelihood alternative for laborers when 
transportation employment was unavailable.  During the first decades of the twentieth 
century, a small proportion of the area of the Zone was occupied by residential and 
transportation facilities.   The remainder was rural, roadless, and poorly surveyed.  It was 
here – at the margins of the Canal Zone – that the parameters of the US enterprise in 
Panama were negotiated.  Were canal administrators exclusively operating a global 
transportation service or were they building a quasi-autonomous imperial enclave?  The 
rise and fall of banana networks around Gatun Lake demonstrates that there was, for a 
time, no final answer to this question.  Even as coalitions of administrators and labor 
leaders pushed for rural settlement and agricultural development, many others actively 
opposed the plan. The Canal Zone Land Lease program that began in 1922 and ended in 
1933 evoked particularly charged inter-institutional tensions.  Socio-ecologies thrived 
along the margins of the waterways that white administrators could not completely 
regulate or contain, a marked contrast to the organized grids of white Canal Zone 
communities clustered around the ocean cities of Panama City and Colon 
 
Consider, again, OW Barrett’s provocation in the epigraph, written nearly a 
century ago, “in three hundred twenty-five square miles of moderately suitable territory, 
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more or less isolated, how nearly self-supporting shall this area be made, what sort of 
horticultural development should it have and how much?”  Looking back from the 
twenty-first century, canal administrators’ answer seems clear: transportation and the 
service economy have displaced agriculture and rural production.
261
  But it need not be 
final.  By analyzing this shadow history of the Canal Zone, I hope to demonstrate that, 
though far from perfect, an alternative way of understanding and governing the 
relationship between agriculture, transportation, and sustainability did exist.  It makes one 
wonder what a diversified, self-supporting regional economy might look like today. 
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IV.  CONCRETE (AND MUD): ROADS AND THE POLITICS OF MOBILITY IN 
A TRANSIT ZONE 
 
 
 
 “The [Canal] Zone is like Egypt; whoever moves must travel by the same route.” 
         - Harry Franck [1913] 2006, 69 
 
 
I never planned to write about a highway.  I went to Panama in 2008 to study how 
watershed management has shaped the livelihoods of people in rural communities around 
the Panama Canal.  But, sometimes, things make you pay attention.  Driving regularly on 
the Transístmica changed how I understand the relationship between the canal and its 
rural hinterlands.  The construction of this fifty-mile strip of pot-holed pavement was 
funded through US defense appropriations during the Second World War.  When it 
opened to the public in 1943, it was – shockingly – the first interoceanic roadway in 
Panama since the demise of the Spanish colonial road (Camino Real) more than two 
hundred years before.  The Transístmica, like the canal, runs between two port cities: 
Panama City on the Pacific Ocean and Colon on the Atlantic Ocean.  But the two routes 
are quite different.  In general, enormous ships pass smoothly through the canal, but, for 
people traveling on nearby roads, movement is an experience of friction: bouncing on bus 
seats, swaying in the crowded beds of pick-ups, and sitting in traffic jams.  
 
The contrast between water and land travel points to a central paradox of life 
around the Panama Canal: this region has been organized around transportation for nearly 
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five centuries, but mobility has been – and remains – a challenge for many of the people 
that live here.  Why is this the case?  In this chapter, I argue that the same networked 
organization of transportation infrastructures that has facilitated global connection across 
this narrow strip of land has also contributed to local disconnection, producing spaces 
that are geographically close yet socio-economically distant.  Transportation 
infrastructure is not designed to move everyone and everything everywhere.  Instead, 
roads, rails, and canals channel people and materials along specific paths in support of 
particular social, economic, and political projects, often reflecting the priorities of 
politicians, engineers, and their publics.  In this chapter, I argue that the establishment of 
socio-technical systems to move ships by water across Panama has also shaped and often 
disrupted land movement within the region.  Put simply, getting across and moving 
around the isthmus are not the same, nor are they necessarily complementary.   I examine 
the construction, use, and maintenance of the Transístmica and its feeder roads to 
illustrate how geographical and socio-economic mobility around the canal is shaped by 
the intersection of networked infrastructures
262
 built to support projects that operate on 
different scales.   
 
At first, my interest in the Transístmica was only practical.  I traveled the 
highway between Panama City and the two rural communities where I conducted 
research.  My drive to Boqueron, the more remote community, often began on the 
Gaillard Highway in the former US Canal Zone, now an upper-middle-class Panama City 
suburb.  The highway runs along the east bank of the canal, skirting the old Zone 
communities of Balboa, Albrook, and Clayton.  The road passes by the new Miraflores 
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Locks Visitor Center, where busloads of foreign tourists pay eight dollars per head to see 
the canal in action.  The Pedro Miguel locks, a few miles north, are frequented by 
Panamanian families, who watch the same ships pass through the locks for free through a 
chain-link fence.   
 
  
 
Figure 4.1: Traffic on the Panama Canal and the Trans-Isthmian Highway. 
 
Transportation histories are sedimented across this landscape.  The legacies of 
nearly a century of US occupation (1904-1999) are readily visible across the northern 
outskirts of Panama City: manicured neighborhoods of bungalow houses, a hulking 
former military base that now houses the offices of the United Nations Development 
Program and Nature Conservancy, and, everywhere, the extensive physical infrastructure 
(power plants, machine shops, administrative offices, and dry docks) that makes transit 
through the canal possible.  Beyond Pedro Miguel, one-story pink and gold houses line 
the roadside in Paraiso, a community largely populated by the descendants of West 
Indian canal laborers.  Past Paraiso, a green lawn dotted with small white crosses slopes 
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up from the road, a reminder of an older, unsuccessful project.  This cemetery 
memorializes a handful of the most valued lives lost among an estimated twenty thousand 
who died during the failed French canal project of the 1880s.
263
  Veer eastward, away 
from the canal on Madden Highway, another old Canal Zone road.  Forest canopy 
swallows the sky as you enter Soberania National Park, a green tunnel that feels ancient 
and insulated from the world around. 
 
As you approach the former Canal Zone-Panama boundary five miles later, the 
forest thins and cracks radiate across the pavement.  Turn left onto the Transístmica.  The 
highway is a world of concrete: the hum of rubber on pavement, the odor of acrid exhaust 
fumes, the visual jumble of cinder block buildings and weedy secondary forest.  This 
landscape is a jarring transition from that of the former Canal Zone, where the Panama 
Canal Authority has largely maintained the uniform architectural and landscape aesthetic 
– mowed grass everywhere – designed by North American planners. Diablo rojos (red 
devils), the former US school buses that have enjoyed lengthy second careers in Panama, 
are everywhere.
264
  They roar and belch black smoke, lurching in and out of traffic to 
reach crowded bus stops. The roadsides are lined with the Asian-owned grocery stores 
that everyone here calls chinos and fondas (food stands) selling hot dogs and day-glow 
sodas.  Despite the markedly different landscapes, there are hints that the Transístmica is 
bound up with the canal and associated transport service sector.  Tractor-trailers haul 
shipping containers stamped with the logos of multinational corporations.  Billboards 
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promote American designer jeans, European watches, and Korean televisions for sale in 
Colon’s Zona Libre (free trade zone) another thirty miles up the highway.  The highway 
corridor is a world in motion, but it is also a bottleneck.  As I said before, it is the only 
road across the narrowest stretch of the Americas.
265
  In the event of construction or an 
accident, traffic comes to a halt.  There are no alternate routes.  
 
Now we’re moving again.  Turn left and you descend to the canal.  Turn right and 
you drive toward rolling green mountains.  Take the next right.  Off the highway, drive 
through groups of boys in white polo shirts and green slacks chatting up girls in matching 
skirts.  A red pick-up heavy with fruit creeps along the road, its driver droning into a 
megaphone mounted on the roof: “plátano, guineo, mango, papaya [plantains, bananas, 
mangos, papayas].”  A campesino man in a straw hat, his pants tucked into knee-high 
rubber boots walks with a machete.  Barbed wire fences demarcate teak forest plantations 
and cow pastures.  A dog in the road struggles to its feet and moves, begrudgingly.   
 
This rural landscape is less than thirty miles by road from Panama City and the 
Miraflores Locks, but it is a world apart.  The people who travel this road regularly will 
tell you that it is feo (ugly).  They are right.  The surface is part asphalt, part gravel, and 
almost all in need of maintenance.  People stand and sway in the crowded beds of pick-up 
trucks that carve wide S-pattern to avoid ruts and washboards.  Drive through a few more 
small towns.  Then, the power lines along the road disappear and the topography buckles.  
Downshift.  The road – it’s all gravel now – climbs and winds through the small 
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mountains.  There are fewer houses and they are set back from the road.  The Boqueron 
River appears on your right as you continue to climb.  The river is clear now, but a few 
days ago it swelled and ran clay red after a heavy rain shower.  Puddles of red water dot 
the road.  The sound of your tires on the gravel announces your arrival in Boqueron.   
 
Arriving in Boqueron 
The families living along the road know you are here before you do.  Faces peek 
down from the straggle of roadside ranchos – open-sided structures with palm thatch or 
tin roofs – and cinder block homes to see who you are.  They shout greetings if they 
know you and stare if they don’t.  This is a small place that is getting smaller.  The 
census of 2000 recorded 130 people living in the community, down from 183 in 1990.
266
  
People have moved to settings where life is a little easier.  Many now work in the urban 
service sector or farm in places outside of the Panama Canal watershed, where 
agricultural land use is far less restricted.  The town center is a cluster of white cinder 
block structures: an open-air community house for meetings, a three-room school, a tiny 
public health post, a Catholic church, and an evangelical church.  The buildings are 
typical of many rural Panamanian communities, with an important exception.  Perched 
high on the far riverbank is a hydrographic station that measures the flow of water from 
here to the canal.   
 
People in Boqueron are always coming from or going to the Transístmica.  They 
leave town, or “go outside” (pa’ fuera), to work as day laborers, sell agricultural 
products, shop at discount megastores, seek government services, and visit friends and 
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relatives.   Getting out and back is not easy.  There are only two privately owned cars in 
town, so most people depend on bus transportation.  The diablo rojo that comes twice a 
day – once early in the morning and once in the afternoon – binds life here with the 
rhythms of the highway. The town bus stop is the end of the line, so those that live higher 
in the mountains walk or ride horses, which they leave hitched to nearby trees.  Due to 
local dependence on the bus, connections with the “outside” can be precarious.  On my 
second day in Boqueron, a strike by the Transportistas – the national union of bus, taxi, 
and truck drivers – halted public transportation and left people in Boqueron and many 
other places stranded and facing hours of walking to complete their everyday activities.  
 
The Politics of Mobility in a Transit Zone 
Transportation was ranked, behind security, as the second most important issue in 
the 2008 presidential election.
267
  Getting around the region around the Panama Canal 
takes an inordinate amount of people’s time, money, and energy.  Consider Alejandro 
Rodriquez, who commuted from Boqueron to work in the Colon free trade zone, where 
he earned $11.25 per day – too little to begin a life in the city without social connections.  
His commute from the campo to the city cost $3.60 – one-third of his pay – and took four 
hours.  Life in the country is hard, Alejandro told me, but life in the city is harder.  Here, 
at least, you can plant corn and yucca to eat.  You only need to buy oil and salt for 
cooking.  In the city, by contrast, if you don’t have money, you don’t eat.  Alejandro quit 
his city job and returned to farming a small family plot in Boqueron.  The logic of global 
commerce also makes small-scale farming difficult; producers lack the credit, marketing, 
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and transportation access to compete with domestic and foreign producers operating on 
larger economies of scale.    
 
People have come to the isthmus from abroad with the capital, technology, and 
labor power to build roads, railroads, and waterways.  It has been a repository of dreams 
of mobility, but benefits have not been widely distributed.  The historical proximity of 
wealth and poverty, mobility and immobility is a phenomenon that still persists today, as 
evidenced by high rates of income inequality.
268
  The sociologists John and Mavis 
Biesanz observed over a half-century ago, "The 'Crossroads of the World’ at the 
convergence of international trade lanes, is a country with woefully inadequate internal 
transportation facilities.  It boasts the first transcontinental railway and an ancient royal 
road, now overgrown with jungle, across the Isthmus.  Not until the forties, however, 
when Uncle Sam finally built it, did it have a road from Colon to Panama….”269  
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter is organized in three sections.  First, I explain how ethnographic 
research led me study and write about roads around the Panama Canal.  I develop a 
conceptual framework by integrating a small anthropological literature on roads with 
theory on how materials – in this case, road surfaces – mediate human politics.  Second, I 
draw on archival research to recover the geopolitics embedded in the construction of the 
interoceanic highway across Panama and discuss the problems engineers encountered as 
they laid concrete across an unstable landscape.  I summarize this history, which has 
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never been explored to my knowledge, because the political dramas and decisions around 
highway construction shape contemporary mobility.
270
  Third, I draw on oral histories to 
show how the Transístmica opened possibilities beyond its builders’ intentions.  Rural 
people took advantage of its potentials and worked around its limitations.  
 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ROADS 
When I began collecting oral histories in Panama, I did not ask about roads.  But 
the people I interviewed, like Alejandro, kept bringing them up.  After struggling to 
redirect people back to my planned interview topic – environmental management and 
rural livelihoods – I decided that I should add some new questions to my interview guide 
to learn about the histories of the narrow feeder roads that run from the Transístmica to 
the communities of Limon and Boqueron.  I asked:  
- Was there a road here when you arrived? 
- When did the construction of the road begin?  When was it finished? 
- Who built the road? 
 
The questions seemed straightforward enough.  But, in interviews, the road 
emerged as a tangle of people, events, and materials shot through with interpretations of 
the relationship between the past and present.  I could never get the story of the road 
straight.  Following historian Alessandro Portelli, we might approach this as an 
interpretive problem inherent in conducting oral history:  
The first thing that makes oral history different, therefore, is that it tells us less 
about events than their meaning…the unique and precious element which oral 
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sources force upon the historian and which no other sources possess in equal 
measure is the speaker’s subjectivity…we might say that oral sources, especially 
from nonhegemonic groups, are a very useful integration of other sources as far as 
the fibula – the logical, causal sequence of the story – goes; but they become 
unique and necessary because of their plot – the way in which the story materials 
are arranged by narrators in order to tell a story.
271
  
 
What analysis of my interview transcripts later made clear was that my questions, 
designed to reconstruct chronological history, were embedded with assumptions about 
roads that reflected my experiences growing up in the southeastern US.  For generations, 
aspiring ethnographers have been inculcated with a reflexive attitude toward our own 
cultural assumptions.
272
  We are less equipped, however, to question the infrastructural 
assumptions we carry into the field.  But they also shape what we think we already know 
and, therefore, what we need to ask. My assumptions about roads were as follows: (1) 
They are constructed by a single builder, generally a state institution.  (2) They are built 
through a linear beginning-to-end process.  The transition from disconnection to 
connection thus represents a clean historical break.  (3) They function and you can forget 
about them.  In oral historical accounts in Boqueron, however, people described the road 
as unfinished.  It did not arrive, but advance and retreat over time in relation to the 
actions of the changing networks of capitalists, entrepreneurs, and government officials 
that channeled money and labor into the region.  Consequently, the road is not taken for 
granted.  It persists as a matter of concern in Boqueron and neighboring communities 
precisely because local connectivity and possibilities have fluctuated in relation to its 
construction and maintenance.  
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Figure 4.2: Rural roads near the Panama Canal vary in terms of maintenance. 
 
Anthropological scholarship on roads has often framed their construction to and 
arrival in rural communities as a pivotal historical moment met with local ambivalence.  
In most cases, rural people seem to want the benefits of paved roads, but believe that the 
state and urban forces that accompany them may change things for the worse.
273
   Some 
anthropologists have examined how people deploy roads in discourse to represent past 
and present relationships with other groups, particularly the various social dislocations 
associated with colonialism and unfulfilled promises of modernity.
274
  Applied 
anthropologists and development studies scholars have been most interested in evaluating 
the correlation of road construction projects with indicators of poverty alleviation, 
including access to markets, employment, and health programs.
275
  Each of these 
approaches has provided important insights, but the materiality of roads is often 
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neglected in anthropological work focused on language and perception.  What about the 
roads themselves? 
 
Gina Porter suggests that rural people often describe poverty in terms of access to 
physical infrastructure, particularly roads.
276
  For many people, in other words, roads 
serve an interpretive function.  Although this corresponds with my findings in Boqueron, 
the claim is also too general.  People talk about bad roads and non-existent power lines to 
frame more than a general state of poverty.  Infrastructure provides a means of talking 
about changing connections with – and access to – other people and places, as well as a 
tangible object for conceptualizing the relationships between development and 
underdevelopment.  A road is a symbol, but it is more than that.  My interviewees’ “story 
materials,” to use Portelli’s term, were gritty: dirt, gravel, and concrete.  The changing 
distribution of these materials across the landscape does not simply reflect power 
relationships – which assumes that social asymmetries stand prior to and independent of 
the road.  Human inequities are shaped or mediated by non-human forces.
277
 
 
Here, I am inspired by the work of scholars who bring the mundane transportation 
surfaces into analyses of social and political life.  On Barak has described how specific 
road surfaces shaped social space in unexpected ways in turn-of-the-twentieth century 
Alexandria.
278
  He argues that new granite-paved roads shaped emergent forms of social 
life in the city, including increased urban violence and instability.  It was not granite, but 
concrete: the inexpensive composite of cement, water, sand, and crushed stone that 
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became the quintessential road surface of the twentieth century.   In a recent article on the 
relationship between concrete roads and public space in Peru, anthropologist Penelope 
Harvey explains its seemingly ubiquitous appeal as a construction material: “Concrete is 
useful because it combines [an] initial flexibility with a powerful fixing capacity, which 
has led to its ubiquitous and dominant deployment in unruly settings and all kinds of 
environmental conditions. Its associations with standardized forms that transcend the 
specificities of local conditions have given the material great value for the regulatory 
spaces of the modern state."  The mixture’s standardizing potential makes it an ideal 
medium for would-be social engineers to pursue projects that integrate both technological 
and social design elements.
279
   
 
 
Road materials turn our attention not only to the intentions of designers, but also 
to the transformations a route undergoes through use in the months and years after a 
surface is laid.  Paved roads are often constructed by state institutions as a top-down 
project.  But, they are then transformed through the use and work of multiple 
communities.  They can become different things.  “A tool” write Susan Leigh Star and 
Karen Ruhleder, “is not just a thing with pre-given attributes frozen in time – but a thing 
becomes a tool in practice, for someone, when connected to some particular activity…By 
analogy, infrastructure is something that emerges for people in practice, connected to 
activities and structures.”280  Clean, hard surfaces are repeatedly abused by tires, hooves, 
feet, and water.  A road, like any infrastructure, both serves and depends on people.  Put 
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another way, it needs a community to maintain it, even as it shapes a community.
281
  
Without maintenance, however, the road becomes difficult to traverse.  Potholes, cracks, 
and puddles create trouble for travelers as a smooth concrete or gravel surface blends 
with the environment.  Geographer Chris Otter points out that road materials are part of 
the surrounding landscape. 
Like rivers and mountain passes as well as canals, tramlines and railways, 
streets are not everlasting routes etched into the face of the earth.  In 
order to become relatively durable they require the cooperation of 
humans (workmen, pedestrians, cleaning systems), matter (which must be 
resilient and cohesive), and atmosphere (by avoiding corrosive chemicals 
dampness and climatic extremes).  If these elements are harmonized, the 
street’s fundamental impermanence can be masked.282  
 
The potholes, washboards, and cracks that spread across pavement when it is not 
well maintained reflect this community and also shape human mobility.  In Panama and 
elsewhere, road surfaces facilitate lines of motion and complicate others, formatting both 
space and everyday life.  
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRANSÍSTMICA (TRANS-ISTHMIAN HIGHWAY) 
The automobile was less than two decades old when the Panama Canal opened in 
1914.  Around the world, paved roads were restricted to cities.  Beyond urban boundaries, 
mobility was tied to railroad lines and dirt roads.  At that time, more than ninety percent 
of the roads in the United States were “muddy, rutted, dirt paths, threatening to mire 
motor vehicles up to their hubs.
283
  For those without paved roads, they were something 
to aspire to.  During the early-twentieth century, Panamanians clamored for a paved road 
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of their own: a trans-isthmian highway that would run parallel to the US-controlled canal 
and railroad line.  The editors of national newspapers, who agreed on very little, argued 
that such a highway would facilitate free – that is, independent of the Yankee control – 
and rapid passage between Panama City and Colon, while opening up the arable land in 
between for agriculture. This refrain resonated with an international discourse about 
paved roads’ potential to “release the energies” of a land.284   But not just any material 
would do.  Modernity would travel over concrete.
285
  A 1923 editorial in the Star and 
Herald made the case for the concrete roads in Panama: “There seems to exist in the 
minds of a great many a mistaken idea that concrete construction is a luxury to be used 
only for city streets.  This ‘hooey’ has always been fostered by the advocates of an old 
semi-permanent type of pavement.  Gravel and water-bound macadam might be cheaper 
in the short term, but required much higher maintenance rates.  It is practically impossible 
to maintain macadam in the tropics.”286 
 
 
Panama had neither paved roads nor the capacity to produce the cement used to 
make concrete.
287
  The existing roads were called caminos de verano: dirt paths passable 
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by foot and pack animal and, during the dry season, by wagon.
288
  Travel within regions 
was organized around North-South river systems that linked the coasts and mountains.
289
  
Travel between regions was organized around East-West steamer routes that connected 
ports on both coasts.
290
  Panamanians in the transit zone could also travel via the US-
controlled Panama Railroad.  The government of Panama established a roads department 
(Junta Central de Caminos) in 1920 to facilitate the construction of a national road 
network; its initial mandate was to develop “penetration roads,” small dirt roads that 
would stimulate agriculture by connecting the rural interior and ports.
291
 
 
Panama Divided, the World United 
The union of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Panama Canal physically cut 
Panama in half.  There was no bridge linking the two sides, so transportation between 
them depended on barges, tugs, and ferries.  Moreover, the flooding of Gatun Lake erased 
many former local transportation routes around the Chagres River.  A geographer 
describing environmental changes associated with the Panama Canal described the old 
routes’ disappearance: “most of the foot-trails were obliterated and the narrow, well-
defined canoe routes became lost in a maze of flooded forests, the tortuous channels no 
longer indicated by wooded banks or rapid currents…broad, stagnant, forested waters 
were covered here and there by flooding vegetation and driftwood that often blocked the 
old route, making travel uncertain."
292
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Geopolitics and a new physical geography articulated to restrict mobility in the 
transit zone. Panama did not have the legal authority to build a land route across its 
sovereign territory without a waiver from the United States.   The Panama Railroad had 
exclusive rights to interoceanic transportation on the isthmus due to an 1867 agreement 
between the company and government of Colombia, which governed Panama at the time.  
Colombia granted the railroad a 99-year monopoly on “any class of carriage roads 
whatever, from one ocean to another.”293  When the US government purchased the 
railroad in 1903, it inherited these monopoly rights.  Some US administrators in 
Washington DC and the Canal Zone preferred that Panama not be given the waiver to 
build a trans-isthmian highway.  They did not see the road as a potential commercial rival 
to the canal, but were concerned about epidemiological and military issues.  For the 
civilian Canal Zone government, tropical disease was a key concern.  Despite their 
famous achievements sanitizing the Zone,
294
 administrators worried that increasing flows 
of automobiles along Panama’s developing road network beyond the Zone would also 
speed the movement of malarial mosquitoes.
295
  Lines of human communication were 
understood to facilitate disease communication between “native” and US communities. 
 
Military commanders also maintained that mobility on the isthmus made the canal 
more open to attack.  In fact, the first governor of the Canal Zone, George Goethals, was 
convinced that an unbroken forest without roads afforded the canal a natural defense 
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from potential invading forces. “With the jungle,” he argued, “large bodies could not be 
moved with ease and rapidity, and though small parties might work their way to the 
locks, they could do no damage if the defense was alive to its duties.”296  As discussed in 
the first chapter of the dissertation, defense and sanitation were among the stated 
motivations for depopulating the rural areas of the Canal Zone during the 1910s and 
allowing secondary forests to grow up.  Ironically, the characteristic traits of tropical 
nature that the Isthmian Canal Commission had struggled against during the early years – 
heat, insects, and disease – were to be enlisted in the defense of the waterway.   
 
However, as military technologies changed, so did the tenor of discussions about 
road construction around the canal.  If forest cover discouraged ground forces, it did not 
deter airplanes.
297
  Within this new context, the US government agreed in treaty 
negotiations with Panama to appropriate $45,000 to conduct a survey for a potential 
trans-isthmian highway.
298
   The absence of a central road between the oceans with a 
network of auxiliary roads made it impossible to move motorized forces quickly between 
the oceans and to the antiaircraft batteries and searchlights that comprised the outer 
periphery of canal defenses.
299
  The military went forward with a plan in the mid-1930s 
to construct 130 miles of hard-surfaced defense roads in Panama that would link the 
expanding canal defense network.  The critical question for was no longer whether to 
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build roads, but what kind of roads to build.  Army engineers had learned that road 
construction was quite different in Panama than in the US.  Plants grew across roadways 
and actively destroyed gravel and macadam surfaces.  Therefore, army engineers began 
to focus on stabilizing an unruly tropical landscape through the construction of well-
drained and maintained concrete roads, as described in 1928 by Major General Malin 
Craig: 
Trucks have been observed to break through a waterbound macadam road, 
apparently in good condition, only a year old.  In addition to the action of 
vegetation the terrific downpours cause rapid deterioration of these roads.  
Ditches, which are ample for ordinary rains in the States, overflow across 
the roads and soon wash out the top dressing, leaving the road-bed 
exposed.  Road maintenance work…involves keeping ditches open and 
thoroughly dug out, throwing back stone which is thrown aside by truck 
traffic, removing ‘cave-ins’ which frequently fall on the road, keeping 
culverts open, destroying vegetation, and keeping the grass clear so that 
the road will dry out… Conversion into concrete is recommended as that 
material is not penetrated by vegetation, is essentially self-maintained, and 
has, with the small traffic to be expected, practically infinite life.
300
  
 
Macadam paving was cheaper – three-fourths of the cost of concrete – but maintenance 
costs were double.  Concrete was considered necessary for heavily used roads and 
macadam fine for auxiliary roads.  
 
The New Geopolitics of Roads in Panama 
The US and Panama signed an agreement to build a trans-isthmian highway in 
Washington DC on March 2, 1936.  In Article I of the convention, the US government 
agreed to waive the railroad’s monopoly rights in order to allow the government of 
Panama to construct the highway.  This marked the end of the foreign monopoly on 
interoceanic ground transportation in Panama. For more than eighty years, the railroad 
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had been the only line of land communication between the nation’s largest cities.  More 
incredibly, perhaps, there had not been a road across the isthmus since the deterioration 
of the Spanish Camino Real two centuries before.  Panama planned to build a road from 
Madden Dam – the end of the road system on the Pacific side – to Cativa, near the Canal 
Zone border on the Atlantic side. The US agreed to construct “without delay and at its 
own expense” a road between Cativa and the existing road system on the Atlantic side.   
 
The 1936 Trans-Isthmian Highway Convention was ratified on July 25, 1939.   As 
the Second World War loomed, the US military scrutinized Panama’s road system and 
found it underbuilt and poorly maintained.
301
  Within this new geopolitical context, the 
construction of previously proposed paved roads and the long-discussed highway 
suddenly became a defense priority.  A State Department official wrote: "The reasons for 
which this Government considers the construction of the Trans-Isthmian Highway to be a 
project vitally concerned with our national defense are, to my mind, obvious.  At the 
present time the surface means of transit across the Isthmus of Panama are limited to the 
Canal and a railroad.  In these days of motorized and mobile equipment for the armed 
defense forces of the country, it is of the utmost importance that a hard-surfaced highway 
be built across the Isthmus."
302
  Meanwhile, at home and at US overseas outposts, the 
Public Roads Administration was building a national network of defense roads.  In mid-
1940, Franklin Roosevelt requested $325,000 in emergency defense funds from Congress 
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to build the United States portion of the road over the mangrove swamps between Colon 
and Cativa.
303
  Panama was given a $3.2 million loan by the Washington-based United 
States Export-Import Bank to build the longer stretch between Cativa and Madden Dam.  
Under the terms of the loan agreement, the road would be built by the Public Roads 
Administration, part of the United States government, which would be responsible for all 
expenditures, as well as the specifications, design, and construction. 
 
The construction of the US section of the highway was underway when the Public 
Roads Administration analyzed the proposed technical specifications of the Panamanian 
section and found them inadequate for projected civilian and military traffic.  The 
Panamanian government planned to build a two-lane, eighteen-foot-wide road.  But the 
Roads Administration argued that a much larger road would be necessary for war: four 
lanes and forty feet in width.  “The pavement” a Federal Works Administrator wrote to 
President Roosevelt, “should be sufficiently heavy to carry mechanized military 
equipment, and should have shoulders sufficiently wide to permit stopping for repairs or 
parking without blocking traffic on the paved sections.”304  Ultimately, the Public Roads 
Administration recommended that the US government take over the construction of the 
Panamanian section of the highway and pay the additional cost of a “heavier and better 
design.”  As technical specificities were debated in Washington, the Export-Import bank 
put Panama’s highway loan on hold pending a decision.305 
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The Trans-Isthmian Highway was designated a defense road in 1940.  Roosevelt 
authorized the allocation of $3,675,000 to the Public Roads Administration from the 
“Emergency Fund for the President” to construct the Panamanian section of the highway.  
The designation meant that the road met War Department and Roads Administration 
defense standards.
306
  Panama would provide a right-of-way, but no financial 
contribution.  This was a major project that required heavy equipment and significant 
labor.  The organization of men and machines echoed canal construction work three 
decades before.  Fifty tractors and men to operate them were imported from the US.  The 
Public Roads Administration announced that all unskilled labor – “instrument men, 
chainmen, rodmen, and machete men” – would be Panamanian.  “Operators for heavy 
power equipment have been imported from the States on account of their experience with 
the type of equipment used.”307  Rain, vegetation, and mud made paved roads necessary 
and, at the same time, a challenge to build.  The ecology of the wet tropical forest drove 
up construction costs and troubled equipment built for drier climates.
308
 
 
 
Construction of the Panamanian section of the highway – to cross twenty-five 
miles of forests, rivers, and rough topography – began in December 1940 when machete 
men began to “hew away at the jungle” at three points along the route.309  During the dry 
period between January and March 1941, half of the forest along the route was cleared.
310
  
Excavation began, with the earth being cut as deep as one hundred feet.  Culverts were 
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laid below the roadbed to divert water underneath and immense soil fills used to plug the 
deep ravines along the route.   Rainfall increased as the dry season ended and built further 
into June and July, when the rivers swelled and roadwork stopped intermittently.
311
  By 
August, machinery stood idle and the crews waited for the weather to break.
312
  
Construction work began again in January 1942 as the work of laying two ten-foot strips 
of concrete commenced on the Atlantic side.
 313
  Laborers slit dumped sacks of cement 
into trucks, which fed the paver as it slowly laid down concrete over the clay roadbed.
314
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Paving of the Transístmica nears completion, May 7, 1942. 
315
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A convoy of US army trucks completed the first automobile trip by road between 
the oceans in Panama on January 21, 1942, after the Atlantic- and Pacific-side 
construction forces met at the Gatun River.
316
  It was dirt, but an interoceanic road, 
nonetheless.  Paving continued for the next three months with pauses for unusually 
powerful torrential rains until a concrete lane was complete.  “It is possible,” the Panama 
American announced on April 17, 1942, “for a car to drive on modern concrete highways 
from the Pacific to the Atlantic in a little over two hours.”317 The road was dedicated as 
the Boyd-Roosevelt Highway and opened to the public on April 15, 1943.  In his 
dedication remarks, Panamanian President de a Guardia used the new concrete road to 
link Panama with a colonial commercial history.  He said, “The new road, built along the 
most modern lines of reinforced concrete becomes the present-day successor to the 
Panama-Portobelo mule train of the colonial days…”318  The president’s phrasing – 
“modern lines of reinforced concrete” – framed the completion of the new paved 
highway across the isthmus as a transformational moment for Panama, a moment when a 
sovereign nation embraced its transportation legacy on its own terms, outside of the 
shackles of colonialism and imperialism.  The next section of the chapter examines what 
happened along the highway after its completion. 
 
LIFE ALONG THE TRANSÍSTMICA 
Describing the changes around the arrival of the railroad in colonial Indonesia, 
Rudolf Mrazek observes the powerful attraction of modern transportation infrastructure: 
“As soon as rails were laid and the first train appeared, people, the whole landscape, 
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turned around and moved to the train."
319
  In Panama, the landscape turned around to face 
the Transístmica before the road was even finished.  In May 1942, nearly a year before 
the highway was officially dedicated and opened to the public, President de la Guardia 
and other state officials inspected the road with the Public Roads Administration’s chief 
engineer in Panama, John Humbard.  State institutions saw the land along the 
Transístmica as a potentially productive agricultural region with access to established 
ports.  Even then, the roads department was building caminos de verano (dirt roads) that 
would connect rural communities previously linked by a network of unpredictable rivers 
and muddy trails shaped by the weather to a single, year-round concrete route.  In the 
communities around Gatun Lake, many of the boatmen (lancheros) who had ferried 
townspeople across the lake to work in the Canal Zone or sell agricultural products in 
Colon, sold their boats and bought small buses (chivas) to transport people to and from 
the new highway.  Contemporary residents told me that the towns began to “decay” as 
their inhabitants migrated up to settle along the new highway.   
 
From a temporal and spatial distance, the story takes on an air of inevitability.  
The geographer Charles Bennett concluded, decades later, that the construction of the 
Transístmica “stimulated” the settlement of an isolated area and that swidden farmers 
“invaded” the region.320   This narrative – still prominent today – portrays rural history as 
an inevitable and mechanical process.  A road built across arable land in the context of 
landlessness and poverty is understood to “release” social energy or lead to 
“spontaneous” settlement.  In this theoretical construction, political-economic relations 
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are thought to exist on a plane that is both prior to and independent of concrete and mud.  
On the ground, however, for those whom the road supposedly stimulated, the historical 
relationship between Transístmica and its hinterlands is understood differently.  Rural 
settlement has always been a precarious achievement.  Like any project, it requires a 
functional support system, an infrastructure.  And that infrastructure has to be 
maintained.  Through hard work and contingency, a network of small places emerged that 
were intermittently connected to the highway by dirt roads and capricious waterways.  In 
the paragraphs that follow, I draw on oral histories to write a genealogy one of these 
roads.  What emerges is a non-linear history of starts, stops, accidents, deviations, and 
reversals.
321
   As I argued in the first section of the chapter, road histories are always 
about design, materials, and maintenance.  
 
The long-awaited highway – just two concrete lanes – sounds modest in 
retrospect.  But Andres Diaz, among the first wave of migrants to settle along the new 
highway in the early-1940s told me how rapidly the Transístmica transformed a region, 
even giving new names to old places. 
 
Ashley: Why did people move to Buena Vista? 
 
Andres: Well, it wasn’t called Buena Vista yet.  Buena Vista was born around 
1947, ’48, ’49.  Before then it was called Agua Sucia [dirty water] because there 
is a river there called Agua Sucia.  There were a few little houses – it wasn’t 
much… 
 
Ashley: Let me be sure I have this right.  The people that came here in the early 
1940s moved from the banks of Gatun Lake and the city of Colon… 
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Andres: Eso, that’s the history.  So, look, there was a fire in Colon – that was 
what motivated us to leave …and they [the US Canal Zone government] didn’t 
want people farming in the Zone.  So what did people do?  Some went to the city.  
Some to work in the Zone.  Others of us came here, to the campo, to work in 
agriculture.  This group of people…came up with the idea of planting bananas 
along the edges of the Transístmica.  It was just a gravel road then, like we have 
in Boqueron today…Raul Segura and his brother had trucks.  They bought the 
bananas and transported them to Colon for export. 
 
 
Andres wanted me to understand that Raul and the others were creative, but that 
their innovation was to adapt an existing strategy to new economic, ecological, and 
infrastructural conditions.   West Indian, Colombian, and Panamanian men and women 
were laborers during the construction of transportation infrastructure.  When construction 
was complete, they devised livelihood strategies that took advantage of the margins of the 
newly built lines.  In this way, the opening of the Transístmica shaped an infrastructural 
ecology not unlike that created when the Panama Canal opened in 1914 and laborers were 
laid off en masse.
322
  People adapted the agricultural practices used along the banks of 
lakes and rivers to the edges of a highway.  Andres said: “1914, imagine it!  All of these 
people came to work on the canal, not to farm.  When they finished the canal, the people 
stayed.  Options?  Bananas!  They began to plant bananas.  But because of [Canal Zone] 
restrictions [against farming] people were forced to leave.  So they moved to Agua Sucia: 
‘Yes sir, there’s good land there.  You can plant bananas and there is a road project 
coming.’…That is what they did.  Sell bananas, drink aguardiente, and live quietly.”  
 
Life was quiet and traffic was sparse when people first settled along the 
Transístmica.  “When I was a kid,” a man who grew up along the highway in the 1950s 
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said, “we played baseball in the road.  After an hour, one car passed – an hour later, 
another car.  Most of them were Americans – lots of soldiers – but only a few individuals.  
We played in the road, lied down on it, and, at night, sat and listened to stories.”  The 
same road was a different space for white North Americans, who traveled between its 
urban termini rather than over its rural margins.  Zonians driving between Panama City 
and Colon were discouraged from stopping in “unsanitated areas” in Panama after dusk.  
“Evening drives,” a 1942 Canal Zone circular admonished travelers, “are safe only if the 
automobile is kept at a normal rate of speed and no stop is made.”  
 
As soon as the Transístmica was opened, it was becoming something different 
than what engineers and state officials had envisioned.  From moving vehicles, Zonians 
must have seen the edges of a region increasingly accessible to and reworked through 
agricultural activity.  Susan Leigh Star has shown how “communities of practice” emerge 
at the intersection of specific technologies and problems.  These heterogeneous 
collectives work around the edges of formal infrastructures.  Over time, she argues, the 
formal and the informal merge, producing something new and hybrid.
323
  A community 
of loggers, local transportation providers (transportistas), and colonists extended roads 
out from the highway into the rural areas and created new worlds.  
 
Loggers, Colonists, and the Life of a Dry-Season Road (Camino de Verano) 
Few in Boqueron today remember Macario and the early loggers well.  But nearly 
everyone agrees that they cut the first camino de verano – a dirt road that is often 
passable and in use only during the dry season – along the north bank of the river.  We 
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know that the loose dirt road was built by 1957 because Smithsonian scientist Dr. 
Alexander Wetmore photographed it during that dry season, the second of a series of 
collecting trips he made around Madden Lake.   
 
Macario’s tractor opened a path to the good lumber around the river.  People 
remember that the road pictured above to the left was not sufficient for the kind of trucks 
pictured on the right to pass.  So, during the dry seasons, the loggers paid laborers to fell 
large trees with hatchets and handsaws, plowed paths down to the Boqueron River, and 
floated the logs down the river to a waiting barge on Madden Lake, where they were 
transported by water and then by truck to urban markets.  During the rainy seasons, when 
loggers could not enter, they paid men a few dollars to stay and cut trees with hatchets for 
extraction when the road dried out again.  They logged Espave, Maria, Roble, Amargo 
Amargo, Cedro Amargo, Cabemo, Amarillo, Tachuelo without state restrictions.  Of 
these, Cedro Amargo, Roble, and Amarillo were the most valuable.    
 
The forests close to the canal had been logged for at least a century, dating to the 
construction of the Panama Railroad in the 1850s.
324
  But the construction of the 
Transístmica made it easier to move heavy machinery into and logs out from the region 
around the upper Chagres, Boqueron, and Pequeni rivers, where large timber had been 
difficult to access.  The logging road also opened the area’s rugged, forested mountains 
and the growing population along the Transístmica.  The first two families – the Seguras 
and the Garcias – settled in Boqueron in the dry season of 1958, a year after Wetmore’s 
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photograph was taken.  Raul Segura, his wife Florentina, and their daughter Elvira 
arrived first.  Raul, who Andres described as a key player in the Transístmica’s short-
lived banana economy during the 1940s, relocated his family from Buena Vista to 
Boqueron, where there was land to farm (tierra libre), and settled across the river from an 
unmanned Panama Canal hydrographic station.  The second colonists, Eusebio “Chevo” 
Garcia and his son Tomas, arrived on foot only a few months after the Seguras.  
Originally from Chorrera, west of Panama City on the Pacific coast, Chevo and Tomas 
had spent most of the past decade moving around the country searching, like Raul, for 
tierra libre.  They wanted to work land to which nobody else had a title or possessory 
right.  They found the land they sought in Boqueron.   There was no such land left along 
the Transístmica, but Boqueron was still frontier. 
 
The children of these families, now grandparents, told me that the first wave of 
settlement worked like this: a rubber tapper, a hunter, or a logger would travel through 
the forest.  As he traveled over the highway and into the cities, he would share 
information about the land he had seen with people – including farmers looking for land.   
I asked Luis Segura, Raul’s son, how he learned about the area.  “You know how people 
talk,” he said, “‘Listen, up there, they made a road and they’re starting to work the land.’  
And one person told another like that.”  Word spread that the land was montaña virgin 
(virgin forest) and it was available.  Montaña is an important word in rural Panama.  It 
refers to land that has been neither settled nor cultivated.  The narratives of the first 
settlers to arrive Boqueron are what one would expect of people settling an area 
understood to be wilderness.  Settlers remember fertile soil, forests full of wild game 
(deer, iguanas, birds, wild pigs, large rodents called pacas), and a river full of fish.  The 
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legacies of previous extraction were few: a few hunting trails, crumbling buildings 
around a manganese mine abandoned after the First World War, overgrown banana 
plantations.  The land was not “tired,” as it was where most of the migrants came from, 
but “rested” (descansado).  People began to clear the forest and plant crops.   
 
Boqueron was bountiful, but it was also a difficult place to live in the late-1950s 
and early-1960s.  The river flooded and swept away houses built in its flood plain.  
Massive trees fell in the wrong direction while being cut and killed men clearing them to 
make fields.  Plagues destroyed entire crops.  But, in those early years, the biggest 
problem was transportation.  When the community was settled, there were two routes – 
on foot over the corte or by boat over the river and lake – to get to the Transístmica.  The 
highway was less than twenty miles away, but both routes made moving people and 
cargo difficult.  The river and Madden Lake rose and fell in relation to climatic 
conditions.  “The river,” one man said, “was larger then.  They would make a canoe to 
carry their cargo out…In the rainy season, when the river was high, they had to travel on 
the banks.  Leave the canoe there and leave on foot by land.  Or wait until the river would 
go down a little.”  The corte was pure mud for most of the rainy season.  It could take 
five hours to walk to concrete without cargo, twice that with a pack animal or in muddy 
conditions.   Getting to and from community was so difficult that many people 
abandoned their farms. 
 
The camino de verano was a work-in-progress shaped by local traffic, regional 
climate, and changing extra-local demand for commodities like lumber and manganese.  
Macario and other loggers continued to work near the Boqueron River as the region 
became more populated.  When the loggers left at the end of the summer and the rains 
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came, traffic by animals and vehicles would transform the road into impassable mud that 
would be washed into waterways.  It had to be cut and graded anew every dry season.  By 
the time that Raul and Chevo replaced their wooden ranchos with cinder block structures, 
the loggers had cut all of the big trees near the river and moved higher in the mountains, 
now working with chainsaws rather than hatchets and handsaws.  The increased distance 
between logging sites and the river made extracting logs that much more difficult, so the 
loggers worked to improve the road to make it passable by trucks.  They embedded 
wooden poles in the road to stabilize it – creating what is called a corduroy road.   
 
The Transportistas 
“Movement, there was always movement,” Andres said.  We were sitting in front 
of his house perched on a hilltop above the Boqueron River.  His deceptively simple 
characterization of life around the canal and the highway resonated with what others also 
told me.  Look, he explained, if people didn’t work for the canal, they worked in 
agriculture or fished.  Many people did both, moving between social worlds – rural and 
urban, wage labor and agriculture, English and Spanish – but also between functional and 
crumbling infrastructure.  Mobility depended upon transportation across a region 
fragmented through the construction of the canal, a system built to channel people across, 
not around, the isthmus.  Therefore, regional transportation has depended on the 
transportistas
325
 who have made a living driving boats, pick-up trucks, diablo rojos, and 
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taxis.  These are the men and women who know local transportation routes – and their 
potholes and eddies – intimately.  Their knowledge and labor serves to bridge formal and 
informal transportation infrastructure, making it possible for poor people to move across 
these boundaries.  So, if mobility in the transit zone is about these routes, it is also about 
transportistas like Luis. 
 
Luis Segura lives in a small yellow house set back a hundred yards from the 
gravel road to Boqueron.  The afternoon we first met, the sky was darkening.  Low 
rumbling thunder suggested an afternoon rainstorm.  His lean eighty-six-year-old frame 
was splayed out across a hammock above a concrete slab patio.  A group of tan hens 
pecked at dried corn on the floor.  Luis was born in 1922 near Cativa, outside of Colon, 
where work on the Transístmica would begin two decades later.  His father Raul moved 
there from the interior province of Veraguas to farm.  Like many men of his generation 
living in rural areas around the canal, Raul was made a living in the banana business.  He 
worked as an independent buyer (comprador) for the US-based Standard Fruit Company 
along the Transístmica.  Small farmers traveled from their farms down to the highway to 
sell their bananas.  Luis and a small group of men worked under Raul.  Their two-day 
buying route along the Transístmica and emerging road system during the 1940s would 
run from Madden Lake to the Atlantic Coast below Colon.  Soon, Luis saved up enough 
money to buy his own truck to buy bananas.  The regional banana industry crumbled 
during the 1950s.  Raul moved to Boqueron to farm.  Luis continued to take various kinds 
of work along the highway in the years between.  Most of it involved driving trucks, 
tractors, and cars. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the railroad and, later, the canal had the effect of centralizing transportation and disenfranchising 
independent carriers who had previously profited from moving foreigners between the oceans. 
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He followed his father to Boqueron in the mid-1960s.  He recalled that his 
emergence as the local transportista began during a long boat trip.  He was paddling a 
boat across Madden Lake with Chevo, the farmer who had settled in the area just after 
Raul.  They left Boqueron early in the morning and arrived at the Transístmica late in the 
afternoon.  “I am going to buy a motor,” Luis remembered announcing during that long 
trip.  He realized that there was money to be made transporting people and their 
agricultural products over the lake to market.  But he didn’t have the money to buy a boat 
motor.  There were loans available to rural people that agreed to work with buyers higher 
up the commodity chain.  Luis approached an Ecuadorian man who bought agricultural 
products in Vigia with the proposal and he agreed to loan him the money to buy a motor 
if he channeled local agricultural products to him for purchase.  The Ecuadorian gave 
Luis a key so he could drop off agricultural products at the house in Vigia.  He then paid 
another man to carve a boat from the trunk of an Espave tree.  Luis brought many of the 
colonists to Boqueron and, after they had settled, brought them and their products – 
mainly agricultural, but also wood – to sell in Vigia or to be carried by car to markets in 
Colon or Panama.  The road to Boqueron was still a camino de verano.  The road became 
passable by truck when a year-round road was built to the old manganese mine in 
Boqueron in the early-1970s.  Again, the regional political economy of extraction, linked 
to transnational markets, changed local mobility.  Luis took the money that he had saved 
through his boat and bought a four-wheel drive pick-up truck.   
 
The road to Boqueron is still gravel.  It is more stable now but still washes out 
during the rainy season.  Power lines have just arrived, nearly 80 years after they arrived 
at the Panama Canal hydrographic station visible from the center of town.   Roads and 
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power lines are tangible, specific manifestations of what social scientists often describe 
as “structural” inequities. They provide a localized means of rendering visible 
relationships with people and places that shape this small place from a distance.  But I 
have argued that a road is also more than a symbol, more than a reflection of preexisting 
social, economic, or political relationships.  It is a relational space.  In Boqueron, people 
recognize that roads both reflect and reproduce social relationships.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Why is it so hard to get around a region organized around transportation?  The 
quick answer is that transnational connection and regional movement are not independent 
of one another.  Mobility and immobility on the isthmus are both the byproducts of 
networked infrastructures that channel people and materials along routes that reflect the 
priorities of the communities that build and maintain them.  My historical analysis of the 
debates around and construction of a critical highway demonstrates that interoceanic 
transportation has been an issue in Panama for at least 150 years.  The Panama Railroad 
had a legal monopoly on routes between the oceans, which was purchased by the Panama 
Canal at the beginning of the twentieth century.  The construction of the canal further 
troubled regional mobility by dividing the isthmus and flooding land routes.   
 
Transportation surfaces mediate relationships between people across space and 
time.  The word road – or carretera – does not capture the variety of land route classes 
that populate the campesino vocabulary in Panama.  Trocha (trail), corte (cut), carretera 
(paved road) each referring to a transportation surface, a width, a seasonality, and a 
community.  The social relationships around roads become visible over time through the 
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presence and absence of maintenance work.  For example, I asked Luis about the 
difference between a cut and a road.  He says that the difference is the groups of people 
involved in its maintenance.  The summer road (camino de verano) to Boqueron was 
opened up only once per year, when loggers from the outside came to the river valley to 
cut down forests.  Now there is a year-round gravel road, but people do not take it for 
granted.  They do political work to keep it up – pressuring their local representative 
(representante) – and, when the state does not maintain the road, the community raises 
money and creates work collectives to repair a broken bridge or impassable section.  The 
history of the road between Boqueron and the Transístmica throws light on how the canal 
system constrains local possibilities for mobility and also how people build worlds 
around its edges. 
 V.  FORESTS: MAKING NATURAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PANAMA 
CANAL WATERSHED 
 
When do plants become water management infrastructure?  Francisco Ramos, a 
forest guard with Panama’s national environmental agency (ANAM), answers that 
question on a daily basis.  When I walked into a regional ANAM office located in the 
upper Panama Canal watershed,
326
 Francisco – an athletic fifty-year-old in a khaki 
uniform with short black hair – was at his desk.  But he spends much of his time in the 
field.  He has inspected forest growth on farms in the Chagres National Park since its 
establishment in 1984.  On small farms within the park, he and other forest guards 
examine the secondary growth of grass, bushes, and young trees that rural Panamanians 
call rastrojo in order to determine when it becomes a forest under state protection.  The 
legal distinction between potential farmland and protected forest is five years of growth, 
so young rastrojo can be cleared and farmed, but older secondary forest cannot.
327
  
“Before, when there was no park,” Francisco said, “farmers were only required to get 
permission to cut and burn.  And it was easy to get.  There were no restrictions on the age 
of the rastrojo.  Now, they are only allowed to cut up to five years.”  I asked how he 
                                                        
326 In this chapter, I use the terms watershed and drainage basin interchangeably.  ‘Watershed’ entered 
English at the beginning of the nineteenth century from the German wasserscheide, or water-parting 
(Oxford English Dictionary 1989). The English usage of the term, like German, originally referred to the 
boundary line dividing drainage basins.   By the late-19th century, however, watershed increasingly 
referred to ‘the whole gathering ground of a river system,’ which is how it is used in this chapter.  The 
watershed is perhaps the key unit in contemporary environmental management and planning, but few in-
depth studies of the scientific and political history of the concept have been written. Older works drawing 
on relatively limited secondary sources include: Smith (1971), and Teclaff (1967). 
327 This distinction was legally established in Panama’s Forestry Law 13 of 1987.  The law prohibited 
cutting of all primary and secondary forest (i.e., rastrojo) more than five years old.  The law was 
implemented and enforced by INRENARE, the national environmental management agency that was the 
predecessor of ANAM.  Rastrojo is generally understood to be secondary growth anywhere between three 
and fifteen years after land is cleared.
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determines a rastrojo’s age.  He explains that, through experience, a guard can to learn to 
interpret the qualities of the plant – its form, its hardness – against the fertility of the soil.  
If the soil is poor, for example, it takes longer for rastrojo to recuperate.  The intimate 
ecological and social knowledge exemplified by forest inspections exemplifies the work 
of making natural infrastructure for the Panama Canal. 
* * *
 
The past decade has been marked by an infrastructural turn in environmental 
management and strategic land-use planning.  Multilateral institutions, state agencies, 
conservation organizations, and private firms have adopted the discourse and practice of 
building “natural,” or “green,” infrastructure.328  Even if the term natural infrastructure is 
not used explicitly, diverse actors now conceptualize particular landforms (forests, 
wetlands, reefs, and barrier islands, to name a few) in terms of the environmental services 
they provide.  But natural infrastructure is not simply nature “out there.”  Any technical 
system is arguably built upon a natural foundation.  Water supply systems, for example, 
harness gravity to move liquid.  However, in the words of its promoters, natural 
infrastructure must, like any infrastructure, be “built,” “made visible and functional,” 
                                                        
328 
The promoters of the natural infrastructure approach are diverse.  They include multilateral institutions 
(United Nations Environmental Program, European Commission of Environment), state agencies (US 
Environmental Protection Agency), conservation organizations (International Union for Conservation of 
Nature, Nature Conservancy), and private firms (Bank of Natural Capital, Booz Allen Hamilton 
Consulting).  What counts as green or natural infrastructure? Examples include soils and forests in 
watershed uplands, rivers, urban green spaces, floodplains, mangrove forests, reefs, and barrier islands 
(Benedict and McMahon 2006, Smith and Barchiesi 2009).  However, more significant than the landforms 
themselves are the environmental services that, through strategic planning and integration, they are 
understood to provide to human communities: water storage, purification, and conveyance; flood 
alleviation; improved air quality; outdoor recreation; and climate regulation. 
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“invested in,” or conceptualized as “part of a portfolio.”  In other words, making natural 
infrastructure takes work: calculation, representation, translation, and enclosure.  This 
political work involves forging new human-environment relationships and disrupting 
existing ones, yet ecological distribution conflicts
329
 are rarely discussed.  In this essay, I 
theorize the concept of natural infrastructure and analyze the practices and politics 
involved in reorganizing landforms to deliver environmental services.  I engage elements 
of two literatures, infrastructure studies and political ecology.  I develop my argument 
through a case study of the water management infrastructure of the Panama Canal, 
examining why, how, and to what effect a region was transformed from agricultural 
frontier to managed watershed. 
* * * 
Forest inspections in the Panama Canal watershed are not about forests, per se.  
Instead, they are bound up with a critical extra-local concern: the canal’s water supply.  
As we concluded the interview, I mentioned to Francisco that in some of the rural 
communities where he works, farmers told me that they bear the burden of environmental 
regulation in the park, while other groups – the government, shipping companies, and the 
Panama Canal Authority – benefit. 
 
The claim seemed to strike a nerve.  He rummaged around his desk, found a 
document, and read: “To preserve the natural forest for the production of water in quality 
and quantity sufficient for the normal functioning of the Panama Canal, as well as 
domestic, industrial, and hydroelectric uses in Panama City, Colon, and Chorrera.”  
 
                                                        
329
  Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997. 
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He finished reading and said, “The principal objective of this park is this – to 
produce water – it’s clear.  This has been a struggle for the people who have been 
restricted.  Every time we have a meeting and try to do something, they say: ‘We take 
care of the canal, but the canal doesn’t give us anything.’”   
 
“What do you say to them?,” I asked. 
 
“You can’t say that.  You aren’t seeing that you have a big television, you have an 
electrical plant, a new school.  All of these goods come from the canal.  You are 
waiting for them to come and say ‘take twenty dollars, it’s a product of the canal.’  
No.  The benefits of the canal that you’ll receive are goods and better education 
for your kids!”   
 
He paused and then continued: “But the people don’t want that, what they want to 
see is money every year.” 
 
 
Two images flickered in my mind as I drove back toward the small mountains 
where forests have, for thirty-five years, been managed to “produce” water for a canal 
downstream.  In one image, Francisco inspects a bright green hillside patch of rastrojo 
surrounded by rows of yuca plantings and speaks with a campesino in a straw hat.  In the 
other, a freighter as long as a skyscraper clears the Miraflores Locks and moves south 
into the dark blue water of the Pacific.   
* * * 
As I explain in Chapter 1, fifty-two million gallons of fresh water are released 
into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the passage of each of the thirty-five to 
forty-five ships that transit the Panama Canal daily.  In that chapter, I examine the 
configuration of technologies, institutions, human labor, and non-human nature 
assembled to consistently deliver the enormous volume of water that that floats ships 
through the canal.  In this chapter, I am concerned with the form and consequences of an 
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emerging form of regional water management.  This includes, of course, the “traditional” 
technologies – dams, locks, and hydrographic stations – built to manage water during the 
early-twentieth century.  These concrete and steel forms correspond with the popular 
conceptualization of infrastructure as technical system.  Over the past thirty-five years, 
however, a kind of natural infrastructural work – governing relationships between forests 
and their human inhabitants – has also come to be understood as critical to supplying the 
canal with water. 
 
My theoretical objective in this chapter is to develop natural infrastructure as a 
heuristic device for understanding the practices and politics of reorganizing landforms as 
support systems for large-scale political-economic projects.  It may seem peculiar to refer 
to soils and forests in terms normally reserved for electrical systems, railroads, and 
computing.  However, conceptualizing particular landforms as infrastructure – or built 
socio-technical support systems – is ever more appropriate as a wide range of 
contemporary actors scramble to define, manage, and profit from ecosystem services.  
There is a growing sense among politicians, economists, and others that nature is the 
ultimate infrastructure and should be managed as such.
330
  I argue that the conceptual 
tools developed in science and technology studies to study infrastructure can be 
combined with insights from political ecology to theorize the shift.  Natural 
infrastructure, like that made of concrete and steel, is embedded with politics.  The 
construction of infrastructural landforms entails the restriction of alternative forms of 
land use.  It both enables and disrupts other projects.  But building natural infrastructure 
also differs in significant ways from, say, roads.  The objects of new designs – in this 
                                                        
330
 See Edwards 2003: 196. 
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case, forests – are bound up in webs of affective and economic relationships that pre-exist 
their identification as matters of extra-local concern.  Natural infrastructure is built upon 
expert environmental knowledge, but its creation is irreducible to the top-down 
application of new technologies of visibility and valuation.  “Because infrastructure is 
big, layered, and complex,” Bowker and Star write, “and because it means different 
things locally, it is never changed from above.  Changes take time and negotiation, and 
adjustment with other aspects of the system involved.”331  In practice, making natural 
infrastructure requires translational work: navigating webs of interdependency, aligning 
incongruent definitions and boundaries, and negotiating responsibilities.
332
    
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter is organized in four sections.  First, I bring together literature from 
science and technology studies and political ecology to develop a framework for studying 
natural infrastructure.  Second, I summarize the assembly of a suite of “traditional” water 
management technologies during the early-twentieth century.
333
  Collectively, these civil 
engineering technologies transformed the volatile flows of the Chagres River system into 
a generally
334
 knowable and manageable water source for the canal.  Third, I examine the 
establishment of the Panama Canal watershed – a hydrologic basin drained by six major 
rivers flowing into the waterway – as an administrative region during the 1977-1999 
transfer of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone from the US to Panama.  Whereas canal 
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 Bowker and Star 1999, 35. 
332 
I mean translation as alliance-building in the classic actor network sense (Callon 1986, Callon and 
Latour 1981), although, in some cases implementing watershed management also involved translation in 
the linguistic sense.
 
333
 The history of the canal’s water management network is described in detail in Chapter 1 of the 
dissertation. 
334
 See chapter 1 and, in particular, the discussion of the flood of December 2010 as an exception. 
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administrators had previously emphasized the control of water in its liquid state, 
watershed management was an attempt to manipulate water flows by managing land 
cover and use in populated forests located more than twenty-five miles upstream from the 
shipping lane.  Finally, the chapter concludes with an empirical discussion of the politics 
of natural infrastructure.   
 
NATURE AND/AS INFRASTRUCTURE 
As I explain in the introduction to the dissertation, infrastructure is the collective 
term used to describe the subordinate parts of a “higher” system, often a society or an 
economy.  The term has generally been used to refer to physical support systems that 
facilitate the flow and distribution of people, materials, energy, and information.  
However, as use of the concept has proliferated in recent decades, it has increasingly 
been applied to both this “hardware” and “soft” social systems.335  Non-human life and 
landforms are a new frontier for thinking in terms of infrastructure.  For example, “green 
infrastructure” is a concept ascendant in North American planning and land conservation 
circles.  It has been defined as “an interconnected green space network…planned and 
managed for its resource values and for the associated benefits it confers to human 
populations.”336  This approach emerged in a historical and governmental context distinct 
from the processes and programs explored in this chapter.  While green infrastructure is 
couched in the neoliberal language of green finance, my research on the water 
management infrastructure of the Panama Canal focuses on state-led projects.  But, that 
said, my arguments about natural infrastructure are an attempt to theorize disparate 
                                                        
335
 See, e.g., about education (Twigg 1994), governance (Globerman and Shapiro 2002), computing (Foster 
and Kesselman, 2004), and public health (Baker et al. 2005). 
336
 Benedict and McMahon 2006. 
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efforts to reorder “natural” landforms as political-economic support systems through 
planning and management.  They might be modified to study projects that have emerged 
under different conditions. 
 
I argue throughout the dissertation that the infrastructure studies literature 
developed in science and technology studies can be combined with recent thinking in 
political ecology to make sense of contemporary environmental problems.  I call this 
framework the political ecology of infrastructure.  The specific problem that concerns me 
in this chapter is an emerging effort to remake landforms as technical support systems – 
or to build natural infrastructure.  The construction of any new infrastructure threatens to 
transform or eradicate existing ways of life.  Natural infrastructure is no different.  Its 
objects cannot be incorporated into new systems in isolation because are bound up in 
existing socio-ecological relationships.  This raises important questions around who is 
able to access and benefit from the non-human world.  In the case of provisioning the 
Panama Canal with water, the forests that became a matter of concern for watershed 
managers were – as I will show – already morally, economically, and ecologically bound 
up in rural agrarian life.  Thus, natural infrastructure is not simply identified, but made.  
 
ASSEMBLING THE PANAMA CANAL’S WATER MANAGEMENT NETWORK 
This chapter focuses on the new, socio-ecological forms of water management 
that emerged during the final decades of the century.  But neither the emerging 
experience of water scarcity in the late-1970s and early-1980s, nor the proposed solution 
– watershed management – can be explained without a basic understanding of the aging 
technical system that the new Panamanian administrators of the canal inherited from their 
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US predecessors at the time.  The suite of water management technologies that created a 
working Panama Canal during the early-twentieth century is described in detail in the 
first chapter, but I want to emphasize one critical point again here.  The 1906 decision by 
the United States government to build a lock – rather than sea-level – canal fixed the 
enormous volume of fresh water required for every transit and shaped the reorganization 
of the Chagres River system via dams and locks.
337
  Gatun Lake and Alhajuela Lake, 
large artificial reservoirs, were created to store water and control its flow through the 
canal system.  A century later, the water volume required per transit remains the same, 
but traffic has increased significantly, from five thousand ships in 1924 to over fourteen 
thousand today.
338
  Thus, infrastructure designed and built a century ago still shapes the 
management of the transit route and surrounding landscapes in significant ways. 
 
The initial assembly of the Panama Canal entailed two connected types of 
infrastructural work: civil engineering and human depopulation.  On the one hand, a 
region’s physical geography was reorganized over time according to the water demands 
imposed by the lock design, the climatic and hydrological specificities of Panama, and 
the increasing volume of traffic passing through the waterway.  As water flowed 
downstream, a network of water management technologies were built further and further 
upstream.  The major human story of the early-twentieth century was displacement and 
dispossession from the US Canal Zone.  Water management and governance were 
considered distinct issues and fell within the purview of different canal institutions.  The 
                                                        
337 
Most water flows out of the Canal system via the locks, but it also exits through the Gatun Dam spillway 
and hydroelectric turbine, through a system that diverts it for consumption in the terminus cities, and 
evaporation.
  
338
 Panama Canal Authority 2010, transit statistics, www.pancanal.com/eng/op/transit-stats/index.html 
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Panama Canal watershed was a geo-hydrological, not an administrative, region.  It was 
the concern of hydrologists and engineers.  This changed during the final decades of the 
century when water management was redesigned to incorporate nearby forests and extend 
responsibility for water provision to the campesinos that lived in and used them.   
 
MAKING THE PANAMA CANAL WATERSHED 
In the 1970s, a new water management problem circulated through offices and 
conference rooms in Panama and the US.  The canal had long been extolled as modern 
man’s ultimate triumph over nature.  But now it seemed that the tables had been turned.  
Foresters and hydrologists suggested that, without decisive action, the environmental 
degradation of the Panama Canal watershed would put the critical shipping route out of 
business.
339
  The problem was articulated most forcefully by tropical forester Dr. Frank 
Wadsworth at the 1978 US Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation, co-sponsored 
by the State Department and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  In a paper entitled “Deforestation: Death to the Panama Canal,” he argued that 
deforestation by shifting cultivators – campesinos – altered runoff from the watershed 
into the canal system, depositing sediment in the upper reservoir, and significantly 
reducing the available water supply.  Wadsworth described the anatomy of an emerging 
crisis: 
 
In May of 1977, the passage of an above average number of ships, an increased 
use of water for hydroelectric power and the domestic supplies of growing cities, 
and the production of timber, food, and forage crops within the Canal watershed 
led to a dramatic demonstration of the limits of the capability of the water system.  
                                                        
339
 The shift can be associated with a larger realignment of nature and culture in which technological 
advances were no longer understood to be progressively liberate humans from the constraints of the 
environment, but, in some cases, to bind us more closely to it.  See my discussion of environment, 
technology, and culture in the introduction. 
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The surface of Gatun Lake dropped to 3.1 feet below the level required for full 
Canal use.  Some ships sent part of their cargo across the isthmus by land, 
reloading it at the other coast, and certain bulk cargo shippers even abandoned the 
Canal, sending very large carriers around the Horn.  In 1977, this predicament 
coincided with a serious drought, and this was seen as a harbinger of what could 
soon take place every year.  Water consumed for power and domestic needs 
drains the lake.  Deforestation and cultivation in areas adjacent to the headwaters 
accentuate both flood losses through the spillway and low flow in the dry 
season.
340
  
 
My strategy for entering the tangle of engineering technology, environmental 
science, and geopolitics around the Panama Canal during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century is to retrace the work of Frank Wadsworth as he wove institutional alliances 
around Panamanian forests in his travels from Puerto Rico, to Panama, to Washington 
DC, and back to Panama.  These alliances connected the canal’s water management 
network with new people and places – as well as alternative institutional and scientific 
genealogies.  The problem, in his formulation, could not be fixed through established 
civil engineering approaches to water management.  Wadsworth thus rejected technical 
proposals to increase water storage capacity as stop-gap measures.  “Only forests,” he 
concluded, “can restore and stabilize the capacity of the canal.  Even if Madden Dam 
were raised, the five additional dams built, fresh water tunneled from elsewhere, and 
power and urban water consumption discontinued completely, the effect of continued 
deforestation would be inexorable.  Sooner or later it would mean death to the Canal as a 
reliable world trade route.”341  By invoking the specter of commercial death, Wadsworth 
assigned the canal a new kind of life.  He reframed the waterway as a socio-ecological 
system – a valuable and surprisingly fragile organism – countering the narrower 
perception of it as a man-made channel.  In his formulation, the heterogeneous character 
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 Wadsworth 1978, 23. 
341
 Wadsworth 1978, 23. 
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of the water supply problem – inextricably social, technical, and ecological – demanded 
an integrated solution: watershed management. 
 
Forest Hydrology, Institutional Politics, and Watershed Landscapes 
Watershed management would entail the conceptual and geographical expansion 
of the Panama Canal infrastructure to incorporate the region’s forests and the campesinos 
that inhabited them.  The forests of the upper watershed were considered the most critical 
for hydrological purposes.  “This area,” Wadsworth wrote, “provides about 40 percent of 
the water for the entire Canal watershed.  It is now being invaded by shifting 
cultivators.”342  Insomuch as a watershed is a “natural fact,” it is always defined against 
other ways of partitioning and managing the earth’s surface.  The artifice of the Panama 
Canal watershed resides in its objectification: the accretion of knowledge, technologies, 
and institutions around an existing drainage basin to make “it” act as desired.  Watershed 
landscapes became infrastructure through practice: the application of knowledge to 
establish a forest support system that would optimize canal water provision.   
 
Wadsworth’s arguments for watershed management in Panama were undergirded 
by twentieth-century science and older ideas about forest-water relationships that dated to 
antiquity in Europe.
343
  The study of the effects of natural vegetation on climate, water, 
and soil was studied under the name “forest influences” during the first half of the 
century and, at the suggestion of Joseph Kittredge, renamed as forest hydrology in 
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 Wadsworth 1928, 23. 
343 
Pliny the Elder may have been the first in Europe to write about the hydrological role of forests.  In 
Natural History, written in the first century, he observed the impact of deforestation on spring flow and 
rainfall (Andreassian 2004, 2). 
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1948.
344
  The field of forest hydrology sought to develop comparative data collection 
methods and analysis techniques to understand the relationship between land cover and 
hydrological processes – precipitation, streamflow, evapotranspiration, flooding, drought, 
erosion, and water quality – that had previously been understood through observation and 
historical anecdote.
345  
 James McCulloch and Mark Robinson identify three prominent 
historical myths about forest-water relationships: 1) forests “make” rain, 2) forests reduce 
floods and erosion, and 3) forests augment low/dry season flows.
346
  All three of these so-
called myths remain, to varying degrees, contentious and/or unresolved issues in 
contemporary forest hydrology.
347
 
 
The scientific verifiability of these so-called myths has not reduced their political 
utility.  They have shaped environmental and social policy for centuries.  Concerns about 
climate change, erosion, and flooding prompted the first localized prohibitions on forest 
clearing in sixteenth-century Europe.
348
  In 1860, France became the first state to 
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 Kittredge 1948. 
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For example, The American proto-conservationist and watershed management advocate George Perkins 
Marsh suggested in 1864 that “it is well established” that forests protect spring flows ([1864] 2003, 171) 
and his own “recollections.”  The first quantitative paired watershed experiments were conducted at Wagon 
Wheel Gap, Colorado during the 1920s (Bates 1928).
 
346
 McCulloch and Robinson 1993, 192. 
347 
First, there is no experimental evidence of increased rainfall following the conversion of bare or 
cultivated land into forest (Calder 2006, Hamilton and King 1983).  Second, the effects of forest cover on 
erosion remain inconclusive.  While natural forests seem to limit erosion, the effect appears to be site- and 
species-specific (Calder 2006, Kaimowitz 2004). Finally, there is no scientific consensus on the 
relationship between forests and low/dry season flows (Kaimowitz 2004, McCulloch 1993).  Forests 
improve water infiltration and replenish groundwater reserves, which should translate to greater water 
availability in the dry season.  However, a review of 94 paired watershed experiments found no evidence 
that the reduction of forest cover led to reductions in water yield, nor any in which increases in cover led to 
increases in yield (Bosch 1982, 16).  Which of these effects dominates seems to be largely contextual, 
depending on a combination of factors including rainfall regime, soil type, and land use.
 
348
 McCulloch and Robinson 1993, 193. 
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mandate watershed afforestation.
349
  In the twentieth century, foresters acquiesced to the 
political use of some questionable claims about hydrologic relationships because the 
rhetoric was used to protect forests.
350
  Lawrence Hamilton and Peter King have 
cautioned that, while well-intentioned, these claims may produce a backlash against 
foresters and conservation if watershed forests are protected, but flooding, droughts, and 
the silting of waterways continues.
351
  Natural resource access and distribution issues 
may also provoke backlashes.  For example, the French afforestation law of 1860 
impoverished a peasantry that had been dispossessed of traditional pasture and communal 
land-use rights, foreshadowing tensions around watershed management in late-20
th
 
century Panama. 
 
Wadsworth arrived in Panama not an impartial expert, but an embodiment of the 
institutional and scientific tradition of the US Forest Service.  His academic and 
professional training would have included a background in forest influences and forest 
hydrology.
352
  The Forest Service and Army Corps of Engineers struggled publicly over 
the efficacy of watershed forests as regulators of stream flow and flooding during the first 
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In an oral history interview conducted by Harold Steen (1993), Wadsworth discusses his professional 
career and philosophy on forestry and natural resource management. Although neither forest hydrology nor 
the ‘sponge effect’ are discussed specifically in his interview with Steen, the views expressed in 
Wadsworth’s ‘Deforestation – Death to the Panama Canal,’ resonate with common understandings of 
forest-water relationships in twentieth-century US forestry.  This is not surprising.  In his analysis of the 
forests and stream-flow controversy, Dodds writes, ‘This thesis, widely publicized in manuals of forestry, 
popular and technical conservation journals, and in the general press, was further disseminated by forestry 
organizations and sympathetic politicians skilled in advocating their views in the mass media’ (1969: 59).  
Wadsworth was a veteran tropical forester who began working at the Tropical Forest Experiment Station in 
Puerto Rico in 1942.  This was among the US Forest Service’s few tropical international outposts.  As a 
doctoral student at the University of Michigan and working forester, Wadsworth was trained in a tradition 
that emphasized integrated natural resource management.
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decades of the century.  Rhetorically, the controversy focused on which water 
management approach – technical vs. “natural” – would create orderly rivers, but this 
reflected an institutional struggle for the political clout and funding associated with 
managing water and land.
353
  Forestry, by comparison, occupied a marginal position on 
the isthmus.  The Panama Canal Company (which operated the canal itself) and, in many 
cases, the Canal Zone Government (which governed the enclave around the waterway), 
were administered by engineers and bound to the Army Corps.  The few North American 
foresters who had worked in the Republic of Panama were conducting scientific research 
or working as short-term consultants.  Their work had little obvious effect on 
environmental policy or management.
354
  There was no forestry training available in 
Panama
355
 and the few domestic foresters, Wadsworth later noted, were “not in the 
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Between 1908 and 1911 – also the peak years of Panama Canal construction – foresters and their allies 
framed watersheds as ‘natural’ political-administrative regions and harnessed anxiety about downstream 
flooding to garner support a proposed law called the Weeks Act that would authorize the federal 
government to purchase forested lands upstream in the watersheds of navigable rivers.  This brought them 
into conflict with the Army Corps of Engineers. Kittredge (1948) describes this as a “period of 
propaganda” by both forest protection advocates and their opponents.  Dodds (1969) shows how friction 
between American foresters and engineers centered on the efficacy of watershed forests as regulators of 
stream flow and flooding.  Gifford Pinchot, appointed first head of the Forest Service in 1905, emphasized 
the urgent need for regional plans for managing water in conjunction with other natural resources.   As no 
university of forestry existed in the US during the late-nineteenth century, Pinchot had been trained in 
France – where the forest-water relationship had an established scientific and political history (Kittredge 
1948).  He had also read George Perkins Marsh’s conservation landmark Man and Nature, and was 
reportedly influenced by the conclusions that the abuse of watersheds and natural resources precipitated the 
demise of previous civilizations (Glasser 2005, 255).  Framing watershed forests as ‘nature’s reservoirs,’ 
early-twentieth-century US foresters presciently reframed these landforms as vital support system for 
commerce.  They argued that deforestation increases flooding level and frequency, accelerates soil erosion, 
and alters precipitation, negatively impacting electrical generation, agriculture production, commerce, and 
natural beauty.  Forest cover was described as regulating volatile water flows through the ‘sponge effect’ – 
a controversial formulation at the time that remains so to this day (Andreassian 2004, Bruijnzeel 1990, 
Hamilton and King, 1983; Kaimowitz, 2004; McCulloch and Robinson 1993; Saberwal, 1997).  The Army 
Corps of Engineers publicly critiqued the arguments for basinwide water management, which threatened 
civil engineering’s hegemony over navigation and flood control (Dodds 1969).  In the strongest critique, 
Corps chief HM Chittenden criticized the empirical underpinnings of foresters’ claims, arguing that forest 
cover showed no quantitatively demonstrable effect on flow and might even accelerate watershed runoff 
(1909). Nevertheless, the Weeks Act passed in 1911 and the Forest Service ultimately managed 25.3 
million acres of federal forest reserves acquired under the law.
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loop.”356  I contrast the genealogies of forestry in the US and Panama to make the point 
that neither the science of forest hydrology nor the practice of managing watershed 
forests was politically significant on the isthmus before the 1970s.  This changed as new 
alliances were forged that linked the forests around the canal to global commerce and 
environmental conservation.  
 
Building Alliances around Watershed Forests 
Wadsworth’s formulation was not simply an act of representation, but of 
translation.  He spoke for the Panama Canal and to the US government.  By framing the 
watershed problem in a manner that militarily, economically, and morally bound the US 
to Panama and the future of the canal, he aligned the interests of his audience in 
Washington DC with the protection of stands of tropical forests thousands of miles away.  
The institutional actors that initially assembled around the watershed problem were not 
collectively concerned with shifting cultivators or forests, per se, but ensuring a 
consistent supply of water for ships to pass through the canal in the face of water scarcity 
concerns.
357
  The water shortage of 1977, Wadsworth wrote, “was seen as a harbinger of 
what could soon take place every year.”358  The objective of watershed management was 
thus the mitigation of meteorological and hydrological risk, a problem that introduced 
serious issues of tractability.  How – and where – do you manage an invisible 
environmental process that confounds human temporal and spatial scales?  
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The conservation of watershed forests became water management by proxy.  
Forest management meant that groups from disparate social worlds in and beyond 
Panama came into contact with one another.  Susan Leigh Star and James Greisemer 
developed the concept of “boundary objects” to explain how groups work cooperatively 
across socio-cultural difference.
359
  Ideally, boundary objects are abstract enough to adapt 
to diverse viewpoints and projects, but concrete enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites.  Recognizable and actionable in a way that weather and water were not, 
representations of Panamanian forests served as a locus for water management during a 
moment of rapid geopolitical change, facilitating the establishment of transnational 
alliances.  Boundary objects are essential for building natural infrastructure for systems 
like the Panama Canal that depend on cooperation across social worlds.  But, as I argue 
below, organizing around poorly defined “natural” objects may ultimately reveal 
problems of asymmetrical power relations around resource distribution. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s were not only a period of rapid geopolitical change on the 
isthmus, but a time when watershed management and forest conservation were ascendant 
topics in international academic and economic development communities.  Stanley 
Heckadon-Moreno, a Panamanian sociologist who played a key role in early watershed 
management efforts told me that the watershed concept arrived in the country via foreign 
institutions.  Reflecting on its ascendance, he recalled, “In Panama the word watershed – 
cuenca – didn’t exist.  People knew about the canal.  But when one spoke about a cuenca, 
nobody had the slightest idea what you were talking about…I think the word began to 
come into vogue in the seventies and definitely in the eighties, used by institutions like 
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CATIE [Center for Tropical Agronomy Research and Teaching] in Costa Rica…The 
concept of using the watershed as a [political] geographical unit – not a country, not a 
province, or a state or a corregimiento [county] – but a river.  That was new.”360  
 
Wadsworth’s translational work extended the reach of tentative efforts underway 
in Panama to manage the watershed.  He collected the material for his alarmist essay in 
1977 while consulting on the development of a USAID program designed to strengthen 
the technical and administrative capabilities of Panama’s historically insignificant and 
impoverished natural resource agency (RENARE).
361
   His argument was not based on 
original research.  USAID had previously funded the research of Dr. Clark Larson.  
Larson, an agricultural engineer, found that deforestation in the watershed for cultivation 
and pasture increased the sedimentation of the canal and reduced water storage 
capacity.
362
  Wadsworth later reflected on his arrival in Panama and the paper that 
emerged.  He said to an interviewer, “I saw a report by somebody before me, Larson I 
think…pointing out some of the critical watershed things about the area. I put it all 
together in a speech I made at the State Department in Washington.  I titled it 
‘Deforestation: Death to the Panama Canal.’ That received a great deal of notoriety, not 
only in the US but it was translated by Hekadon [sic.] in Panama into Spanish.  I think it 
led AID to spend more on the canal.”363  
 
                                                        
360 
Heckadon-Moreno, interview, 8 October 2009.  Transnational networks of environmental expertise are 
documented in the annual reports of Panama’s Ministry of Agriculture and natural resource agency 
(RENARE) throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  I also interviewed several Panamanians working at RENARE 
during this period who supported Heckadon-Moreno’s claims. 
361
 Wadsworth, 1978, 24. 
362
 Larson 1979. 
363
 Steen 1993, 68-71. 
 172 
Watershed Maps and the New Environmental History of the Panama Canal 
Actor network theorists have argued that documents circulate through material 
channels and matter to the extent that they establish connections between actors and 
sites.
364
  Panamanian forests traveled to new places via texts and maps.  Two forest cover 
maps – one from 1952 and the other from 1978 – supported Wadsworth’s speech in 
Washington, providing striking visual evidence of the rapid deforestation of the Panama 
Canal watershed.  The dwindling green forests depicted on the maps established a link 
between the specific water scarcity concerns of the canal and emerging global 
environmental concerns.  Representations of rural deforestation within the watershed 
linked specific environmental problems around the waterway and general problems of 
environmental degradation across the global tropics.  In the discussion that followed 
Wadsworth’s presentation, for example, audience members agreed that forest 
conservation was not – counter to previous orthodoxy – an impediment to economic 
development in the tropics, but necessary to its realization.  The discussion concluded: 
“because of the importance of the Panama Canal to world commerce, universal concern 
and action could result in saving the waterway, thus making the Canal a prototype for the 
application of necessary solutions.”365 
 
Even a cursory analysis of the reams of scientific and policy-oriented documents 
about the management of the canal watershed available today reveals a common 
environmental narrative.  When the canal was first reimagined as a techno-ecological 
system during the late-1970s, it had to be assigned an alternative genealogy.  In this 
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history, 1952 – the date of the first watershed map, rather than the 1914 opening of the 
waterway – became the baseline year.  “Originally covered with dense rain forest and still 
85 percent forested as recently as 1952,” Wadsworth said in his presentation, “some 
250,000 acres, or 35 percent, of the Canal watershed have since been deforested.”366  
Deforestation seems to begin in 1952 and, in many cases, is illustrated by the same crude 
map.  This map, made by a Panama Canal employee named Frank Robinson, has become 
the Panama Canal watershed’s ur-text.   Frank Robinson described the map to a US 
government interviewer in 1982.  “The green depicts more or less what is left forested, 
this orange area is the little boundary.  This is your watershed.  In the pink or reddish part 
is [sic] areas that has been cut over and the original forest gone.”367  
 
Robinson created the original watershed map in 1952, his first year as an 
employee of the Panama Canal Section of Meteorology and Hydrology.  He was a 
recently married veteran of the Second World War in his late-twenties.  His new job was 
to collect hydrographic data from stations that the Section managed across the watershed.  
Robinson was personally drawn to the forests of the upper watershed.  “When I first came 
to work here,” Robinson said, “I was a young knucklehead and I loved the bush.”368  He 
was not a cartographer and his work responsibilities did not include the creation of a 
forest cover map.  Forests were not the concern of the hydrologists employed by the 
canal.  The rivers and lakes of the watershed were under US jurisdiction, but all forests 
beyond the Canal Zone were under Panamanian control.  This is why Robinson chose to 
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isolate the watershed – half in Panama, half in the Canal Zone – from its political 
geography in 1952: “During the political days I would only put the watershed [in the 
map], because it was none of my business what was happening here [in Panama].”369  
The watershed on the map – the shape of a breaching whale – was an alternative 
geography.  It seems to elide geopolitics even as it testifies to their environmental 
importance.  Most of the watershed was forested, but red deforested areas clearly identify 
the Panamanian side of the boundary. 
 
In 1972, the Section of Meteorology and Hydrology hired Luis Alvarado, a young 
Panamanian hydrologist.  Alvarado was interested in the environmental changes that 
Robinson had been mapping for two decades around the stations where the Section 
collected hydrographic data.  Robinson became his mentor.  Alvarado explained to me 
during an interview at a coffee shop in Panama City
370
 how they made the forest cover 
maps in the 1970s: “It was done very crudely, simply visual observation out of 
helicopters when we were picking up [hydrological] data…when we were going in, you 
could see where new forest was being cut.  We’d fly with maps and then we’d pinpoint it.  
No GPS or anything.  You knew the river and you knew more or less where the area it 
was ‘that looks like ten hectares’ and you’d make a little circle: ten hectares.  Very crude 
but very effective, because over ten years you could see the difference in what was 
happening.” 
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The 1952 map became important in relationship to the watershed map that 
Robinson and Alvarado made in 1978.  In this map, deforestation (red) has relegated 
forest (green) to the roadless margins of the upper watershed.  These stark before and 
after images were picked up and used widely in the late-1970s and early-1980s as the 
Canal Zone – and, by extension, the entire watershed – was reverted to Panamanian 
control: by Wadsworth, in a USAID country profile, and, by 1982, by a student at the 
Florida State University branch in the Canal Zone.  Read against one another, the maps 
distill complex socio-ecological changes into a neat, two-frame declensionist narrative: 
forests had disappeared and would soon be completely gone.    
 
The maps arguably misrepresent the history and geography of the watershed.  It is 
easy to interpret the heavily forested baseline image (the 1952 map) as representative of 
historical land cover.  Beginning with this assumption, the arc of an environmental 
declensionist narrative (from primary forest to degraded land) appears linear and can be 
projected forward to justify political interventions in the present.  However, scholars tell 
us that such a reading of pre-1952 environmental history is inaccurate.  Forest cover in 
the transit zone follows a non-linear pattern, marked by periods of deforestation and 
reforestation prior to European contact.
371
  In fact, Charles Bennett argues that the period 
between the arrival of the Spanish and the beginning of the US canal project (1501-
1903), was “marked by the ecological retreat of man [indigenous people on the isthmus 
had altered landscapes through agriculture] and the reestablishment of forested or 
wooded conditions over much of the isthmus.”372  Geographically, the boundary lines of 
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the watershed isolate the region from its broader socio-political and ecological context.  
They delimit a space that had, in political and social terms, never existed.  My objective 
here is not to debunk Robinson’s maps, but to trace how they performed.  As a tool for 
interpretation and action, the boundary lines and the two simple fields of color made a 
difference.  By equipping would-be watershed managers in Panama and elsewhere to 
make claims and justify intervention, they would slowly begin to reshape the reality they 
represented. The Panamanian environmental agency, RENARE, requested Robinson’s 
watershed maps in 1976, so their cartography department could produce copies for 
watershed and forest management purposes.
373
  
 
RENARE had already begun to compile meteorological, hydrological, soil, and 
social data across the watershed for analysis and prospective management.
374
  Their 
initial efforts were not coordinated with work done in the Canal Zone before the 
inaugural Panama Canal watershed management program.  This program, funded 
between 1978 and 1983 by a $10 million USAID loan and $6.8 million Panamanian 
contribution, aimed to establish the basin as a cooperatively managed region.  The 
program also had localized objectives: to increase environmental awareness and 
“establish watershed management programs…that incorporate, to the extent possible, the 
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watershed's population into the resource management conservation process.”375  This 
phrasing – incorporation of the watershed’s population into the resource management 
conservation process – marks a significant shift in which groups of actors were 
ultimately assigned responsibility for the management of the canal water supply.  As 
forested landscapes were assigned a new infrastructural function (water provision), their 
inhabitants were simultaneously charged with a new responsibility (forest conservation).  
But this was easier said than done.  The region’s campesinos inhabited a world largely 
dissociated from the waterway and its transport economy.   
 
THE POLITICS OF NATURAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 “Emerging infrastructures,” Paul Edwards notes, “invariably create winners and 
losers.  If they are really infrastructures, they eventually make older ways of life 
extremely difficult to maintain.”376  The establishment of the Panama Canal watershed as 
an administrative region depended on campesinos accepting new responsibilities 
incompatible with those that the Panamanian state had historically assigned them: 
agricultural colonization and development. RENARE was a section of the Panamanian 
Ministry of Agriculture, an institution that had worked throughout the 1960s to 
modernize agriculture across Panama’s rural interior – including the upper watershed – 
through experiment stations, rural penetration roads, and agricultural extension.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture built the socio-technical infrastructure for the state “Conquest of 
the Jungle” program that promoted campesino colonization of forested frontier zones for 
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both economic development and political purposes.
377
  The topography of the upper 
watershed had historically made it unattractive for agricultural development.
378
  But the 
Panamanian state pursued regional agricultural development, nonetheless, opening a 
demonstration ranch in the 1950s to expand cattle production in “a region not commonly 
considered appropriate for these types of activities” and identifying it as a priority area 
for national development.
379
 
 
The focus on rural development was amplified significantly after 1968, when the 
Guardia Nacional, the first military government in Panamanian history, took power in a 
coup.  One of the Guardia’s public priorities was improving the condition of the 
peasantry.  They particularly emphasized rural land reform programs.  Latifundias (large 
estate farms) were expropriated and landless campesinos were encouraged to join 
agricultural cooperatives called asentamientos, often on this land.
380
  The Ministry of 
Agriculture’s annual reports from the late-1960s and early-1970s reflect this populist, 
agrarian reform fervor – “Production is revolution!  Exploit the land, not the man.”  
Government reports proudly tallied roads built, forests cleared, and new land planted.  
“The Guardia Nacional,” Heckadon-Moreno writes, “like other military regimes that 
came to power in tropical America during the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s, was keenly interested 
in securing the physical integration of the selva [forest] into the nation 
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state…colonization was a fast and cheap way of incorporating the forest into the 
development process.”381  
 
This approach changed rapidly within the watershed after the 1977 Treaty began 
the reversion of the canal and Canal Zone from the US to Panama.  The transition was to 
be complete before the year 2000.  The Panamanian state, which had framed watershed 
forests as blocking economic development during previous decades, now deemed them to 
be necessary to its achievement.  As an environmental support system – an infrastructure 
– they were valued in a new way.  The description under the heading “Beneficiaries” in a 
1981 USAID project evaluation is revealing:  “Although not specifically stated in the 
Project Paper the principle sub-purpose of the project is the protection of Panama Canal 
waterways and water storage systems. The Canal represents Panama's major industry and 
is at the heart of a complex system of support and service industries closely associated 
with the Canal. Consequently, the project benefits Panama's major industry and its work 
force which is increasingly made up of local inhabitants…In a larger context, natural 
resource protection and management benefits all Panamanians...
382
   
 
What was the “larger context” in which all Panamanians benefited?  Forests were 
understood to produce water, the lifeblood of the canal and its associated transport 
service economy.  But they could not be protected without hurting rural livelihoods.  
Agriculture employs approximately twenty-five percent of Panamanians, while the 
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transport sector employs a mere six percent.
383
  The Panamanian state re-scripted 
campesinos living in the watershed from development solution to development problem.  
 
Given the rapidity of this shift and obvious tensions between old and new state 
plans for the region, it proved difficult to convince rural people to curtail agricultural 
production to protect the Canal’s water supply – to convince campesinos that the forests 
they lived and worked in were not exclusively theirs, but part of a hydrological support 
system for shipping.  New watershed managers encountered, at every turn, a rural 
development infrastructure – roads, agricultural cooperatives, extension agents, 
agricultural loan programs – that encouraged the very land use practices they now 
considered economically and ecologically irresponsible.  The inertia of that socio-
technical system made it difficult to quickly change ingrained patterns.  This was because 
the development apparatus was designed to shape practice and cultivate modern, 
productive rural subjects.  Building natural infrastructure in the watershed thus entailed 
both navigating an entrenched system and the moral economy – or norms and customs 
concerning the legitimate roles of particular groups within the economy – that had 
accreted around it.
384
  Managers quickly recognized that the success of watershed 
management was contingent on enrolling translators
385
 able to align the diverging 
interests of state institutions and rural social worlds – in the idiom of the campo.  The 
next section focuses on this quotidian translational work.  Because there are few existing 
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written records on the subject, I draw largely on oral history interviews that I conducted 
in 2008 and 2009 with forest guards and campesinos in the watershed.  
 
The Translational Work of Watershed Management 
The political redefinition of populated forests located more than twenty-five miles 
upstream from the Panama Canal as a living support system for shipping highlights the 
complexities around allocating the burdens and benefits associated with natural 
infrastructure.  The infrastructural work needed to implement watershed management is 
very different from building a dam or a road.  In Panama, watershed management has 
entailed the slow, difficult work of forging and maintaining relationships with the rural 
people whose livelihoods are scripted as a threat to the canal.  This process, unlike 
engineering, is bottom-up.  It depends on the participation of new actors that had not 
previously participated in water management. 
 
Luis “Lucho” Alvarez remembers when he learned about the watershed.  We are 
sipping coffee on the porch of his grey, two-story cinder block house as he recalls that 
day nearly thirty-five years ago.  In 1958, he moved with his family from Panama City to 
the banks of Madden Lake.  Like many settlers arriving at that time, Lucho, still a 
teenager, dreamt of farming his own land.  He knew that he never wanted to work as an 
empleado, or wage-laborer.  One day in 1975 he was cutting back the rapidly growing 
brush – or rastrojo – on his farm near Madden Lake, when he received a note that 
Colonel Ruben Dario Paredes, the Minister of Agriculture, wanted to meet. 
 
“You’ve been recommended as a man who is not afraid of anything,” Paredes said 
to Lucho. 
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“We’d like to give you a job: we want you to keep the hand of the campesino 
from destroying the watershed.’  
 
“What is the watershed?” Lucho asked.  He had never heard the term.   
 
“The watershed is all of this area that drains into Alhajuela Lake,” explained 
Paredes.  “I’d like to do it,” Lucho said, “but I have to talk with my wife, my first 
child is on the way.” 
 
Paredes offered a starting salary of fifty dollars every two weeks.  “I’m not going 
to abandon my land for fifty dollars, Colonel,” countered Lucho.  ”I’ve got an old 
mother, an old father, a brother – we can’t live off of that much money.  I’m my 
father’s right hand.” 
 
Paredes increased the offer to include a free education in natural resource 
management.  Lucho had no particular interest in natural resources at the time, but he 
wanted an education, so he accepted.  He had, in actor network terms, been enrolled in 
watershed management.
386
  Paredes mobilized the promise of career opportunity and 
education to convince Lucho to put down the machete, leave his farm, and assume the 
role of forest guard.  RENARE initially recruited and trained forty-six forest guards to 
patrol the watershed.
387
  They were, like Lucho, mostly local men who had been 
identified by officials as leaders respected in their rural communities.  This was a 
strategic decision; it was hoped that hiring guards familiar with the area and its people 
would facilitate cooperation with watershed management.  
 
The forest guards’ initial project was to survey the human population living 
within the contours of the watershed.  Unlike the US surveyors that collected geophysical 
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data on the watershed in the early-twentieth century, the guards spent three years (1975-
1978) collecting information about the region’s human inhabitants.  Survey data, 
combined with national census data, provided a demographic baseline for the watershed, 
assigning – for the first time – a human population to the administrative region.388  Forest 
guards anticipated a pushback to land use restrictions in rural communities.  Wadsworth, 
who returned to Panama in 1979 to assist with the USAID-funded training of the initial 
group of forest guards, recalled “They wanted to know what they should do if the mayor 
of their district was telling people to move in and farm there or if they found him there 
with a shotgun, what were their rights and so on.”389  A training later that year focused on 
the translational aspects of watershed management or, as the course certifications read, 
“methodologies for incorporating the campesino in programs of development, 
conservation, and administration of Panama’s natural resources.” 
 
Forest guards were then charged with traversing the watershed and translating 
extra-local concerns about forests, water, and the canal to its new inhabitants, the 
“shifting cultivators” that Wadsworth had identified as a threat to the trade route.  The 
enrollment of campesinos in watershed management was physically demanding for 
guards.  Ironically, the very physical attributes – steep topography, heavy rainfall, dense 
forest, and a lack of roads – that historically made the upper watershed unattractive for 
agricultural development now frustrated watershed managers’ efforts to restrict farming.  
Forest guards complained that the watershed was too large and too difficult to access to 
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be effectively patrolled by their small number.
390
  The problems presented by watershed 
management were geographical, but they were also – perhaps less obviously – cultural. 
 
In practice, watershed management raised questions and issues around the 
definition of forests.  The forests depicted on Frank Robinson’s watershed maps existed 
in only two states: present (green) or absent (red).  When actors made the case for forest 
conservation in urban settings, the referent – areas covered with trees – was clear enough.  
In fact, the vague definition of the “forest” around the Panama Canal likely facilitated 
alliances around watershed management.  They were an ideal type, a boundary object that 
“does not accurately describe the details of any one locality or thing…However, it is 
adaptable to a local site precisely because it is fairly vague; it serves as a means of 
communicating and cooperating symbolically -a 'good enough' road map for all parties.  
An example of an ideal type is the species.  This is a concept which in fact described no 
specimen, which incorporated both concrete and theoretical data and which served as a 
means of communicating across both worlds…They result in the deletion of local 
contingencies from the common object and have the advantage of adaptability.”391  
 
Before 1984, when upper watershed lands – about thirty percent of the basin area 
– were enclosed within Chagres National Park, campesinos were legally permitted to cut 
secondary forest for agriculture with written permission.
392
  Watershed management 
efforts focused primarily on reforestation with exotic tree species – teak, pine, and others 
                                                        
390
 Pinzon and Esturain 1986, 213-214. 
391
 Star and Greisemer 1989, 410. 
392 Chagres National Park was declared through the Panamanian government’s Decreto Ejecutivo 73 de 2 
de Octubre and legally established in 1985 with the publication of the Gaceta Oficial 20.238.
   
 185 
– distributed through a network of RENARE nurseries.  Because forest guards at that 
time were local men who understood campesino agricultural systems and maintained 
personal relationships, agriculturalists were often able to effectively communicate their 
livelihood concerns to the extension agents of watershed management. Forest definitions 
were, at that time, negotiable in a mutually acceptable manner and guards gave out 
licenses easily to cut and burn secondary forest.  In 1987, with the passage of Forest Law 
13, watershed management took a coercive turn.  Guards, now accompanied by soldiers 
from Manuel Antonio Noriega’s Fuerzas de Defensa (Defense Forces), explained that 
rastrojo of five years was legally considered forest and could never again be cleared.  
Violators were fined and had their machetes and hatchets confiscated.  Some were taken 
to jail, provoking outrage in rural communities.   “In essence,” Stanley Heckadon-
Moreno concluded, “the government decided that, in order to save the Canal, the forests 
had to be protected from the machetes of the farmers.”393 
 
This is where the previously negotiable boundaries of watershed forests broke 
down.  In everyday encounters between forest guards and campesinos, local 
contingencies could not be deleted from forests.  Wet lowland forests are not a stable 
object, but a heterogeneous process.   Once primary forests were cut down – and many 
had been – the distinction between forest and farm became blurred.  Secondary forest 
serves as fallow in the swidden agricultural system practiced by campesinos across much 
of rural Panama.  Within this system, there are three general land cover categories: monte 
(land in cultivation), rastrojo (secondary growth from three to fifteen years, considered 
fallow for future planting), and montaña (primary forest).  My semi-structured interviews 
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suggest that even these broad categories differ from one farmer to the next.  Rastrojo, as I 
suggested in the introduction to this chapter, was the problematic category, encompassing 
land covers that range from low brush to what temperate zone visitors may identify as 
forest.  Forest Law 13 imposed a seemingly arbitrary legal distinction – five years – on 
the processual, messy nature of human-environment interactions around the canal.  
 
Farmers were unhappy with the decision, not only due to aggressive enforcement, but 
because it changed their fallow practices for the worse.  In interviews, farmers told me 
that the more mature the rastrojo is when cleared, the better nutrients provided to the next 
crop on that land.  Consequently, campesinos weigh the maturity of a rastrojo against the 
need to put land back into production quickly.  Only in desperate circumstances would a 
farmer clear a rastrojo less than five years old.  But reduced fallow cycles was precisely 
what forest laws demanded.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The infrastructural work that went into making the Panama Canal watershed is 
inscribed on the contemporary landscape.  There are, on the one hand, markers of a 
stabilized administrative region.  The coercive forest protection tactics of the 1980s – the 
Noriega era – have been replaced by community-based sustainable development projects 
like reforestation with native trees, sustainable ranching, and beekeeping.  Signs 
promoting these projects are posted along the edges of the gravel road that runs eastward 
up the watershed and into Chagres National Park.  A disproportionate number of the 
autos within the park are the late-model pickups of conservation and development 
professionals.  Yet, despite changes in approach, familiar questions of justice persist in 
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the region.  If the history of Panama Canal watershed is legible to local people in 
presences, like development projects, it is also recognizable through absences on the 
landscape.  During my fieldwork, people recalled neighbors who migrated elsewhere to 
farm without restriction.  They remembered the rise and fall of the local agricultural 
cooperative (asentamiento) that attracted landless farmers from far away to settle what 
seemed to be an open frontier.  They pointed to the infrastructure that arrives slowly, if at 
all.  For example, the community where I worked is within forty miles of the canal and 
Panama's largest cities – Panama City and Colon – but electricity arrived for the first time 
last year, decades after the rest of the region.  The road is often impassable during the 
rainy season.  In this way, infrastructure renders the logics of distribution embedded in 
these arrangements visible and raises important questions about the complex relationships 
between environmental and social responsibility. 
 
In this chapter, I have examined a regional infrastructure assembled to make 
water circulate through the canal in a manner that meets the transportation needs of 
global commerce.  By bringing infrastructure to the surface, I have sought to ground 
large-scale political-economic processes (global commerce) in the local-regional 
practices (water management) that make them possible.  Infrastructure is conceptually 
and geographically unstable.  The parameters of critical infrastructure are always 
changing as the articulation of new knowledge and circumstances redefines “critical.”394  
My theoretical objective in this chapter has been to flag and analyze one shift in 
particular.  Drawing on political ecology and what has been called infrastructure studies, 
I have argued that there is a global push to reimagine and reorder “natural” landforms as 
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support systems for larger projects.  Like roads and dams, natural infrastructure is 
necessarily political.  Its organization reflects assumptions about how societies are (or 
should be) organized and its construction actively produces new social arrangements.  In 
the case of provisioning the Panama Canal with water, the objects of new infrastructural 
designs – forests – were economically, ecologically, and morally bound up with a 
development infrastructure that encouraged rural people to act, think, and feel in ways 
that were opposed to the goals of watershed management.   
 
Despite the current obsession with environmental visualization and valuation, 
building a working and equitable natural infrastructure ultimately depends translational 
work.  It is about aligning incongruent boundaries, negotiating responsibilities, and 
allocating responsibilities and benefits.  This is a challenging prospect.  Over the past 
thirty-five years, Panamanian campesinos have been repeatedly assigned responsibility 
for canal water, a claim they now deploy in encounters with watershed managers.  
Because they “care for water” – now recognized as a commodity – by protecting forests, 
they argue that they should be compensated.  They are not working, they argue, so the 
canal can.  This framing calls us to consider how infrastructure, both technical and 
natural, might be designed and managed in such a way that large technical systems like 
the canal do more work for their neighbor
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In The World Without Us, Alan Weisman describes how quickly the built, human 
world that we often take for granted could fall apart.  Without the constant behind-the-
scenes work of a multitude of engineers, administrators, and laborers, he explains, the 
Panama Canal’s water storage reservoirs would empty as the metal gates that currently 
contain them rust and fail.  The Chagres River would emerge from the canal and follow 
its former channel north to the Atlantic Ocean.  Sediment would clog un-dredged 
channels.  As the Pacific section of the route – where most of the canal excavation took 
place a century ago – dried up, North and South America would be united once again.395 
 
I introduced the dissertation with a critique of the popular notion of the Panama 
Canal as a “big ditch”: a project completed once and for all in 1914.  In the case of the 
canal, the political ecology of infrastructure approach that I framed in the introduction 
redirects our attention from the global transportation operations that normally capture our 
attention – the smooth flow of passing ships – to the situated human, technological, and 
environmental organizational work that makes transportation possible.  By bringing the 
backstage elements of transportation to the surface, I have portrayed the canal as an 
always-unfinished project that functions and endures only through constant maintenance.  
However, for the people employed through, or affected by, the extensive system that 
facilitates transportation across Panama, the “backstage” of global shipping is the fabric
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of everyday life.   Canal infrastructure sprawls across the landscapes and livelihoods of 
the region around the shipping lane.  But even this characterization is too neat, because it 
leaves the boundaries between technology, nature, and culture intact.  
  
The canal is a work-in-progress.  My use of the word “work” is purposeful 
because there would be no trade route without the collective work of people, engineering 
technologies, and the Chagres River.  Historian Richard White, like Weisman, underlines 
the significance of work in his history of the remaking of Washington state’s Columbia 
River as an “organic machine”: an entity in flux where, over time, work renders the 
boundaries between the natural and the human, as well as the material and the social, 
difficult to distinguish.
396
  The agency of the river – widening, eroding, and removing 
obstacles to its flow in search of an efficient path to the sea – shapes, but does not 
determine, human decisions about where, for example, to build a dam or establish a 
community.  White writes, “The energy system of the Columbia determined where 
humans would portage, but human labor created the actual route of the portage and 
human social relations determined its final social form and outcome.” 397  The river 
shaped human thought and action and, in turn, humans used their technologies to 
organize a new river.  Today, human relationships with Washington’s Columbia River or 
Panama’s Chagres River cannot be encounters with pristine nature, but with a built 
environment where the cultures and politics of the past – materially embedded in the 
designs of our infrastructures – articulate with rainfall, snowmelt, and earthquakes, and 
then act back upon us.   
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The work of a river, regardless of its agency, is clearly distinct from human labor, 
which is socially organized and ascribed meaning.  During the construction of the 
Panama Canal, for example, most white North Americans (gold-roll employees) held 
engineering, administration, supervision, and equipment operation jobs, while most black 
West Indians and Spanish-speaking peoples (silver-roll employees) were low-level 
laborers.  Cultural distinctions were reflected by the differential location of workers’ 
bodies within the organic machine of the canal and the purposeful organization of a 
segregated human and physical geography “designed to remove white American residents 
from an array of ‘Others’, specifically an ‘Other’ natural landscape (the Panamanian 
‘jungle’), an ‘Other’ cultural landscape (Panamanian cities), and an ‘Other’ people (the 
West Indian Panama Canal labour force and Spanish-speaking Panamanians.”398  In other 
words, taxonomies of race, language, and culture shaped governmental decisions about 
“appropriate” environments for particular human settlements and land use therein.   
 
We do not typically think of transportation in environmental terms.  
Environmental anthropology research has largely focused on ecologies of extraction, 
production, and consumption.  These critical issues should and will continue to attract 
attention.  What I am arguing against is the notion that transit zones – those in-between 
landscapes along train tracks, roads, and waterways – are somehow non-places399: 
uniform sites without history, social life, or ecological significance.  After all, 
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transportation infrastructure is local at all points.
400
  It is always situated somewhere, 
even if circulating ships, trains, and trucks are not.  On the one hand, this means that the 
environmental impacts of transportation services are distributed unevenly across space.
401
  
On the other hand, the standardized nature of transportation systems demands the 
organization and maintenance of specific configurations of technologies, human 
populations, and nature.   
 
My dissertation examines this infrastructural reorganization and the natural 
resource access/distribution conflicts that have resulted in Panama.  Transportation 
projects rework landscapes and, in so doing, may disrupt the livelihoods of those that 
depend on those environments for other purposes.  They also establish new connections.  
Infrastructures are networked, formatting political-ecological relationships among actors 
that may be distant in time and space.  For example, the Panama Canal’s water 
management infrastructure – especially the water supply demands imposed by the lock 
design – linked the agricultural livelihoods of small farmers in the surrounding watershed 
during the 1980s with both the US experts and politicians that made engineering 
decisions in 1906 and the contemporary global network of consumers, producers, and 
shippers dependent on the canal.  In this way, infrastructure moves us beyond 
conceptualizing a technology as mediating one group’s relationship with one 
environment, and toward an understanding of how multiple ecologies and social groups 
come into communication.   
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I have developed several claims around this argument in the dissertation.  First, 
infrastructure is a tool for understanding the constitution of relational space.  Large 
technical systems are generally designed and built in a top-down manner, but, over time, 
they intermingle with the human and non-human communities that accrete around them.  
Through a multiplicity of small interactions, they slowly become different things.  It is 
the combination of a traceable materiality and an emergent quality – the system changes 
from below, yet exceeds individuals’ capacity to know and act – that makes infrastructure 
such a potentially powerful heuristic tool for political ecology research.  Second, 
infrastructures are political: their creation and expansion inevitably threatens existing 
ways of life, creating winners and losers.  In this way, the assumptions and biases of 
system-builders persist long after those people are gone.  Because they are such robust 
sites of quotidian politics, infrastructures are a rich ethnographic subject.  For example, I 
found that many people living in rural communities around the Panama Canal interpreted 
their changing connections with – and access to – other places and groups through the 
absence, presence, and maintenance of infrastructure – providing extra-local analyses 
akin to the reverse anthropology described by Stuart Kirsch.
402
  Third, building upon the 
previous point, we should conceptualize infrastructures not simply as means of 
connection and communication (crossing boundaries) but sites of convergence, attraction, 
translation, and negotiation – as boundaries themselves.  They are sites of collaboration, 
contestation, and negotiation, where different systems come into contact.  If we approach 
political ecology in terms of boundary infrastructures, we see that power often operates in 
a heterarchical fashion.  The “global” does not simply act upon the “local,” but depends 
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on the organization of technologies, landscapes, and people at multiple sites to come into 
existence.  The region around the Panama Canal is one site where globalization is made.  
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